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
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

Cr. No. 80-200

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EDWIN P. WILSON, et al.

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FILED BY DEFENDANT EDWIN P. WILSON ON AUGUST 6, 1982

STANLEY S. HARRIS United States Attorney

E. LAWRENCE BARCELLA, JR. Assistant United States Attorney

CAROL E. BRUCE Assistant United States Attorney

RICHARD C. OTTO Assistant United States Attorney

Washington, D. C.

September 8, 1982

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INTRODUCTION

Comes now the United States, by and through its attorney, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and respectfully responds to the myriad of motions filed by the defendant in the above-captioned case.

On April 23, 1980, the defendant was indicted by a , federal grand jury on a multi-count indictment charging him with a variety of offenses arising out of his activities in and on behalf of the government of Libya. On August 6, 1981, a superseding indictment was returned by a federal grand jury, charging the defendant in ten of eleven counts with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (18 U.S.C. §951); conspiracy to transport explosives in foreign commerce with the intent to use unlawfully, to violate the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and to unlawfully transport hazardous materials in foreign commerce (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371); six substantive offenses arising out of the transportation and exportation of those hazardous materials in violation of 22 U.S.C. \$2778(c), 49 U.S.C. \$1809(b) and 18 U.S.C. §844(d)), as well as with solicitation and conspiracy to commit murder (in violation of 22 D.C. Code §§2401, 105, 105(a), 107 and 49 D.C. Code §301). A bench warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued on August 7, 1981. On June 15, 1982, the defendant was arrested by the United States Marshal's Service at the John F. Kennedy Airport in New York.

On August 6, 1982, the defendant filed approximately three dozen motions, demands and requests. In general upon a review of his various pleadings, we are reminded of the recent pronouncement of the Fourth Circuit in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Computer Sciences Corporation</u>, et al. Cr. No. 81-5053 4th Cir. cited June 16, 1982 at page 3 of the slip opinion:

Rescureeful lawyers representing criminal defendants often desire to be thorough and to overlook nothing in their commendable zeal to afford first-class representation. Consequently in many cases they tend to excess as they innundate us with a plethora of arguments, some good and some not so good. Sometimes one wonders whether such lack of selectivity is not counterproductive, for a party raising a point of little merit exposes himself to the risk of excessive discount for a better point because of the company it keeps.

In spite of this approach by the defendant, we have attempted to respond to the general and often vague motions of the defendant with as much specificity as possible. At such time as the defendant makes a more particularized argument, we will respond, if necessary, appropriately.

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*The Court will note that we do not respond to defendant's pleadings in precisely the same order as he presented the issues. We feel our order is more logical.

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I. THE FUGITIVE RECOVERY WAS ENTIRELY PROPER AND DOES NOT EVEN NECESSITATE A HEARING

A. Legal Foundation

The defendant challenges the jurisidiction of this court, claiming that the manner in which he came back into the United States, following two and one half years of fugitivity, was illegal. From his perspective, it is unfortunate that he must attempt to challenge one of the most long-standing and well-settled tenets of American jurisprudence. The law in the United States is, and for nearly one hundred years has been, that the court shall not inquire into the manner in which a defendant was brought before it. This doctrine, known as the Ker-Frisbie rule, emanates from two Supreme Court opinions. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Since the inception of the rule, both the Supreme Court and virtually every Federal Circuit Court that has addressed the issue, no matter the factual context, has upheld the vitality of the doctrine. Since the facts of this case are virtually irrelevant to the resolution of the issue, we will deal with them shortly, initially outlining the concrete rule that defendant now challenges.

In <u>Ker v. Illinois</u>, <u>supra</u>, the defendant, Frederick Ker, was indicted in Illinois but, before the process of the court could be served upon him, fled to Lima, Peru. A warrant of extradition was signed by the governor of Illinois and an individual was dispatched to Peru to execute that warrant. Upon arriving in Peru, however, the agent did not present his warrant of extradition to Peruvian authorities. Rather, he caused Ker to be abducted and placed on a boat which, after circuitous passage, eventually ended up in San Francisco, California. Ker was then sent, at the request of the governor of Illinois, back to his ultimate trial and conviction in

Chicago. The Court held that despite the United States' having a valid extradition treaty with Peru, the fact that that treaty was circumvented did not in any way vitiate Ker's conviction. Further, the court stated that the defendant's kidnapping in a foreign country and forcible removal to the jurisdiction to where he was tried provided him with no relief. Over half a century later, in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952) the defendant complained that he was living in Chicago, Illinois when officers from the state of Michigan "forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and took him to Michigan." Id at 520. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court stated

this Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois 119 U. S. 436, 444, that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisidiction by reason of a "forcible abduction." No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will. Id at 522. (Footnote omitted.)

Since this decision, we have found no case in which the conviction of a defendant was ultimately discarded or where the court voluntarily divested itself of jurisdiction as the result of a challenge based on the manner in which the defendant was brought to court. In fact, in only one case, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2nd Cir. 1974) has a court even questioned the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Since then, as we will show, not only has the Supreme Court twice

:..**.**

strongly reaffirmed that the <u>Ker-Frisbie</u> doctrine, and not only has no Circuit followed the Second Circuit's <u>Toscanino</u> ruling, but the Second Circuit itself has substantially retreated from its pronouncements.

In Toscanino, the defendant claimed that he was lured to a deserted bowling alley in the city of Montevideo, Uruguay with his seven-months pregnant wife where he was knocked unconscious and abducted by seven armed driven to the Uruguayan-Brazilian border. There, arrangement and with the connivance of the United States government, he was met by a group of Brazilians and subsequently held incommunicado for seventeen days during which he was continually tortured and interrogated. He also alleged that federal drug agents participated in the interrogation and torture and that the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York was aware of what was going on. The court went on the state the facts as follows:

> [Toscanino's] captors denied him sleep and all forms of nourishment for days at a time. Nourishment was provided intravenously in a manner precisely equal to an amount necessary to keep him alive. Reminiscent of the horror stories told by our military men who returned from Korea and China, Toscanino was forced to walk up and down a hallway for seven or eight hours at a time. When he could no longer stand he was kicked and beaten but all in a manner contrived to When he would punish without scarring. not answer, his fingers were pinched with metal pliers. Alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids ...were forced up his anal passage. credibly, these agents of the United States government attached electrodes to Toscanino's earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, rendering him unconscious for indeterminate periods of time but again leaving no physical scars.

الله أشأه ما ما الدين من الدين الله مع مواجعها كالعال مومان الواجهها المحمد الما المواجعة المحمد الما المواجعة معالمها العالم بالمواجعة الما المعالم الما المحمد الما المواجعة الما المواجعة الما المواجعة الما الما المواجعة

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Finally, on or about January 25, 1973, Toscanino was brought to Rio de Janeiro where he was drugged by Brazilian-American agents and placed on Pan American Airways flight number 202 destined for the waiting arms of the United States government. On or about January 26, 1973, he awoke in the United States, was arrested on the aircraft and was brought immediately to Thomas Puccio, Assistant United States Attorney.

At no time during the government's seizure of Toscanino did it ever attempt to accomplish its goal through any lawful channel whatever. From start to finish the government unlawfully, willingly and deliberately embarked on a brazenly criminal scheme violating the laws of three separate countries. <u>Id</u>. at 270.

The United States neither affirmed nor denied these allegations and the trial court without holding a hearing refused to vacate the verdict. Faced with those facts, a panel of the Second Circuit determined that there had been some erosion of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine over the years and that, in this case alleging corruption, bribery, kidnapping, violence, brutality, deliberate misconduct, constitutional violations and international law violations, that due process would require "a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant where it has been acquired as a result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights." Less than a year later, the Second Circuit was again faced with a claim of abduction in United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 95 There, the defendant was lured from his s. Ct. 2400 (1975). Argentine sanctuary to fly an individual to Bolivia. Once in Bolivia he was taken into custody, held incommunicado for

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five days and expelled to the United States. The trial judge dismissed Lujan's petition without a hearing. The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the case, stated that while

Ker and Frisbie no longer provide a carte blanche to government agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States by the use of torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct, we did not intend to suggest that any irregularity in the circumstances of a defedant's arrival in the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court. Id. at 65 [emphasis added.].

The court found that there were no allegations of torture, terror or interrogation, no violations of international law, and, in fact, no substantially different treatment accorded to the defendant than would have been the case in a normal extradition. The court stated that "...absent a set of incidents like that in <u>Toscanino</u>, not every violation by prosecution or police is so egregious that <u>Rochin v. California</u>, 342 U. S. 165 (1952)] and its progeny requires nullification of the indictment." <u>Id</u>. at 66.

In his concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Anderson, a member of the <u>Toscanino</u> panel, explained the Circuit's position:

After Toscanino was decided, however, a motion was made for a hearing in banc. A majority of the active members of the court voted to deny the petition for a hearing in banc. Three judges dissented. In so doing the majority obviously interpreted the decision in Toscanino as resting solely and exclusively on the use of torture and other cruel and infuman treatment of Toscanino in effecting his kidnapping and it rejected the proposition that a kidnapping of a foreign national from his own or another nation and his forcible delivery into the United States against his will, but without torture, would itself violate due process. This interpretation of Toscanino has become the law of this Circuit. It has been similarly construed by another Circuit, United States v. Herrera 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974).

I, therefore, concur in the opinion in the present case. Judge Kaufman has correctly, it seems to me, noted and applied the thrust of the action of the majority of this court in denying an in banc hearing in Toscanino, to the effect that whenever a foreign national is abducted or kidnapped from outside the United States and is forcibly brought into this country by United States agents by means of torture, brutality or similar physical abuse, the federal court acquires no jurisdiction over him because of a violation of due process. Otherwise the holdings of the Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois, and Frisbie v. Collins, govern. Id. at 69 [citations omitted] [emphasis added]

A few months later, the Second Circuit withdrew even farther from its Toscanino opinion in United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1975). There, the defendant alleged arrest by Chilean police officers who blindfolded, tortured and interrogated the defendant at various locations for nearly a month before he was turned over to United States agents and expelled to the United States. The court in Lira found that "essential to a holding that Toscanino applies is a finding that the gross mistreatment leading to the forcible abduction of the defendant was perpetrated by representatives of the United States government." Id. at 70. The court went on the say that even where allegations of torture could be substantiated, if such torture were at the hands of foreign police, not acting as agents of the United States, the United States would not be vicariously responsible and the jurisdiction of the court could not be challenged. Id. at

Most recently, in <u>United States v. Reed</u>, 639 F.2d 896 (2nd Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit maintained its distance from <u>Toscanino</u> in a case where the defendant alleged that C.I.A. agents deceitfully entited him onto a private airplane in Bimini, allegedly bound for Nassau, then flew him

to Florida. Reed alleged the agents made him lie on the floor at gunpoint and threatened to blow his brains out. The court found no violation of due process by the use of false pretenses, a revolver and threatening language. <u>Id</u>. at 902.

In addition to the Second Circuit's own retreat from Toscanino, the Supreme Court has twice since that decision reaffirmed the strength of its century-old position. See United States v. Crews, 445 U. S. 461, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975). In both of these cases, the Supreme Court held that even when the initial arrest of a defendant was illegal, this would not be viewed as a bar to a subsequent prosecution nor a defense to a valid conviction.

Additionally, every federal circuit that has addressed this issue in the past decade has either rejected Toscanino or reject similar arguments. See, e.g. United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 987 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U. S. 825 (1976); United States v. Herrera, supra; United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 747-49 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 411 U. S. 936; Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964); see also Davis v. Mullar, 643 F.2d 521, 529 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Humphries, 636 F.2d 1172 1180 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Humphries, 636 F.2d 283, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1976); and United States v. Scios, 191 U.S. App. D.C. 254, 259-60 n.13, 590 F.2d 956, 961-62 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

As the court can clearly see, even taking the facts as presented by the defendant, he would have no right to a hearing on jurisdiction, let alone a viable challenge to the court's jurisdiction. Because a number of the facts presented

in the defendant's motion are in error, however, the court may find it helpful to have them set out in accurate fashion. Unlike <u>Toscanino</u>, distinguishable as it is, the United States did "...attempt to accomplish its goals through [every] lawful channel..." United States v. <u>Toscanino</u>, <u>supra</u> at 270.

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B. Factual Foundation

The defendant was last known to be in the United States in late 1979. In response to the intensified grand jury effort then being directed towards him and his operation, Wilson consciously removed both himself and his operation from the United States and more firmly entrenched them in Europe and Libya. In anticipation of the upcoming indictment, the United States Attorney's Office began in late March 1980 to make efforts to secure Mr. Wilson's arrest and presence in the United States. During early April, 1980, both British and Swiss authorities made efforts on our behalf to locate Mr. Wilson. British authorities were unable to locate him and Swiss authorities indicated to us that he had left for Libya just shortly before their inquiries began. On April 23, 1980, the grand jury returned the indictment against Mr. Wilson and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. that time until Mr. Wilson's capture in June of 1981, the United States exhausted virtually all normal, and some unusual, means of securing his return to the United States. We should note for the defendant's benefit, that contrary to the twisted implication that he leaves in his pleadings, there of course is no alienable right to be a fugitive. To the complete contrary, a defendant has a total and absolute obligation to abide by court process; it is not the option of the defendant determine the time, manner or means under which he will obey court orders.

Beginning with the indictment, the United States Attorney's Office stepped up its efforts to have Mr. Wilson brought before this court. Since Mr. Wilson had taken up

^{1/}Documents, including telexs, recovered from Wilson associates clearly indicate that Wilson was immediately aware of his indictment.

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permanent residence in Libya, we were foreclosed from utilizing the normal channel for the return of a fugitive from a foreign country. The United States shares no extradition treaty with the government of Libya and, in light of the fractured relations between the two countries, we were in no position to ask, nor were they of a mind to accede to a request, for Wilson's return. In spite of that rather obvious impediment, the United States Attorney's Office was aware that Wilson would occasionally venture out of his Libyan sanctuary for quick visits to other countries. For that reason, we contacted Interpol, the international police organization, seeking and receiving their cooperation in obtaining an Interpol "red notice." That is, Interpol sent a notice to all its many member countries requesting Wilson's apprehension if he were found to be in that country.

The United States was not satisfied, however, with its inability to obtain him diplomatically from Libya, nor with hoping that an Interpol member nation would find Wilson within their confines. In August of 1980, the United States Attorney's Office received information that Wilson would be traveling to Malta in mid-August. Through the United States Department of State and the FBI Regional Legal Attache, the United States Attorney's Office notified the government of Malta that Wilson was believed to be on his way to Malta and if found there we would request his arrest and extradition

^{2/}In December, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tripolii was stormed and looted with no internationally mandated protection provided by the Libyan government. As a result, the Embassy staff was reduced to only a few Foreign Service Officers. In May, 1980 the Embassy was formally closed and all personnel withdrawn. In May, 1981, the Libyan Embassy here was ordered closed because of that country's involvement in, and refusal to cease, terrorist assassinations. Since then, the two countries have communicated, if at all, through third countries.

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or expulsion. In fact, Wilson was arrested pursuant to our request in Malta on August 18, 1980 and held for extradition. During the ensuing days, the United States Attorney's Office made substantial efforts to gather together the appropriate 'evidence and documentation to secure Wilson's extradition from Malta. These efforts proved to no avail, however, when the government of Malta, without any notification whatsoever, placed Wilson on a midnight flight to London in late August. The United States Attorney's Office learned the next morning from Scotland Yard authorities that Wilson had entered the United Kingdom. Scotland Yard immediately launched an intensive manhunt for Wilson. Wilson had lied on his immigration form as to where he would be staying in London and the United States subsequently learned that he hid in the United Kingdom, ultimately leasing, then purchasing, a small aircraft to fly him back to his Libyan haven.

Since we were unable to secure his appearance in the United States either voluntarily or through diplomatic means, the United States Attorney's Office took the somewhat unusual step of agreeing to a request from Edwin Wilson that we meet with him at a neutral location. Beginning in the early Spring of 1981, the United States Attorney's Office began negotiating with Wilson's attorney to accomplish such a meeting. As the June 5, 1981 letter clearly indicates, the United States, while skeptical of the results of such a meeting, agreed that it "might break the stalement" that existed as a result of Wilson's fugitivity. Representatives of the United States ultimately met with Wilson during early July in Rome, Italy.

^{3/}See attachment A.

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As our letter of July 23, 1981 to Wilson's attorney clearly indicates, the results of that meeting were less than fruitful. While we indicated we were willing to maintain a dialogue, we stated that "our efforts to apprehend Mr. Wilson under circumstances of our choosing will not slacken and at this juncture we will make every effort to continue to restrict his travel and to apprehend him and bring him to trial."

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Within a few days of sending that letter to Wilson's counsel, Assistant United States Attorneys E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr., and Carol E. Bruce were introduced to Ernest Keiser. Mr. Keiser indicated that he had casually met Mr. Wilson some years earlier and strongly felt that he would be able to assist the United States in apprehending Mr. Wilson. AUSA Barcella later indicated to Mr. Keiser that we would accept his assistance.

During the month of August 1981, Mr. Wilson granted interviews to both <u>Newsweek</u> magazine and ABC News. In both interviews he indicated that he had no intention of returning to the United States until he was ready - that he would do so "when the heat settles down a little bit." August 25, 1981 ABC News interview.

In late September 1981, the United States Attorney's Office was advised by Mr. Keiser that he was sending an associate of his, Dan Drake, to Libya to talk with Mr. Wilson. Drake did subsequently go to Libya in early October and met with Wilson and some of Wilson's associates. During the next

^{4/}In light of the fact that the July 23, 1981 letter undercuts and completely disposes of a number of issues raised by the defendant, we find it neither coincidental or accidental that he neglected to acknowledge its existence in his pleadings.

two months, Mr. Keiser had a number of telephone conversations with Mr. Wilson. Mr. Keiser advised us that he had indicated to Mr. Wilson that he, Keiser, had certain connections with the National Security Council which might prove to be of some assistance to Mr. Wilson. Assistant United States Attorneys Barcella, Bruce, and later Assistant United States Attorney Richard C. Otto, indicated to Mr. Keiser that we did not wish him to utilize the aegis of the National Security Council in his dealings with Wilson.

Finally, on December 27, 1981, Mr. Keiser, at Wilson's request, traveled to London, where he met with Diana Byrne and John Heath, both employees of Wilson's. Mr. Keiser indicated to these two individuals that he could provide a sanctuary for Mr. Wilson in a Caribbean or South American country, probably the Dominican Republic. During this late December trip, Keiser also spoke with Wilson from London via When Mr. Keiser indicatelephone on a number of occasions. ted that Wilson would need visas to enter whatever country of sanctuary was chosen, Miss Byrne and Mr. Heath produced three passports and turned them over to Mr. Keiser. The passports were an expired United States passport under the name of Edwin P. Wilson. This passport had been stamped cancelled by the U. S. Embassy in Rome at our request immediately after the July, 1981 Rome meeting. passport in the name of Phillip McCormack was also turned over. This passport contained a previously obtained visa to

^{5/}Following her initial meeting with Mr. Keiser, Assistant United States Attorney Bruce through a combination of maternity leave and other assignments, had very little contact with the recovery operation. Thus, defendant's demand for her recusal is factually, as well as legally, inaccurate. See pp. 21-22, infra.

enter the United States - the visa having been obtained at the United States Embassy in London on December 22, 1981. Wilson's associates also turned over a Maltese passport in the name of Giovanni Zammit. The stamps, or cachets, in the Maltese passport indicated that Wilson had used that document to travel illegally in 1981. Mr. Keiser returned to the United States on December 31, 1981 and turned these passports over to Assistant United States Attorney Barcella.

In early January 1982, Mr. Keiser was authorized by the United States to travel to Libya and meet with Mr. Wilson. For operational reasons, it was, of course, necessary for Mr. Keiser to bring the fraudulent passports of Mr. Wilson's with him. Mr. Keiser turned these over to Mr. Heath in Zurich, Switzerland and proceeded with Mr. Heath to Tripoli, Libya where he spent a number of days with Mr. Wilson. indicated to Keiser that he wished to leave Libya because of increasing pressure in that country, that he was in the process of negotiating with another African country for residence. but that he would prefer to travel with Mr. Keiser. Wilson indicated that he would like to "set up shop" in another country and possibly meet with representatives of the National Security Council in that country.

Upon Mr. Keiser's return, AUSA's Otto and Barcella indicated to Mr. Keiser that the National Security Council had no desire to meet with Mr. Wilson and that we did not want him to pursue that line. Mr. Keiser was told that any dealings that Mr. Wilson wished to have with the United States Government would have to be through the United States Depart-

_6/This was confirmed by Wilson's associates and later the United States received confirmation from that African country.

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ment of Justice and that Mr. Keiser's "contact" would be Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark M. Richard. from Mr. Wilson's perspective, and at his direction, Mr. Keiser was acting on his (Wilson's) behalf to intercede with the Department of Justice. With respect to a potential meeting with Wilson, Mr. Richard indicated in an extremely brief letter (See attachment B.) that such a meeting could not take place while Wilson remained in Libya. letter did not say (as alleged in page 22 of Defendant's Motion) that it was perfectly safe for Wilson to travel outside of Libya. Evidently, Wilson did not wish to travel outside of Libya at that time and directed Keiser to approach Assistant United States Attorney Barcella directly for the purpose of setting up a meeting between Wilson and Barcella. At the same time, Wilson's attorney approached Assistant United States Attorney Barcella and confirmed that Wilson was, in fact, desirous of setting up another meeting with representatives of the United States Attorney's Office. In light of our unsatisfying experience in Rome, the United States Attorney's Office asked for several assurances from Wilson prior to a meeting taking place. The United States also began to inquire of a number of foreign countries whether they would be willing to host such a meeting. From the end of February through the end of May, the United States either formally or informally inquired of over a half a dozen nations and requested permission for such a meeting to take place in their jurisdiction. In light of the defendant's notoriety and the position of Libya in the world community, it may not be surprising that every country contacted by the United States declined to host a meeting. It was in anticipation that one of those countries, Turkey, would agree to

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such a meeting that the April 26, 1982 letter to Wilson's attorney (Attachment E in the Defendant's Motion) was written. The letter made clear that any proposed travel in connection with such a meeting should not take place until the exact terms were confirmed in writing by the Assistant 'United States Attorneys.

In early June, the United States Attorney's Office again advised Mr. Keiser that, merely for appearance reasons, we did not wish the National Security Council to be used as an excuse for such a meeting, and on June 4, 1982, Mr. Keiser specifically advised Mr. Wilson that the National Security Council optioon was not viable. Mr. Keiser also advised Mr. Wilson during this period of time that the Department of Justice was still unable to find a country that would be willing to host a meeting and suggested that the two of them proceed to a sanctuary for Mr. Wilson in the Dominican Republic. The United States Attorney's Office was then informed through Mr. Keiser that Mr. Wilson had acceeded to the latter suggestion and would be willing to meet Mr. Keiser in Zurich, Switzerland and to proceed thereon to the Dominican Republic. In fact, Mr. Wilson requested Mr. Keiser to purchase airline tickets for Mr. Wilson, under the name Phillip McCormack, from Zurich through Madrid, Spain to the Dominican Republic. Mr. Keiser did so. Mr. Keiser arrived in Zurich, Switzerland, as did Roberta Barnes and Diana Byrne.

Mr. Wilson and his associates then spent the next twenty-six*

^{7/}In his pleading, council constantly refers to "Barbara Barnes." We assume he's referring to Wilson's lady friend and business associate, Roberta J. Barnes and not Mr. Wilson's ex-wife Barbara Wilson.

hours in the international transit lounge at the Zurich airport. Wilson then voluntarily boarded a plane to Madrid in the company of Mr. Keiser and an official of the United States Marshal's Service acting in an undercover capacity, Philip Tucker. Wilson accompanied Keiser and Tucker to Madrid and from there to the Dominican Republic. Mr. Wilson attempted to enter the Dominican Republic on the fraudulent Phillip McCormack passport and was subsequently placed on a flight to New York where he was arrested upon arrival at $\frac{9}{4}$

After Mr. Wilson was in custody in the United States, the United States Attorney's Office learned for the first time that Mr. Keiser, in his understandable zeal to assist us in recovering the fugitive Wilson, had made up on his own initiative and without our knowledge a letter purporting to be from the National Security Council and had shown it to Wilson and some of his associates in the airport in $\frac{10}{2}$ While we would have preferred

^{8/}The defendant erroneously notes that "arrangements were made for cots to be installed in the transit lounge so that Edwin Wilson could sleep there. Edwin Wilson was locked in the transit lounge from 11 p.m. to 6 a.m. on June 14, 1982. Upon information and belief, this action of locking him in the transit lounge was done with the cooperation of the United States Government." In fact, when Mr. Wilson was informed that there were sleeping facilities in the nursery area of the international lounge, he and a female companion availed themselves of the opportunity to utilize the sleeping facility together. The Swiss Airport authorities have advised us that, in an effort to ensure the tranquility of the people in the nursery, it is routinely locked in the middle of the night. This hardly sounds like the torturous treatment Toscanino complained of.

^{9/}For a fuller explanation of this episode, see the search and seizure portion of these pleadings at pp. 56-60, infra.

^{10/}Since the letter is wholly irrelevant in light of the case law, it matters only from a curiosity standpoint that Mr. Keiser and Mr. Wilson dispute some portions of its alleged content. The letter was destroyed in Zurich.

that Mr. Keiser follow the instructions we had given him with regard to eliminating discussions of the National Security Council, it was, as mentioned, only because the United States Department of Justice was seeking to abide by a legally unnecessary, self-imposed code of conduct that after two and one half years of flaunting the process of this court the defendant Wilson would have found laughable.

Contrary to the assertions made in the defendant's motion (Points and Authorities, p. 9) Mr. Wilson was never told, nor was it ever the case, that there was any contemplation with regard to dismissal of the indictment. Further, he has attempted to merge negotiations with regard to a possible meeting with representatives of the Department of Justice in Europe with his flight to the Dominican Republic. They are separate and distinct. Under all the circumstances, whether those alleged by the defendant or those as they actually occurred, the defendant has not demonstrated any justification whatsoever for the court to even hold a hearing into the matter, let alone divest itself of jurisdiction over his person.

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II. OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT WILSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICEMENT BASED UPON A QUALIFIED GRANT OF IMMUNITY TO EDWIN P. WILSON

The United States of America respectfully opposes defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based upon a qualified grant of immunity to Edwin P. Wilson and gives as its reasons the following:

The defendant asserts that, when the indictment was returned, he was in "the midst of . . . negotiations", (Defendant's pleading, page 34) with the government after having received the government's letter of June 5, 1981 and after having met with government representatives in Rome in July of 1981. He further asserts that the qualified grant of immunity he was given in the government's June 5th letter amounted to an "unambiguous agreement" in which "it was understood that Mr. Wilson would not be indicted based upon what he told the prosecution or any leads developed from what he said during the period of time that a disposition of the case was being negotiated." (Defendant's pleading, pages 32-33).

First, defendant's assertions are baseless and incorrect on their face. As the June 5th letter clearly states, the government promised the defendant only that they would not use the defendant's statements directly against him but that, absent a negotiated settlement of the case, we would use against him evidence gathered from leads developed as a result of his statements to us. Never was he given immunity from prosecution.

Second, the government and the defense were not "in the midst of negotiations" as he would have the court believe after the Rome meeting. Curiously, the defendant fails to

attach to his pleadings a July 23, 1981 letter wherein the government advised counsel for the defendant, <u>inter alia</u>, that although we were "less than pleased" about the defendant's lack of candor at the Rome meeting and that

While we are willing, of course, to maintain a dialogue through you, please understand that our efforts to apprehend Mr. Wilson under circumstances of our choosing will not slacken and at this juncture we will make every effort to continue to restrict his travel and to apprehend him and bring him to trial.

Government's Letter of July 23, 1981, page 3.

That letter makes it clear and unequivocal that the government's investigation, prosecution, and pursuit of Edwin P. Wilson was still on track after the Rome meeting. Accordingly, the superseding indictment, then, was a natural consequence of the ongoing investigation and was not barred by any qualified grant of immunity or plea bargain.

^{11/} Attached hereto as Exhibit No. C.

 $[\]frac{12}{\text{Th}}$ In our earlier June 5th letter, we had also made it clear that we did not intend to stop the investigation or prosecution of Edwin Wilson simply because of his stated interest in meeting and negotiating with us in Rome. Defendant fails to mention this fact in his pleading.

You must appreciate the fact that for obvious reasons we simply cannot agree to grant your client any more protections than what we have outlined here. As I have indicated to you previously, we have a number of other potential charges against Mr. Wilson and we will not decline to fully pursue them simply because of this meeting. You should also understand that the degree of Mr. Wilson's candor will most certainly be a significant factor in any future decision to negotiate with him.

Page 3 of June 5, 1981 letter.

. III. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A DISQUALIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT COUNSEL IN THIS CASE

The United States of America respectfully opposes defendant's Motion to Disqualify Government Counsel, E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. and Carol E. Bruce and gives as its reasons the following:

Defendant gives as his reasons for the disqualification of the two prosecutors in question that he intends to call them as witnesses with respect to two matters: (1) Edwin Wilson's statements at a July, 1981 meeting in Rome and (2) circumstances surrounding the method by which Mr. Wilson was involuntarily returned to the United States.

The law is well-settled that courts are extremely reluctant to allow lawyers, including prosecutors, to be called as witnesses in cases wherein they are advocates. See Gajewski v. United States, 321 F.2d 261, 268-269 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 968 (1964). While the court may, in its discretion, allow the defendant to call as a witness the prosecuting attorney trying the case, Id., see also United States v. Fiorello, 376 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1967), Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99, 104 (9th Cir. 1956), the defense must first demonstrate that such a course of action is "unavoidably necessary". United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974) in that the testimony sought cannot be obtained from other sources. See United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824; United States v. Fiorello, supra; United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1957).

^{13/} We, of course, recognize that the A.B.A.'s Code of Professional Responsibility applies with equal force to prosecutors as to private practitioners. See Canon 5 and DR 5-102; United States v. Alu, supra.

The defendant cannot manufacture a reason to call a prosecutor as a witness in order to rid himself of that prosecutor as an advocate in his case. With respect to the Rome meeting, present were the two prosecutors — Mr. Barcella and Ms. Bruce, two federal law enforcement agents who were the case agents for their respective bureaus in this investigation — Special Agent Richard Pedersen from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and Special Agent William Hart from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the assistant legal attache (FBI) from the U.S. Embassy in Rome — Leone Flossi, and counsel for the defendant, John Keats, Esquire. Obviously, any one of the three law enforcement officials could be called as witnesses on matters pertaining to the Rome meeting and any statements made by Edwin P. Wilson there.

With respect to the so-called <u>Toscanino</u> issue it is the government's position as set forth in response to defendant's claim that the "United States Government does not have jurisdiction over Edwin P. Wilson" (see pp. 1-18, <u>supra</u>), that the defendant has not stated sufficient facts or arguments to warrant a hearing on this issue. Therefore, no testimony, let alone the testimony of the prosecutors, should be elicited on this issue. Further, jurisdiction is never a jury issue so any testimony in this matter would be taken before the court itself.

For the above-stated reasons we respectfully submit that defendant's motion to disqualify the prosecutors should be denied.

^{14/} By defendant's own admission, his oral statements in Rome, were principally self-serving declarations. As such they are inadmissible as direct evidence.
15/ United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
16/ Assistant United States Attorney Bruce notes that while she is flattered that defendant includes her as one who was principally responsible for his being returned to this country for trial she must disabuse him of that notion, as she was on maternity leave from December 1, 1981 until late March, 1982 and was only peripherally involved in the recovery effort before and after that period.

IV. THE STATUTES CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL

The defendant has made a broad-based attack on the constitutionality of the statutes charged in the indictment without the support of a single case which pertains to any of the statutes charged (See defendant's motions at 42-45; defendant's points and authorities at 14.).

In <u>United States v. Truong Dinh Hung</u>, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.), <u>cert. denied</u>, 102 S.Ct. 1004 (1980), the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 951. Contrary to defendant Wilson's contentions, the court held that the registration requirement embodied in §951 does not offend the Fifth Amendment and that the term "agent," as used in the statute, is a readily understandable term which provides adequate notice of the conduct proscribed by the statute. 629 F.2d at 919-920.

The defendant's allegation that 18 U.S.C. 844(d) is vague and ambiguous ignores the clear language of the statute. The \$844(d) offense has three elements:

- (1) the transportation or receipt in interstate or foreign commerce;
- (2) of any explosive;
- (3) with the knowledge or intent that it will be used to kill, injure or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage any building, vehicle or other real or personal property.

United States v. Carlson, 561 F.2d 105 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 973 (1977). Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, it is clear that, in order to constitute the offense, the defendant must have the requisite knowledge or intent at the time the explosives are transported.

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The defendant challenges the constitutionality of 22 U.S.C. 2778(c) and 49 U.S.C. 1809 on the ground that they are "unlawful delegations of authority to a non-legislative authority." Defendant ignores the well-established rule of law that Congress may constitutionally provide a criminal sanction for the violation of regulations which it has empowered the President or any agency to promulgate. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); United States v. Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stone, 452 F.2d 42 (8th Cir. 1971); Samora v. United States, 406 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1969).

The predecessor statute to 22 U.S.C. 2778 and the regulations issued thereunder supply a sufficiently narrow definition of the goods and services covered by the law and provide adequate notrice of the licensing requirement for exportation. United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1979); United States v. Edler Industries, Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d 326, 331 note 6 (5th Cir. 1979) (references to the former \$1934 are deemed references to \$2778). As the Second Circuit noted in Swarovski, the argument that the regulations are unconstitutionally vague comes "with little grace" from a "sophisticated" person, such as defendant Wilson, who directed a multi-national business, which included procurement and shipping companies. 592 F.2d at 132-133.

Similarly, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Transportation the power to issue regulations governing the transport of "hazardous materials," a term which is definied by the statute. 49 U.S.C. 1802(2); 49 U.S.C. 1803; 49 U.S.C. 1804. In language which tracks the language

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of the criminal penalty provision of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(C.)), Congress imposed a criminal penalty on any person who "willfully violates" any provision of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act or "any regulation issued under" the statute. See 49 U.S.C. 1809(b) and 22 U.S.C. 2778(c). The regulations provide a list of materials which are "hazardous materials" and provide the conditions for their transportation. 49 C.F.R. 172.101. Thus, 49 U.S.C. 1809(b) provides adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed by the statute.

Defendant's complaint that 49 U.S.C. 1809(b) "does not repeat" the language contained in §1809(a)(1) and (2) is inapposite. Section 1809 sets forth separate civil (1809(a)) and criminal (1809(b)) penalties for violations of the Act or the regulations. The elements of the criminal offense, including the requisite mens rea, are adequately set out in §1809(b) and are not, in any way, dependent on the civil penalty provision of subsection (a). See United States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 431 F. Supp. 361 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).

By its express terms, Title 22, \$105(a) of the D. C. Code addresses offenses which occurred within the District of Columbia. Section (c) of the statute recognizes there may be cases where a conspiracy "contrived within the District of Columbia" (emphasis added) has, as its object, conduct outside of the District of Columbia. The gravamen of the offense in 22-105(a) is the conspiracy, which by the plain terms of the statute must be contrived within the jurisdiction. A conspiracy to commit an offense is a crime itself, separate from the actual commission of the crime which is the object of the conspiracy. See United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166, affirmed United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 181 U.S.

App. D. C. 254, <u>cert. denied</u>, <u>Erlichman</u> v. <u>United States</u>, 432 U. S. 933 (1974); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Bachman</u>, 164 F. Supp. 898 (D. D. C. 1958).

It is not unconstitutional for a state or the District of Columbia to impose snactions for an offense which was only partly committed within the jurisdiction. District of Columbia ha an obvious and substantial interest in policing any unlawful activity withhin the jurisdiction. The breadth of the law of conspiracy derives from the supposed danger of secret combinations to commit crimes, see United States v. Conlon, 481 F. Supp. 654 (D. D. C. 1979), and the design of conspiracy statutes recognizes that concerted action makes crimes easier to perpetrate and harder to detect. See Woods v. United States, 240 F. 2d 37, 9 U. S. App. D. C. 351, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 941 (1957). Significant portions of the criminal activity alleged in the indictment as violations of Title 22, §§105 and 107, and Title 49, §301 occurred within the District of Columbia. Defendant's challenge to their coonstitutionality flies in the face of years or precedent of successful prosecutions under these statutes.

The long history of these statutes of their common-law precedents also contraverts defendant's assertion of vagueness. These offenses were well-known at common law, and their terms have reasonably well-defined and settled meanings that are known to potential defendants and the courts. Cf. United States v. Conlon, supra, at 662. The statutory language, when measured by general understanding, gives fair notice of prohibited conduct to a person of ordinary intelligence. Id.; see also United States v. Maude, 481 F.2d 1062, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 378 (D. C. Cir. 1973). The conspiracy

statute in particular is saved from vagueness by the requirements that specific intent, as well as overt acts, be alleged and proved. See <u>United States v. Conlon, supra</u>. The indictment has provided substantial detail about the circumstances of the conspiracy in this case, and the particular allegations contained in the overt acts have helped to put defendant on notice of the charges against him. See <u>United States</u> v. <u>Haldeman</u>, <u>supra</u>, at 997.

V. THIS IS NOT A OF CASE SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

The defendant moves to dismiss the indictment on the basis of the argument of selective prosecution. identifying a single firm, specifying even one transaction, or offering any legal authority for his claim, defendant offers the wholly unsupported contention that his indictment constitutes an unconstitutionally selective prosecution because "throughout the United States firms are supplying arms and explosives to other nations with the Government's knowledge and approval under circumstances identical to those charged in this indictment" (Defendant's Motion, $\frac{18}{18}$ Even if defendant could establish as a matter of fact that he has been prosecuted where other firms which have violated federal explosives laws have not, the mere fact of treatment by the Government different from that of others similarly situated would not, without more, be sufficient to validate his constitutional claim. failure to prosecute other offenders is no basis for a finding of a denial of equal protection." Moss v. Horing, 314 F.2d 89, 93 (2nd Cir. 1963). What is "generally required to establish a claim of selective enforcement of a law" [is a showing] "that there was intentional or purposeful discrimination" in its enforcement. Tollett v. Laman, 497 F.2d 1231, 1233 (8th Cir. 1974). Since defendant cannot make the required showing, his motion to dismiss the indictment as an unconstitionally selective prosecution should

^{17/}Perhaps it was defendant's intellectual concern for the issue of selective prosecution that led him to anonomously inform on one of his competitors (See defendant's bail application, pp. 19, 29).

^{18/}In making this argument, Wilson apparently concedes that the arms transactions described in the indictment did in fact take place but seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the United States' allegedly singling him out from among a number of firms which behaved similarly.

be denied. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448 (1962); Snow-den v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944); Busch v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 864 (1977).

VI. VENUE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IS PROPER

Defendant contends that venue, as to the last nine counts of the indictment, is misplaced in the District of Columbia because defendant "did not commit any of the acts constituting material elements of the crime charged in the indictment in the District of Columbia" (Defendant's Points and Authorities, p. 18). Defendant's contention disregards the clear terms of the statute which governs venue in conspiracy prosecutions and misunderstands completely the cases which have interpreted that statute.

18 U.S.C. §3237(a) provides:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.

Any offense involving the use of the mail, or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such commerce or mail matter moves.

Within the context of a prosecution for criminal conspiracy, courts have consistently interpreted Section 3237 to mean that commission within a district of any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is sufficient to support venue for prosecution of the conspiracy in that district. In <u>United States v. Overshon</u>, 494 F.2d 894 (8th Cir.), <u>cert. denied</u> 419 U. S. 853 (1974), for instance, the Eighth Circuit commented that

^{19/}Defendant apparently concedes the propriety of venue in the District of Columbia as to the first count of the indictment. He is not charged in the second count.

it is well settled law that venue as to prosecution of all members of a conspiracy lies either in the jurisdiction in which the conspiratorial agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators.

Id. at 900 [citations omitted]. See also United States v.

Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1333 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 447

U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513, 517

(7th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States

v. Guy, 456 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

896 (1972); United States v. Phillips, 433 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 401 U.S. 917 (1970).

Under the statute and the cases which have interpreted it what is significant, therefore, for purposes of venue, is not whether any material element of an offense charged in the indictment was, as defendant contends, committed by him in the indicting district, but rather whether any overt act was committed by any conspirator within the indicting district.

^{20/}In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), the Supreme Court, ruling for the first time on the question which defendant raises here, explained that any other resolution would produce an intolerable result. If a conspiracy, the Court reasoned, could only be prosecuted in the district where all of its material elements had been committed, then some conspiracies might never be prosecuted at all. The Court specifically rejected this result and defendant's argument which leads to it. 225 U.S. at 463.

The nine counts of the indictment as to which defendant challenges venue allege two different but related conspiracies and groups of connected crimes. Counts three through nine charge the defendant and others with conspiracy to violate United States laws regulating the shipment of explosives and other munitions and with violations of those statutes; counts ten and eleven charge the defendant with conspiracy to commit murder. Of the thirty-nine overt acts which the indictment alleges to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy to ship explosives, fourteen occurred in the District of Columbia and all but two were committed by the defendant himself. One of the six overt acts which the indictment alleges to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit murder occurred in the District of Columbia and was committed by the defendant. Since venue is proper "in any jurisdiction in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators," United States v. Overshon, supra at 900, venue is obviously proper in the District of Columbia, where overt acts in furtherance of both conspiracies alleged in the indictment were committed by the defendant himself.

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^{21/}The charges in the indictment arise from defendant Wilson's involvement over a period of years in providing the government of Libya with a variety of goods and services for commercial gain. Counts three through nine charge defendant Wilson and others with conspiring to ship to Libya and with shipping to Libya quantities of explosives and timing devices for use in a Libya terrorist training school near Benghazi. Counts ten and eleven charge the defendant and Frank E. Terpil with attempting to recruit individuals to assassinate Umar Muhayshi, a Libyan dissident, for a fee of one million dollars.

VIII. THE COUNTS IN THE INDICTMENT ARE PROPERLY JOINED AND SEVERANCE IS NOT WARRANTED.

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Defendant's opening salvo in his shotgun approach to motions is an attack on the joinder of the counts in the indictment. Like those motions that follow, his argument that severance is necessary falls far short of the mark. The requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Joinder), the circumstances which would necessitate relief under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Severance) and the counts and circumstances of the instant indictment clearly demonstrate that the joinder of offenses against the defendant was entirely proper and that no severance is called for.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establishes the requirements for joinder of offenses or defendants in the same indictment. The objective of the rule is to balance any prejudice inherent in a joint trial against the benefit of judicial economy obtained by trying multiple offenses of defendants in a single trial. See, e.g. United States v. Turkett, 632 F.2d 896, 906 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 2524, aff'd convictions on rehearing, No. 79-1545 (1st Cir. 1981). Since one of the indicted defendants, Douglas M. Schlachter, Sr., has pleaded guilty and the other, Francis E. Terpil, has not yet been apprehended, Rule 8(a) (Joinder of Offenses) rather than Rule 8(b) (Joinder of Defendants), applies to the instant case. Under Rule 8(a) the prosecutor may join multiple offenses under the same indictment if the offenses meet any, one of three tests:

- (1) Are they of the same or similar character,
- (2) Are they based on the same act or transaction, or,

(3) Are they based on two or more transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme.

Fed.R.Crim.P.8(a); see, e.g. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Anderson</u>, 642 F.2d 2081, 2084 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. (1981); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Harris</u>, 635 F.2d 526, 527 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1981); United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1980); <u>Jervis</u> v. <u>Hall</u>, 622 F. 2d 19, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Gorham, 173 U. S. App. D. C. 150, 523 F.2d 1088 (D. C. Cir. 1975). Further, courts prefer to try jointly-indicted defendants together, particularly when the defendants are charged with conspiracy. See United States v. Brin, 630 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 994 (1980). Similarly, courts may jointly try defendants who participated in different conspiracies, as long as the conspiracies were part of the same series of acts. See United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 956 (1980); United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).

In the instant indictment, not only are most of the counts properly joined because they are the same or similar character under the first test but, in addition, the entire indictment is quite properly joined as two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan under the third test. Count one charges defendant with acting as a foreign agent of Libya without notification to the Department of State. Virtually all

of the evidence that the government intends to present in the course of trial will show defendant's actions as unregistered foreign agent, but specifically, each of the other counts in the indictment is an example of defendant's actions on behalf of the government of Libya and demonstrates the defendant's relationship as an agent of the government of Libya. Additionally, the United States will show that defendant conspired with Jerome S. Brower, an unindicted co-conspirator in this indictment who has previously pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and that as part of that conspiracy, Brower agreed to ship to defendant in Libya a variety of munitions and explosives over a period of time. Count three of the indictment spells out in great detail the nature and circumstances of this conspiracy. Counts four through nine are substantive offenses involving the transportation of these explosives and munitions on three separate dates (August 10, 1976; October 4, 1976; and April 2, 1977) during the period of the conspiracy. The evidence on each of these counts will show that, pursuant to the conspiracy between defendant, Brower and others, the materials involved were collected in the United States by Brower and Brower's employees, shipped to Libya, and used by defendant and defendant's employees as part of a terrorist training project in Libya.

The last two counts of the indictment, Counts ten and eleven, charge the defendant with conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder. The proposed victim of this assassination, Umar Abdullah Muhayshi, was a Libyan dissident and a former member of that country's revolutionary council. The evidence will show that this conspiracy and solicitation was yet another example of acts committed on the part of

defendant Wilson which demonstrate his agency relationship and with the government of Libya.

In addition, the government's evidence will show that Overt Act six of Count ten (conspiracy to commit murder) and Overt Act eighteen of Count three, the explosives conspiracy, involve the same people, the same meeting and the same discussion. Specifically, the government's evidence will show that on September 16, 1976, in a hotel in Geneva, Switzerland, defendant Wilson and his co-defendant Terpil met with three individuals and sought their assistance in the assassination of Muhayshi. At the same time, defendants also asked one of the three individuals, who was an explosives expert, to travel to Libya, utilize the explosives that were then in place and others that were being shipped and train individuals in the use of those explosives.

In sum, it is not the action of the United States, but rather the actions of the defendant, which properly joined these counts and made severance factually and legally unnecessary. The facts dictate that all of the offenses are logically related to one another and thus are properly joined. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. Gorham, supra.

Lastly, we fail to perceive how the joinder of the foreign agent's registration, explosives conspiracy and explosives and munitions substantive counts, with the solicitation and conspiracy to commit murder counts, causes any undue prejudice to the defendant. It defies all logic and ignores common sense to suggest that a greater degree of prejudice

may accrue to defendant from charging him with the attempt to assassinate a Libyan dissident than with supplying explosives and munitions to run a terrorist training camp. It would be a Hobson's choice, indeed, to decide which is the more perfidious activity. Since that the offenses are, in some instances, of same or similar circumstances, and since all constitute part of a common scheme or plan, and also the offenses are not such as to cause disparate levels of prejudice, their joinder was entirely proper.

^{22/}The defendant string-cites a number of cases, supposedly in support of his position on severance and joinder. A simple review of the facts of each of those cases shows that the only similarity between the circumstances of those cases and the instant case is that all involve criminal cases in federal court.

IX. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT A BAR TO THE INDICTMENT AND PROSECUTION IN THE INSTANT CASE

The defendant moves to dismiss Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Ten and "Perhaps Count II" wherein defendant asserts that the statute of limitations is a bar to the outstanding indictment. We disagree with his position for the following reasons:

A. BACKGROUND

1. The Original Indictment

The original ten count indictment in this case was filed on April 25, 1980 and charged Edwin Wilson as follows:

Count I: with being an unregistered foreign agent of Libya between April 15, 1976 and December 30, 1977;

Count III: with conspiring to violate several federal statutes dealing with the illegal exportation of explosives between April 1976 and January 1, 1978;

Count IV: with transporting explosives in foreign commerce with intent to use unlawfully on or about August 10, 1976, in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 844(d);

Count V: with unlawfully exporting defense articles on the U.S. Munitions list on or about August 10, 1976, in violation of 22 U.S. Code § 2778(c);

Count VI: with unlawfully transporting hazardous materials in foreign commerce on or about August 10, 1976, in violation of 49 U.S. Code § 1809(b);

Count IX: with conspiring between August, 1976 and September 17, 1976, to commit murder in violation of 22 D.C. Code §§ 2401, 105a and the homicide laws of the Arab Republic of Egypt;

Count X: with soliciting another between August, 1976 and September 17, 1976 to commit murder in violation of 22 D.C. Code §§ 107, 105 and 22 D.C. Code § 301.

Edwin Wilson was not a named defenandt in Counts II, VII and VIII of the original indictment.

2. The Superseding Indictment

The superseding eleven count indictment was filed on August 6, 1981 and charged Edwin Wilson as follows vis-a-vis the original indictment.

There were several technical and stylistic changes made throughout the indictment that were not substantive in nature. Moreover, Jerome S. Brower was dropped as a defendant as he had already entered a plea of guilty to the third count of the original indictment and been sentenced and Douglas M. Schlachter, Sr., was added as a defendant in most of the counts of the indictment. Specific substantive changes reflected in each count of the superseding indictment are as follows:

Count I: identical to original indictment.

Count III: in paragraph two of the third count, informational, noncharging language concerning certain specific explosives which was included in the original indictment was omitted in the superseding indictment - <u>i.e.</u>, references to electric blasting caps and trinitrololuene (TNT).

Ten (10) overt acts were added which dealt with events that took place on the following dates:

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Overt Act No. 7: August 3, 1976

Overt Act No. 12: August 13, 1976

Overt Act No. 26: Between September 17, 1976 and

October 4, 1976

Overt Act No. 28: Between September 17, 1976 and

October 4, 1976

Overt Act No. 29: Between September 17, 1976 and

October 4, 1976

Overt Act No. 31: October 4, 1976

Overt Act No. 32: Between October 6, 1976 and

October 14, 1976

Overt Act No. 33: Between October 6, 1976 and

October 14, 1976

Overt Act No. 35: April 2, 1977

Count IV: identical to original but omitted reference to specific types of explosives that were included in alleged shipment.

Count V: identical to original but omitted assertion that Trinitrotoluene (TNT), cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), and Composition B (RDX-TNT mixture) was involved in the alleged shipment.

Count VI: the original Count VI was completely omitted and replaced by a <u>new</u> count in which Edwin Wilson and Francis Terpil are alleged to have violated the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act on October 4, 1976;

Count VII: the original Count VI was completely omitted and replaced by a <u>new</u> count in which Edwin Wilson and Douglas Schlachter are alleged to have transported explosives in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 844(d) on April 2, 1977;

Count VIII: the original Count VIII was completely omitted and replaced by a <u>new</u> count alleging an April 2, 1977 violation of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976;

Count IX: Count IX is a <u>new</u> count alleging an April 2, 1977 violation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act by Edwin Wilson and Douglas Schlachter;

Count X: the original Count IX charging the murder conspiracy became Count X in the superseding indictment with no substantive changes.

Count XI: the original Count X charging the solicitation to commit murder became Count XI in the superseding indictment with no substantive changes.

Edwin Wilson was and is not a named defendant in Count II of the superseding indictment.

B. ARGUMENT

The prosecution of Edwin Wilson is not barred by the statute of limitations for five reasons:

- (1) the original indictment filed on April 25, 1980 was well within the five (5) year statute of limitations established by 18 U.S. Code § 3282;
- (2) the statute of limitation was tolled as of the indictment filing date as to the charges contained in the original indictment, see <u>United States</u> v. <u>Grady</u>, 544 F.2d 598,

601-602 (2d Cir. 1976); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Wilsey</u>, 458 F.2d 11, 12 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Garcia</u>, 412 F.2d 999, 1000-1001 (10th Cir. 1969); <u>Powell v. United States</u>, 352 F.2d 705, 707 n.5, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 222, 224 (1965) (dictum);

- (3) because the statute stopped running with the bringing of the first indictment, the superseding indictment which was brought while the first indictment was validly pending is not barred by the statute of limitations as to those charges contained in the first indictment because those charges themselves were not broadened by the new indictment. (See cases cited above in paragraph 2);
- (4) the new, additional counts contained in the superseding indictment were in addition to and did not broaden the
 original charges in the original counts themselves and the
 new additional counts in the superseding indictment were,
 themselves, within the statute of limitations when the superseding indictment was filed on August 6, 1981;
- as to the new, additional counts in the superseding indictment under the provisions of 18 U.S. Code § 3290 because the defendant had been a fugitive from justice until his apprehension in June of this year. See Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 1976), Donnell v. United States, 229 F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1956); Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. 128, 135 (1895).

For the above-stated reasons we respectfully submit defendant Wilson's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment should be denied.

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X. DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO MOVE TO STRIKE REFERENCES TO UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATORS FROM THE INDICTMENT AND THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR HIS MOTION

Defendant moves to strike from the indictment several references to unindicted co-conspirators, both identified 23/ and unidentified. Defendant has no standing to make such a motion. Moreover, the applicable case law on the issue specifically permits the naming in indictments of unindicted co-conspirators who will testify at a trial on the indictment pursuant to agreements with the Government. Since the only unindicted co-conspirator named in the indictment will testify at trial as part of such an agreement, his naming in the indictment is completely proper.

A. Defendant Has No Standing

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In <u>Briggs</u> v. <u>United States</u>, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975), two persons, who had been named as unindicted co-conspirators but had not been charged in the prosecution of a plot to achieve riot, moved to expunge all references to them from the indictment. The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the trial court's denial of their motion, held that the two persons named as unindicted co-conspirators had standing to make such a motion because their naming in the indictment raised the possibilities of "injury to their good names and reputations and impairment of their ability to obtain employment." <u>Id</u>. at 797. Several other courts have followed the Briggs reasoning where persons named as unindicted

^{23/}That aspect of defendant's motion which seeks deletion of all references to unidentified co-conspirators is completely without merit and deserves only summary treatment here. Even if defendant had standing to raise the issue, which he does not, no serious claim of prejudice to defendant could conceivably arise from the mere use of the term "unindicted co-conspirator" in the indictment. Indeed, defendant's statement of points and authorities, his rhetorical flights notwithstanding, alleges no such prejudice.

co-conspirators have sought deletion of their names from an indictment in which they were not charged. See e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1977).

No court, however, has ruled, as defendant urges this court should, that a defendant has standing to seek deletion of the names of persons referred to as unindicted co-conspirators from the indictment. There is, in fact, authority directly to the contrary. In Application of Jordan, 439 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.W.Va. 1977), upon which defendant relies, the Court, in granting a petition by a person named in an indictment as an unindicted co-conspirator for deletion of all references to him from the indictment and other court documents commented:

The rights preserved herein are preserved for the unindicted co-conspirator alone. Thus, a defendant, properly indicted in an indictment which may name others as unindicted co-conspirators, has no standing to question that practice, no benefit arriving from it, and no basis for alleging prejudice attributed to it. $\underline{\text{Id}}.$ at 209 n.11. $\underline{\text{24}}/$

This court should, therefore, dismiss for lack of standing defendant's motion to strike references to unindicted co-conspirators.

^{24/}Defendant strains to confer standing upon himself by claiming that the mere mention of unindicted co-conspirators will leave a jury "with the distinct impression that, since these persons were found to be conspirators and accomplices, the defendant must be implicated also" (Defendant's Motion, p. 55). This vague and unsupported contention is, we submit, insufficient to establish that defendant, for purposes of standing, is "himself among the injured." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1971). In any event, whatever minimal prejudice might arguably arise is easily and adequately cured with an appropriate jury instruction.

B. A Person Who Has Agreed to Cooperate with Prosecuting Authorities Is Properly Named In the Indictment as an Unindicted Co-Conspirator

Even if defendant had standing to move for deletion from the indictment of references to unindicted co-conspirators, which the government does not concede, his motion should be denied. The very cases upon which defendant relies in support of his motion note that an unindicted co-conspirator whose name appears in the indictment as the result of an agreement with prosecuting authorities is properly named in the indictment. Since the only unindicted co-conspirator identified in the indictment in this case has made such an agreement with the United States and given, pursuant to it, self-incriminating grand jury testimony, defendant has no grounds, even assuming standing, upon which to seek deletion of the unindicted co-conspirator's name.

In <u>Briggs</u>, upon which defendant relies, the Fifth Circuit noted that

[a] person might agree to cooperate with authorities by voluntarily giving self-incriminating testimony before a grand jury, and that testimony might form the basis of his being named in an indictment as an unindicted co-conspirator. Briggs, supra, 514 F.2d at 804 n. 16.

Like the Briggs court, the court in Application of Jordan,

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^{25/}On April 20, 1980, Jerome S. Brower was charged in six counts of a ten count indictment with conspiracy and violations of federal statutes regulating the shipment and exportation of explosives and other munitions, and with perjury. On December 15, 1980, Brower entered a plea of guilty to one count of the indictment charging him with a violation of the general conspiracy statute (18 USC §371). Brower's plea was part of an agreement with the United States under the terms of which he gave grand jury testimony which formed part of the basis for the superseding indictment filed on August 6, 1981. Brower was sentenced on February 23, 1981 to serve four months of a five year term of imprisonment. The balance of his sentence was suspended and Brower was placed on three years probation and fined \$5,000.

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supra, also distinguished unindicted co-conspirators who had cooperated with prosecuting authorities and given self-incriminating grand jury testimony pursuant to such an agreement from those who had not, and concluded that such persons were appropriately named as unindicted co-conspirators. In Jordan, the Court explained that an application for expungement by an unindicted co-conspirator who had no agreement with the prosecuting authorities was

not an attempt to expunge the name of one whose name appears in the indictment as a conspirator as the result of a plea agreement or an agreement by the Government not to prosecute. Obviously such a person has waived the rights which are preserved here.

Application of Jordan, supra, 439 F.Supp. at 206 n.7a.

Because the only unindicted co-conspirator identified in the indictment, Jerome Brower, has made an agreement
with the United States under the terms of which he has given
self-incriminating grand jury testimony in support of his naming
in the indictment, any rights applicable here, even if enforcible by the defendant, which they are not, have been waived.

Defendant's motion to strike the references to Brower and
others not yet identified in the indictment as unindicted
co-conspirators should, therefore, be denied.

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XI. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE SURPLUSAGE FROM THE INDICTMENT SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE COMPLAINED OF IS NOT SURPLUSAGE

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Defendant moves, pursuant to Rule 7(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to strike from the indictment certain language appearing in counts four and seven. Specifically, defendant moves to strike from each count the words

kill, injure, and intimidate others and with the knowledge and intent that said explosives would be used unlawfully to damage and destroy buildings, vehicles, and other real and personal property, and which explosives did cause the injury and death of others.

(Defendant's Motion, p. 57). As grounds for his motion, defendant offers the unsubstantiated claim that the language of which he complains is "inflammatory", <u>Id</u>., and contains allegations "which [the Government] is unable to prove or will not prove." <u>Id</u>. Defendant's motion to strike should be denied because the language which is the subject of his motion sets out an element of the crime with which he is charged. It is, therefore, not surplusage and not the proper subject for such a motion.

Surplusage has been defined by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit as "language of an indictment that goes beyond alleging the elements of the statute," <u>United States v. Jordan</u>, 200 U.S. App. D.C. 64, 67, 626 F.2d 928, 931 (1980), which the indictment alleges the defendant to have violated. Under certain circumstances, such excess language might be the proper subject of a motion to strike. Where, however,

the language in the indictment is information which the government hopes to properly prove at trial, it cannot be considered surplusage no matter how prejudicial it may be (provided, of course, it is legally relevant) (citations omitted)

United States v. Climatemp, Inc., 482 F.Supp. 376, 391 (1979).

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18 U.S.C. 844(d), which defendant is charged in counts four and seven of the indictment with violating, provides:

Whoever transports or receives, or attempts to transport or receive, in interstate or foreign commerce any explosive with the knowledge or intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or indimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property, shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or fined not more than \$10,000, or both; and if personal injury results shall be imprisoned for not more than \$20,000, or both; and if death results, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment as provided in section 34 of this title.

The defendant's knowledge that the explosives shipped in violation of Section 844(d) would be used for a specific unlawful purpose designated in that Section is clearly an essential element of the crime described in the statute under which defendant is charged. The challenged portion of the indictment does not, therefore, include language which goes beyond alleging the elements of the statute. It simply sets out facts which the government will, since they constitute an essential element of the offense charged, properly prove at trial and is not, therefore, surplusage. See United States v. Jordan, supra; United States v. Climatemp, Inc., supra.

Moreover, defendant's statement that the United States has acted in bad faith in charging the defendant under Section 844(d) because it has no evidence to support that charge is incorrect. At trial, the United States can and will show, through the testimony of witnesses and through

documentary evidence, that the defendant knew when he and the other conspirators charged in the indictment caused explosives to be shipped to Libya in 1976 that those explosives would ultimately be used to injure persons and to damage property. Because language in the indictment which defendant moves to strike sets out an element of the offense with which defendant is charged by alleging facts which the government can and will prove at trial, it is not surplusage. Defendant's motion to strike should, therefore, be denied.

^{26/}The United States will introduce at trial, for instance, the co-conspirators' original written proposal to the Libyan government which resulted in their obtaining a contract to supply the terrorist training school at Benghazi with explosives. The document shows quite clearly that the co-conspirators knew, when they shipped the explosives, exactly what use the Libyans would and did make of them.

XII. DEFENDANT WILSON'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS IS MOOT

The United States of America, through its representative, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, respectfully oppose defendant's motion to suppress statements and gives as its reasons the following:

The only statements of the defendant which might be subject to disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were oral statements made by the defendant to government representatives in Rome, Italy in July, 1981 and a written memo in the custody of the United States in which the defendant appears to set forth his defense to the charges.

^{27/} Which rule provides, in pertinent part that:

[[]u]pon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy . . . any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant . . . within the possession . . . of the government, the existence of which is known, or . . . may become known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral statement which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant . . . in response to interrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a government agent . . .

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We do not intend to introduce the above-noted written 28/
statement as direct evidence against the defendant in our case-in-chief and, pursuant to the agreement set forth in our June 5, 1981 letter to counsel John A. Keats we will not use Mr. Wilson's oral Rome statements against him in our case-in-chief, reserving the right to use both the written and the oral statements against the defendant for impeachment purposes in cross-examination and/or rebuttal. See

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). It should be noted that attorney Keats was present at all times in Rome, Italy when the federal prosecutors and investigators interrogated the defendant and obtained the oral statements in question.

Nevertheless, we will supply the defense with all reports of interviews prepared by federal investigating agents of Edwin P. Wilson.

For the above-stated reasons we respectfully submit that defendant's motion to suppress statements is moot.

^{28/} We will supply a copy of this statement to the defense. See, United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 178 U.S.App. D.C. 20 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087.

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XIII. DEFENDANT'S ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MOTION IS BOTH LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY WITHOUT SUPPORT

The defendant, citing 18 U. S. Code §3504, requests disclosure of and moves to suppress "any and all evidence of whatever kind and nature, acquired directly or indirectly as a result of the existence of electronic surveillance, together with any and all fruits obtained therefrom and thereby." While defendant predicates his request upon 18 U. S. Code §3504, a simple reading of that section demonstrates that it does not provide the relief that he seeks.

Section 3504, Title 18, provides that

- (a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body or other authority of the United States --
 - (1) Upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because it was the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act the opponent of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act;
- (b) As used in this section "unlawful act"

 means any act the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device
 (as defined in section 2510(5) of this
 title) in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or
 any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant thereto. (emphasis added)

In this Circuit, the law is that the government's obligation under 18 U. S. Code §3504(a)(1) is triggered "by the mere assertion that <u>unlawful</u> wiretapping has been used against a $\frac{29}{\text{party.}}$ "

^{29/}Other courts have required more a specific claim of unlawful electronic surveillance before the court's duty to affirm or deny is triggered. These cases are all subsequent to Evans. E.g., United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940 (2nd Cir. 1977); United States v. Tucker, 526 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 958 (1976).

In re: Evans, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 452 F.2d 1239, 1247 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U. S. 930 (1972) (emphasis added). Here, however, the defendant has not alleged any unlawful electronic surveillance, nor even any electronic surveillance at all. It has been held that the United States is not even required to respond to such an allegation. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 855-856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 992 (1975).

laws suggest Relevant case that an appropriate motion for disclosure of electronic surveillance must meet prima facie standards for the presence of electronic veillance. United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit in Alter elaborated its test for sufficiency of allegations by requiring that a claim of electronic surveillance by the defendant reveal, inter alia, the specific facts which reasonably led the affiant to believe that the named party had been subjected to electronic surveillance; the dates of such suspected surveillance; and a connection between the possible electronic surveillance and the present party and proceeding in which the party involved. Only thereafter the the government required to 1d. at page 1025. Clearly the government respond in kind. must respond to a proper claim under 18 U. S. Code §3504;

[h]owever, because responding to ill founded claims of electronic surveillance would place an awesome burden on the government, a claim of governmental electronic surveillance of a party must be specifically concrete and specific before the government's affirmance or denial must meet the requirements of Alter, supra. Accordingly, a general claim requires only a response appropriate to such claim. United States v. See, supra, 505 F.2d at 856 [footnote omitted] [citation omitted].

In the spirit of obviating the need for the defense to respond with the specifics that they must to trigger the government's specific response, we would note for both the court and the defense that we are aware of no non-consensual electronic surveillance in which the defendant was overheard and, therefore, we plan to rely on no non-consensual electronic surveillance evidence in the trial of this matter.

^{30/}The three prosecutors, whose collective responsibility for this case extends almost to the inception of the investigation, as well as the primary case agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the Treasury Department are fully willing to provide affidavits to the court and counsel indicating the absence of non-consensual electronic surveillance. At this juncture, however, on the basis of the defendant's motion, there is no need even for that response.

XIV. THE PROPERTY WHICH DEFENDANT MOVES TO SUPPRESS WAS LAWFULLY SEIZED FROM HIM

Claiming that they were unlawfully seized from him, defendant moves to suppress certain documents, which were recovered by the United States Marshal's Service after he tore up and discarded them aboard an aircraft in flight from the Dominican Republic to New York City, and his briefcase and its contents, which Deputy United States Marshals took from him at the time of his arrest in New York. Defendant contends that he was arrested without probable cause in the Dominican Republic and that property seized from him aboard the aircraft and in New York therefore should be suppressed. Defendant, however, was never arrested in the Dominican Republic, abandoned the papers aboard the aircraft, and was arrested in New York on probable cause before the briefcase was seized. His motion to suppress should therefore be denied.

A. Circumstances of Defendant's Arrest

Early in the morning of June 15, 1982, defendant arrived in the international zone of the Santo Domingo International Airport in the Dominican Republic on a flight from Madrid, Spain. He was, at the time, traveling on an Irish passport issued in the name of Phillip McCormack but bearing defendant's photograph. When defendant attempted to enter the Dominican Republic, Dominican authorities advised him that there was a problem with his travel documents and refused him entry into the country. For the next several hours, defendant waited voluntarily in the international zone of the

^{31/}According to Irish authorities, the passport itself is not a forgery but does appear to have been fraudulently obtained.

^{32/}The Dominican immigration authorities had been advised by the United States Marshal's Service that the person traveling on the Irish passport was not Phillip McCormack and was wanted in the United States.

B. Defendant Abandoned the Property Recovered on the Flight to New York and Has No Standing to Challenge Its Admissibility

It is a well-established rule of Fourth Amendment law that where "a person has voluntarily abandoned property, he has no standing to complain of its search and seizure."

<u>United States v. Jackson</u>, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976).

<u>See also Abel v. United States</u>, 362 U. S. 217, 240-41 (1960);

<u>Hester v. United States</u>, 265 U. S. 57, 58 (1923); <u>United States v. Sampol</u>, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 349, 411-12, 636 F.2d 621, 683-84 (1980); <u>United States v. Colbert</u>, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973); <u>United States v. Cowan</u>, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2nd Cir. 1968). As in any other context, abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes "is primarily a question of intent and may be inferred from words, acts or other objective facts" [citations omitted]. <u>United States v. Jackson</u>, <u>supra at 409</u>.

The circumstances surrounding the recovery of the papers in the airsickness bag make clear the defendant's intention to abandon those papers. Defendant tore the papers up, placed them in a container which he knew would have been discarded under ordinary circumstances, and permitted the flight attendant to take possession of the papers along with other items obviously destined for disposal. Here, as in Sampol, "the objective circumstances provide an in-escapable inference that the [property seized] was abandoned." Sampol v. United States, supra, 204 U. S. App. D. C. at 411, 636 F.2d at 683. Defendant, has no standing to seek suppression of that property since there was no seizure from him.

airport until Dominican authorities told him that he would not be permitted to enter the Dominican Republic and would be placed on the next flight to New York City. Defendant was never arrested.

On the flight to New York, the United States Marshal for Puerto Rico, who was observing defendant, saw him tear up some papers, place them in an airsickness bag, and then put the bag containing the papers on a breakfast trav in front of him. When a flight attendant collected the breakfast tray, the United States Marshal for Puerto Rico followed her to the galley of the aircraft where she dropped the airsickness bag along with other items from the breakfast tray into a large garbage container. The Marshal then removed the airsickness bag from the garbage container, kept it until the plane reached New York, and there turned over the airsickness bag and its contents who retained the items as evidence. Upon defendant's arrival in New York, the Marshal's Service executed a bench warrant for his arrest which had been issued concurrently with defendant's indictment in the District of Columbia. the time of the arrest, Deputies seized defendant's briefcase.

^{33/}The airsickness bag contains what appear to be personal records kept by defendant relating to his net worth, debts owed to him, and other financial matters.

^{34/}The indictment, which supersedes an indictment returned in April, 1980, was returned on August 6, 1981; the bench warrant was issued the following day.

^{35/}The briefcase contained pens, a calculator, a book, a magazine and a variety of personal papers, as well as correspondence and memoranda relating to defendant's business and financial dealings, and other items.

C. Defendant Was Arrested on Probable Cause and Any Property Seized Incident to His Lawful Arrest Is Admissible

On August 6, 1981, a grand jury empanelled in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging defendant with a variety of violations of federal law. On the following day, a United States Magistrate for the District of Columbia issued a bench warrant, based on the indictment, for defendant's arrest. On June 15, 1982, the United States Marshal's Service executed the bench warrant when defendant arrived in New York from the Dominican Republic where he had been refused entry but never, despite his contention to the contrary, was arrested. At the time of his subsequent arrest pursuant to the bench warrant, Deputy United States Marshals seized the defendant's briefcase and its contents. Defendant contests the seizure.

Defendant's indictment on August 6, 1981 rendered nugatory any issue of probable cause for his arrest because, as the Supreme Court stated in <u>Giordonello</u> v. <u>United States</u>, 357 U.S. 480 (1957),

the grand jury's determination that probable cause existed for the indictment also establishes that element for the purpose of issuing a warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged.

357 U. S. 480, 487 (1957); see also Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932). In addition, it is established well beyond any serious question, that items such as the

^{36/}Even if defendant had been arrested in the Dominican Republic, his arrest would still have been accomplished with probable cause. His situation for purposes of a Fourth Amendment analysis therefore would remain the same whether or not he had been arrested in the Dominican Republic.

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briefcase and its contents, which defendant moves to suppress, seized from a person arrested on probable cause are admissible as evidence and not subject to suppression. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 236 (1973). Defendant's motion should, therefore, be denied.

37/In a concurring opinion in Robinson, Justice Powell quoted a Ninth Circuit articulation of the Court's rationale:

Power over the body of the accused is the essence of his arrest; the two cannot be separated. To say that the police may curtail the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging upon the sanctity of his pockets except for enumerated reasons is to ignore the custodial duties which devolve upon arresting authorities. Custody must of necessity be asserted initially over whatever the arrested party has in his possession at the time of apprehension. 414 U. S. at 237-238 n. 1, quoting from Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 388-389 (1960).

XV. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRETRIAL HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CO-CONSPIRATORS' STATEMENTS

The defendant requests a so-called pre-trial "James"

Hearing on the issue of the admissibility of co-conspirators'

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statements as follows:

This circuit has specifically addressed the question of the circumstances surrounding the introduction of such statements at trial in <u>United States v. Jackson</u>, 627 F.2d 1198, 39/201 U.S.App.D.C. 212 (1980), a case that postdates the <u>James</u> case upon which the defendant purports to rely and, neither <u>Jackson</u> nor <u>James</u> require the type of pretrial determination of the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements that defendant claims is his right.

In <u>Jackson</u>, the court found that the government must prove the existence of a conspiracy by substantial evidence independent of any co-conspirator's statements to the satisfaction of the trial judge before it submits the case to the jury for its deliberations. <u>See also</u>, <u>F.R.Evid</u>. 104(b).

As to the procedural timing of the determination by the trial judge, the better practice is for the court to determine before the hearsay is admitted that the evidence independent of the hearsay testimony proves the existence of the conspiracy sufficiently to justify admission of the hearsay declarations.

Jackson, supra, 627 F.2d at 1218, 201
U.S.App.D.C. at 232.

^{38/} Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

^{39/} United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).

While calling this the "preferred order of proof" the Court stated that trial judges were not obligated to follow that course, recognizing that "it is just impractical in many cases for a court to comply strictly with the preferred order of proof." Id., 201 U.S.App.D.C. at 232-33, 627 F.2d at 1218-19; see United States v. Gantt, 199 U.S.App.D.C. 249, 263, 607 F.2d 831 (1980). The James court had set forth a similar "preferred order of proof", stating that:

The district court should, whenever reasonably practicable, require the showing of a conspiracy and of the connection of the defendant with it before admitting declarations of a conspirator. If it determines it is not reasonably practical to require the showing to be made before admitting the evidence, the court may admit the statement subject to being connected up.

590 F.2d at 582.

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It is an unnecessary burden on this court's resources to conduct a "mini-trial" on the <u>Jackson</u> issue of admissibilty of co-conspirator's statements either in advance of trial or during the trial out of the presence of the jury before the presentation of <u>any</u> such evidence from co-conspirators. <u>See Jackson</u>, <u>supra</u>. In this case the court already has before it the guilty pleas of two testifying co-conspirators who both entered pleas of guilty to violating 18 U.S. Code § 371, confessed the existence of the conspiracy with which defendant Wilson is charged, and disclosed the roles that they individually played in it with Edwin P. Wilson. The court, then,

already has before it substantial independent evidence of the existence of the conspiracy. Additional evidence, separate and apart from co-conspirators' statements, establishing the existence of the conspiracy will be offered at trial and can be proferred in advance of the introduction of the 801(d)(2)(E) statements.

We respectfully submit that, in this case, the court should follow the procedure found acceptable in <u>Jackson</u> whereby the court permits

the introduction of evidence as to things said and done by an alleged co-conspirator subject to being connected up and followed by evidence of the existence of the conspiracy.

Id. 627 at 1218, citing United States v. Vaught,
485 F.2d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 1973).

Then, if the government fails to make the necessary evidentiary connection the court can strike the testimony at issue and instruct the jury to disregard it. $\frac{40}{\text{Id}}$.

Based on the fact that witnesses in this case have both hearsay and non-hearsay evidence to give and, further, based on the unnecessary expenditures of the court's resources in conducting the pretrial hearing proposed by the defendant, we urge this Court to make a preliminary determination as to the strength of the independent evidence in this case and in that determination conclude that admitting the hearsay declarations

^{40/} It would be foolhardy for the prosecution to promote this procedure it we had any doubt at all in our ability to prove the existence of the conspiracy in this case as we would be courting a possible mistrial if we should fail in our proof.

of co-conspirators against this defendant, subject to their connection, does not involve the risks of curative instructions or mistrial. Accordingly, we urge this Court to deny defendant Wilson's Motion for a Pre-Trial Hearing to Determine the Admissibility of 801(d)(2)(E) Statements.

XVI. ANSWER AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, INSPECTION AND BILL OF PARTICULARS

Viewed in context, the motions filed by the defendant seriously confuse the nature, extent and purpose of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Procedure), Rule 7(f) of the Federal rules of Criminal Procedure (Bill of Particulars), and the doctrine enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963) and its progeny. The defendant completely misperceives the purpose of a bill of particulars, attempting to make it a discovery device; then he attempts to distort Rule 16 into a legal crystal ball, hoping it will enable him to see the entirety of the government's case; and finally he attempts to twist Brady into an adhesive that would hold his ill conceived creation together. Since the motions are based on the erroneous premise that certain discovery they are not entitled to under Rule 16 they can somehow receive under Rule 7(f) and Brady, it is important at this juncture for the United States to present in clear terms the nature, scope and purpose of Rule 16, Rule 7(f) as well as Brady and to state specifically what these Rules do not cover.

A. DISCOVERY (RULE 16)

Defendants in criminal cases have no general constitutional right to discovery nor does the Due Process clause govern the nature or amount of discovery which must be provided. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Rather, discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is controlled by Rule 16. Rule 7(f) and the Brady doctrine, as will be more fully explained below, are not discovery devices. The 1975 amendments to Rule 16 provide for greater discovery to the defense as well as the prosecution. Under the expanded and liberalized discovery provisions of Rule 16, defendants

are entitled to discover four things:

Statements of the defendant where the statement is

- (a) a written or recorded statement made by the defendant directly to the government,
- (b) an oral statement made by the defendant "in response to interrogation by a person then known to the defendant to be a government agent,"
 (c) the recorded testimony of the defendant
- before the grand jury;
- (2) The defendant's prior criminal record;
- (3) Documents and tangible objects which are material to the preparation of the defense, or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belonged to the defendants; and
- (4) The results or reports of scientific tests or experiments which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in at the trial. Rule 16(a), Fed. R. Crim. P.

The United States has already advised counsel for the defendant that we will fully comply with the four areas which Rule 16 covers. Additionally, the United States will provide appropriate informal discovery to the defendant at such time as the defendant avails himself of the opportunity to accept our offer. As indicated in the defendant's motions, he has not yet sought the opportunity to gather informal discovery from counsel for the United States.

Notwithstanding the limits of Rule 16, the defendant has made wide sweeping requests for additional discovery, going far beyond that which he is entitled to under Rule 16. These requests in effect constitute the demand for an open-ended inspection and examination of much of the government's investi-In no instance has the various "discovery" gative files.

^{41/}We will treat later in this pleading defendant's "discovery" requests which are disguised as Brady demands.

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request made by the defendant been supported by references to specific cases or other authority. Courts have regularly condemned such sweeping discovery motions as improper. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 410-412 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 837; United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610, 615 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied,, 393 U. 1005; <u>United States</u> v. <u>Leta</u>, 60 F. R. D. 127, 129 (N. D. Pa. 1973). In fact only a precious few of the areas of requested discovery outlined in the defendant's pleading conform at all to requirements of Rule 16. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently repeated its position that there is "no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case." <u>United States</u> v. <u>Agurs</u>, 427 U. S. 97, 111 (1976) citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 J. S. 786, 792 (1972).

It is, therefore, very clear that Rule 16 does not give the defense the right to discover all of the government's evidence. It is also clear that Rule 16 does not give the defense the right to the names of the government's witnesses or persons interviewed during the course of the investigation. Our own Court of Appeals in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Bolden</u>, 169 U.S. App. D.C. 60, 71, 514 F.2d 1301, 1312 (1975), spoke directly to this point

Since this was not a capital case at the time of the trial [citation omitted], there was no government duty to disclose the witness list.

Even more recently, the Congress of the United States, in adopting the 1975 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically rejected the idea that the defense should be entitled to the names and addresses of government's witnesses even three days before trial. In the <u>Conference Report H. R. Rept. No. 94-414</u>, 94th Congress, 1st Session,

at 12 (1975) the conferees stated:

The House version of the bill provides each party, the government and the defendant, may discover the names and addresses of the other party's witnesses three days before trial. The Senate version of the bill eliminates these provisions, thereby making the names and addresses of a party's witnesses non-discoverable. The Senate version also makes a conforming change in Rule 16(d)(1). The conference adopts the Senate version.

A majority of the conferees believe it is not in the interest of the effective administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the defendant be forced to reveal the names and addresses of its witnesses before trial. Discouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed at influencing their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the formulation of this policy.

The Supreme Court recently upheld this position in Weatherford v. Bursey, supra at 559-561. A number of circuits have also reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49,62 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 910 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970); Carpenter v. United States, 463 F.2d 397, 402 (10th Cir. 1972). It would be especially harmful in the instant case for the United States to prematurely disclose the names of witnesses. The defendant is charged with, among other counts, solicitation and conspiracy to His resources and background demonstrate a commit murder. clear and present ability to cause substantial damage to witnesses if so inclined. Already the United States has found it necessary to place certain witnesses in the Witness Protection Program. Additionally, a substantial number witnesses have indicated to the United States their fear of physical retaliation if their status as witnesses or location were to become known. At least one court has specifically said that it would be an abuse of discretion to order the names of witnesses where coercion or harm would likely result.

<u>United States v. Moceri</u>, 359 F. Supp. 431 (N. D. Ohio 1973).

As a further example of defendant's misperception of what constitutes legitimate pre-trial discovery, he has made a sweeping request for "all statements, notes, recordings or any other form of transcription of statements made by any and all prospective government witnesses." (Defendant's Motion at p. 66.) Not only have we found no case which requires the pre-trial disclosure of this information, the Jencks Act (18 U. S. Code §3500) prohibits the production of these materials in discovery and quite clearly mandates the timing of such production.

Clearly, to the extent that the defendant's request for these statements constitutes a left-handed method of determining the government's witnesses, it is impermissible for the reasons previously stated. In spite of the fact that the law in no way requires it, we will agree to turn over the statements of virtually all perspective government witnesses on the date the case is called for trial. This will give the defendant ample opportunity through jury selection, pre-trial matters and on-going testimony to review and digest the Jencks material. The defendant also seeks the identity of any informers, agents, special employees or employees of the government who were utilized during the course of the investi-It is understandable why the defendant cites no law in support of any of their discovery requests, including this, one, for the law provides the defense no support for this demand. In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957),

^{42/}Defendant specifically requests the status of Ernest Keiser,
Philip Tucker and Dan Drake. The position of these individuals is made clear in the portion of this response
discussing fugitive recovery at pp 1 -18.

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reveal the identity of informers, but the government need not disclose all witnesses "who have knowledge of the case" United States v. Gonzalez, 466 F.2d 1286 (5th Circuit, 1972). In sum, then, the law will neither tolerate nor countenance the disclosure of the identity of informers simply in the whim of the defense. Rather, when the informant is integrally involved in the offense for which the defendants are charged and when the government does otherwise intend to produce or identify the informer, the court then may determine it to be appropriate to reveal the name sought. We do not anticipate these set of circumstances occurring in the instant case. Barring those circumstances, the defendant's broad request must be denied.

with respect to the defendant's request for promises and agreements made to witnesses, the United States is well aware of its responsibilities under <u>Giglio</u> v. <u>United States</u>, 405 U. S. 150 (1972). However, <u>Giglio</u> does not relate to pretrial disclosure of such information, but rather withholding such information at trial. The government will clearly make known to the defense, and most likely bring out on direct examination, any promises or commitments made to any government witnesses, consistent with <u>Giglio</u>. To the extent that those agreements are in writing, the United States will provide them at the time the <u>Jencks</u> material is provided.

The defense all requests "all materials, evidence or records in the prosecutor's possession which involve special investigations in connection with this case." (Defendant's motion at p. 68) Even within the rubrik of this overly broad, non-supported scatter-gun approach to motions presented by the defendant, we are unable to fathom what the defendant is asking for here. While it may likely fall into the same category as other requests made by him, we would need some information from him on this request before we could even begin to respond.

the court reversed the conviction of the defendant where the government refused and the trial court sustained the non-disclosure of the identity of an essential informant who was alleged in the indictment to be the individual to whom the defendant had sold heroin. In discussing the need to disclose at trial the identity of an integral witness, the court said:

We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest and protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders non-disclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. Id. at 62.

Decisions subsequent to Roviaro have increasingly emphasized the particular facts of Roviaro. See e.g. Alvarez v. United States, 525 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1976) and cases cited therein. Where the informer's role was simply providing information, no disclosure is necessary. United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550 (2nd Cir. 1975). In fact, the prenon-disclosure. vailing law in the circuits favor interests of law enforcement are served by protecting the identity of the informant except where a need for disclosure is demonstrated by the informant's own testimony, and not by the speculative claims of the defendant." United States Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5, 7 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 415 U. S. 984 (1974); accord <u>United States</u> v. <u>Hurse</u>, 453 F.2d 128, 130-131 (8th Cir. 1971); <u>United States</u> v. 400 F.2d 414, 416 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U. S. 934 Thus, not only is the United States not required to

B. BILL OF PARTICULARS (RULE 7(f))

Before discussing what a bill of particulars is, it is important to state what it is not. "It is not the function of a bill of particulars to provide a detailed disclosure of the government's evidence in advance of trial." Overton v. <u>United States</u>, 403 F.2d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1968). sition of evidentiary detail is not the function of a bill of particulars." Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 877 (1968). "The total items "equested by all defendants go far beyond that to which they are entitled. To require the government to furnish the minutiae sought would be tantamount to a preview of its case in advance of trial and compel a disclosure of dence, including the names of witnesses." States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 84, (S. D. N. Y. 1962).

"The purpose of a bill of particulars is to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against him to adequately prepare his defense, to avoid surprise during trial and to protect him against a second prosecution for an inadequately defined defense...when the indictment itself is too vague and indefinite for such purposes." United States v. Addonizio, supra, 451 F.2d at 63-64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord Wyatt v. United States, 388 F.2d 395, 397 (10th Cir. 1968); and United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1965) (and cases cited therein).

A motion for a bill of particulars is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, absent a showing of abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal (citations omitted). Ordinarily, the function of a bill of particulars is not to provide single "detailed disclosure of the government's evidence in advance of trial" but to supply "any

essential detail which may have been omitted from the indictment." tions omitted]. The informati [cita~ tions omitted]. The information sought by the defendants in their motion was the entire range of evidence on which the government relied, including the names of all witnesses to be used by Denial of such disthe government. closure, 'whether requested by a motion for bill of particulars under Rule 7(f), or by motion for discovery under Rule 16(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,' will not be an abuse of discretion on appeal [citation omitted]. Unite United States v. Anderson. 691 (4th Cir. 1973). 481 F.2d 690~

In the instant case, the indictment is extremely detailed and by no stretch of the imagination could it be described as vague and indefinite for the purpose of informing the defendant of the nature of the charges against him.

The indictment in each substantive count and more obviously in the conspiracy counts spells out in the various legal activities. The indictment discloses the identity of each of the indicted co-defendants, one of the unindicted coconspirators, the statutes involved, the object of the conspiracies, the means used by the defendants to further the objects of the conspiracy and finally, in count three, describes in forty-one overt acts the step-by-step planning and execution of the crime; and in count ten, six overt acts It is hard to imagine a more describing the conspiracy. particularized indictment than the one returned in the instant Frankly, one of the reasons why the indictment was drafted so specifically was to avoid having to respond to an unreasonable motion for a bill of particulars like the one filed by the defendant. His request for numerous particulars is clearly contrary to the underlying function of a bill of particulars in light of the specificity of the indictment. E.g. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1970); Overton v. United States, supra; Hemphill v. United States, supra.

Clearly, the mere fact that the indictment charges two conspiracy counts does not by some mystical process transform a rather straight-forward case into one that mandates a bill of particulars. In fact, "in an indictment for conspiracy to commit a criminal offense, the elements of that offense need not be stated with the same particularity as would be required in an indictment for a violation of the substantive offense." United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 70 (5th Cir. 1973), citing inter alia, Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77 (1927).

In light of the detailed nature of the indictment, the non-complexity of the charges and the extensive conversations which counsel has and will have, there is no way the defense can fairly claim that it does not know the nature of the charges so as to avoid surprise at trial, to prepare the defense, and to avoid double jeopardy. As stated above, these are the hornbook purposes of a bill of particulars. When these conditions are satisfied, as they are without any doubt in this case, the defendants are not entitled to a bill of particulars. United States v. Pollack, 175 U. S. App. D. C. 227, 534 F.2d 964, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 924 (1976). Pollack case involved a complicated mail fraud security scheme. Judge Gasch denied the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars on the ground that the indictment outlined the scheme and each defendants' role in that scheme in a manner sufficient to avoid surprise and permit the defendants to prepare a defense. The Court of Appeals for this Circuit upheld Judge Gasch, stating:

These circumstances, appellants' demands for further particularization of overt acts, the circumstances surrounding the

alleged acts, and attribution of the alleged misrepresentations may be construed as attempts to procure evidentiary material rejected within the discretion of the district judge. <u>United States</u> v. Pollack, supra 175 U. S. App. D. C. at 233, 574 F.20 at 970.

In taking the 16 numbered requests as well as the general requests of the defendant as a whole, it is clear that the defendant is seeking incredible amounts of detail with respect to the government's case. In fact, with respect to some counts, the defense requests virtually every evidentiary detail of the government's case -- a result which is totally contrary to the purpose of a bill of particulars. The Supreme Court has specifically held that a motion for a bill of particulars seeking this detail -- "which in effect sought a complete discovery of the government's case in reference to the overt acts"-- is properly denied. Wong Tai v. United States, supra, at 82. Such demands are customarily denied. E.g. United States v. Ford Motor Company, 24 F.R.D. 65, 70 (D.C.C. 1959) (Tamm J.); Hickman v. United States, 406 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 960 (1969); Cook v. United States, 354 F.2d, 529, 539 (9th Cir. 1965).

However, notwithstanding the fact that there is absolutely no justification for a bill of particulars in this case, the government is prepared to the extent possible to detail for the defense the time, date and/or place of certain acts set out in the indictment about which they have specifically inquired. This information will be provided to the defense in ample time prior to trial.

Finally, we wish to point out that the procedure we are following here was not only accepted by Judge Gasch and the Court of Appeals in the Pollack case, discussed above, but

has been fairly routinely followed by federal judges in the Southern District of New York. For example, in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Leighton</u>, 265 F. Supp. 27, 35 (S. D. N. Y 1967), after the government consented to supply the defense with the time and place where the alleged offense took place, the trial judge ruled as follows:

Where the indictment as written contains all the particulars necessary to enable the defendant to understand the charges against him and to protect himself from double jeopardy, the court will not order the government to set forth any further particulars. The indictment in the instant case most particularly sets forth the nature of the charges by specifying the approximate date of the offense, the amount of the bribe, the duty performed by the Revenue Agent and the name and year of the income tax return involved. Any particulars sought herein by the defendants which have not been consented to by the government either seek a preview of the evidence or go to matters not within the indict-As indicated, supra, these matters are not properly within the scope of a demand for a bill of particulars and, accordingly, both defendants' motions are granted only in so far as has been consented to by the government.

Further, in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Birrell</u>, 263 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S. D. N. Y. 1967), the trial judge ruled as follows:

The indictment herein is replete with factual details. Nevertheless, the government has consented to supply the defendant with a number of particulars, as specified by the government in its opposing affidavit and its opening memorandum of law.

The motion is granted to the extent that the government has consented. It is denied in all other respects for the reasons that other particulars sought obviously constituted an unwarranted attempt to obtain evidentiary detail of the government's proof in advance of trial and of the theory of its case.

To the same effect are <u>United States</u> v. <u>Diliberto</u>, 264 F. Supp. 181 (S. D. N. Y.); <u>United States</u> v. <u>Roberts</u>, 264 F. Supp. 662, 624 (S. D. N. Y. 1966).

Finally, the defendant's attempt to justify his bill of particulars by claiming difficulty in preparing or conducting his defense does not warrant the remedy he seeks.

Every denial of the defendant's request for a bill of particulars may in some measure make the preparation of his defense more onerous. But a demonstration of the generalized kind of prejudice is insufficient to override the broad discretionary powers vested in a district court with respect to such requests. If only a generalized showing of prejudice were sufficient, perhaps the defendant would always be entitled to a bill of particulars. Although the law of discovery in criminal cases has recently been liberalized, that development has yet to materialize. United States v. Wells, 387 F.2d 807, 808 (7th Cir. 1967); See also United States v. Johnson, 504 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1974).

C. RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS OF DEFENSE WITNESSES

Since the defendant has made requests for disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and (D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (See pages 67, 68 paragraphs 11 and 12 of their Omnibus Motion.), the United States requests pursuant to Rule 16(b)(1)(A) and (B) for reciprocal discovery of appropriate items called for by the Rule and specifically requests an order of the court granting reciprocal discovery.

Additionally, pursuant to Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States moves this court to issue an order directing the defendant to produce statements of witnesses called to testify on behalf of the defendant (or by the court).

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Effective December 1, 1980, Rule 26.2 was added to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As the Advisory Committee has stated, "Rule 26.2 provides for production of statements of defense witnesses at trial in essentially the same manner as is now provided for with respect to the statements of government witnesses." The new Rule establishes procedures for the production of defense witnesses' statements was enacted in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). The Advisory Committee pointed out that the purpose of Rule 26.2 is to make defense statements discoverable on the same basis as discovery of government witnesses is presently authorized by the Jencks Act (18 U.S. Code §3500): "[Rule 26.2], consistent with the reasoning in Nobles, is designed to place the disclosure of prior relevant statements of a defense witness in the possession of the defense on the same legal footing as is the disclosure of prior statements of prosecution witnesses in the hands of the government under the Jencks Act, 18 U. S. Code §3500 [which Rule 26.2 would replace]." In effect, a two-way "Jencks Act" has now been established "the Rule, with minor exceptions, makes the [discovery] procedure identical for both prosecution and defense witnesses."

The provisions of Rule 26.2 establish that, as a matter of right, the United States is entitled to all statements of defense witnesses called to testify at the trial of this case. This includes experts as well as lay witnesses. We stress that the "statement" as defined in Rule 26.2(f) includes not only written statements made by a witness that is signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him, but also a substantially verbatim recital of oral statements that is recorded contemporaneously with the making and is contained in a

stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording or transcription thereof. It may be that the defense has taperecorded interviews of persons whom they have interviewed. These are "statements" under Rule 26.2(f) and, thus, the United States is entitled not only to written statements pertaining to these witnesses but also tape recordings of these witnesses'.

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Moreover, the "work product" doctrine does not prevent disclosure that is required under Rule 26.2. The Advisory Committee made clear that Rule 26.2 was "consistent with the reasoning in Nobles." And in Nobles, the court rejected the argument that the "work product" privilege did not prevent disclosure of witnesses' statements. The court stated:

Respondent by electing to present the investigator as a witnesses waived the [work product] privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony. Respondent may not more advance the work product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work product materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privileges to resist cross-examination on matters reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination. United States v. Nobles, supra, 422 U. S. at 239-24045/

^{44/}The Court in Nobles upheld a lower court's order that required the defense to make available to the government its investigators report when the investigator testified.

^{45/}In a concurring opinion, Justice White took the view that the work product doctrine applied only to pre-trial discovery and not to "production of evidentiary material at trial." 422 U.S. at 243. The court itself reserved that question, relying instead on the narrower waiver analysis. Id at 239.

The court also noted that even if the Sixth Amendment privilege were applicable (which the court noted it was not) that was also waived. Id. at 240 n. 15. And, of course, the same would be true with respect to the attorney-client privilege were it applicable. But the attorney-client privilege is clearly not applicable in any event because it applies only to "confidential communications between client and attorney..." Baird v. Coerner, 278 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1960); accord (cont'd)

Initation on the requirement to produce witness statements was the explicit holding in Goldberg v. United States, supra, n. 2. Indeed, the court held that even the government attorneys' notes of witness conferences were not protected to the extent that those notes reflected the statements of a witness. The court reasoned that so long as only witness statements are disclosed, the lawyers' reflections and strategies continue to receive protection. The court explained:

Proper application of the [Jencks] Act will not compel disclosure of a government lawyer's recordation of mental impressions, personal beliefs, trial strategy, legal conclusions, or anything else that 'could not fairly be said to be the witness's own' statement. 'If a government attorney has recorded only his own thoughts in his interview notes, the notes would seem both to come within the work product immunity and to fall without the statutory definition of "statement".' Furthermore, if a witness has for some reason 'adopted or proved' a writing containing trial strategy or similar matter, such matter would be excised under section 3500(c) as not relating to the subject matter of the witness' testimony or direct examination. Thus, the primary policy underlying the work product doctrine—i.e. protection of the privacy of an attorney's mental processes—is adequately safeguarded by the Jencks Act itself. Id. at 106 (citations omitted).

The work product doctrine cannot, therefore, prevent disclosure under Rule 26.2, which as the Advisory Committee stated, "is designed to place the disclosure of prior relevant statements of a defense witness in the possession of the defense on the same legal footing as is the disclosure of prior statements

^{45/}Cont'd. Wilcoxen v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 386, cert.

denied, (351 U. S. 943 (1946)). Here we are concerned only with the statements of third-parties. Indeed neither in Nobles nor in Goldberg v. United States, 425 U. S. 94 (1976), did anyone even try to suggest that the attorney-client privilege was implicated by the required disclosures.

....

of prosecution witnesses in the hands of the government under the Jencks Act, 18 U. S. Code §3500," (emphasis added).

We recognize that the Rule does not require disclosure of defense witness statements until after the witness testifies on direct examination. However, the Advisory Committee has stated that Rule 26.2 "is not intended to discourage the practice of voluntary disclosure at an earlier [than after the witness's direct testimony] so as to avoid delays at trial." Thus, in order to avoid delay, we respectfully request that the court (in concert with our suggestion relating to government disclosure of Jencks Act statement) direct the defendant to disclose all statements of witnesses they plan to call prior to the commencement of the presentation of the defense case.

^{46/}The defendant makes a request for restricted discovery (page 111-112 of his Omnibus Motion) and specifically seeks that items discovered or disclosed be revealed solely to the court and to the defense and "under no circumstances, be made public or available to any other person, including the news media." In light of counsel for the defendant's proclivity towards television appearances following court hearings and practice of delivering their motions to the news media prior to delivery to the United States, we find such a request disingenuous. As the court is aware, it is not the practice of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia to provide discovery materials relevant to a criminal case to individuals other than the court and counsel. We will continue to act appropriately with regard to this practice. Further, with rare exception, it is the practice of this office to provide copies of discovery and inspection materials to the defense to peruse at their leisure. If there are unusual or unique circumstances where this is not possible, we will make those instances known to the court.

THE INDICTMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY PLED TO INFORM

DEFENDANT OF THE CHARGES OF WHICH HE IS

ACCUSED SO THAT HE MAY PREPARE HIS DEFENSE

The defendant asserts that the indictment contains insufficient allegations to notify the defendant of the charges he must meet to adequately prepare for trial. We disagree.

Rule 7(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that [t]he indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." Courts have repeatedly held that the indictment serves two principal functions: it is supposed to sufficiently apprise the defendant of the offense of which he is accused so that he "knows what he must be prepared to meet" and so that a judgment therein will protect him from a subsequent prosecution for the same crime. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764 (1962), quoting from Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1894). The second function has less significance than the first in view of the fact that the whole record of the proceedings, and not the indictment itself, may be relied upon to protect the defendant's right against double jeopardy. Id.

In the instant case, most all of the charges are uncommon ones rarely charged in this jurisdiction, so the government was careful to track the language of the statute in each instance in which the statute set forth the essential elements of the offense. We agree with the defense that the extent to which tracking the statute is permissible depends on the language of the statute itself:

It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as "those words of themselves fully, directly and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished."

United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882).

Accord, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1942); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-378 (1953).

We submit that the language under which the defendant was indicted and of which he now complains "meets the requirements of clarity and certainty" as set forth above. <u>United States</u> v. <u>Ramos</u>, 666 F.2d 469, 474 (11th Cir. 1982) (and cases cited therein). Moreover, wherever appropriate, the government supplemented the statutory language with the time and place of the criminal activity and the names or identities of the participants. When appropriate, the defense can, of course, obtain more particulars concerning the charged offenses in a bill of particulars and through pretrial discovery. <u>See</u>, <u>United States</u> v. <u>Carrier</u>, 672 F.2d 200, 303 (2d Cir. 1982).

Contrary to defendant's assertion with respect to Count Three, the defendant is specifically charged with conspiring to violate three separate statutes. Moreover, he is similarly specifically advised as to which statutes the government is proceeding against him with in Counts Five, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine.

For the above-stated reasons we respectfully submit that the defendant's motion should be denied.

XVIII. DEFENDANT'S BRADY DEMAND SEEKS INFORMATION TO WHICH HE IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED

In a preposterously broad demand for disclosure based on an apparently deliberate distortion of the rule of law established by the Supreme Court in <u>Brady v. Maryland</u>, 373 U. S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, defendant requests that the prosecution literally turn over its entire file to him.

Brady, of course, requires nothing of the kind.

What Brady does require, where the issue is pretrial disclosure of evidence, as distinguished from posttrial discovery, is that prosecutors, upon specific request, make available to the defense "evidence favorable to an accused... where the evidence is material either to guilt or Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U. S. at 87. punishment." Material evidence, for Brady purposes in the pretrial setting, has been defined by the Court as "evidence [which] creates a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist ... " United States v. Agurs, supra n. 3, 427 U. S. at 112. The Government's Brady obligation is, therefore, much more narrowly drawn than defendant's elaborately embellished version the Brady doctrine would make it appear. In short, the Government must disclose, in response to a Brady demand made before trial, any evidence which might create a reasonable doubt not suggested by any other evidence. See United States

⁴⁷Defendant, in his motion, has "requested that the prosecution's file be produced in court and examined by the court and defense counsel..." (Defendant's Motion, p. 107).

⁴⁹ In United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1975), the Supreme Court's most recent and dispositive discussion of the Brady doctrine, the Court noted that it had "rejected the suggestion that the prosecutor has a constitutional duty to routinely deliver his entire file to defense counsel...". 427 U. S. at 111.

⁴⁹Defendant's motion actually requests production of "any evidence in [the Government's] possession favorable or exculpatory to the accused" (Defendant's Motion, p. 98). That request is obviously well beyond anything ever realistically contemplated by Brady or Agurs.

v. <u>Lemonakis</u>, 158 U. S. App. D. C. 162, 185, 485 F.2d 941, 50/ 964 (1973), <u>cert</u>. <u>denied</u> 415 U. S. 989 (1974).

The Government is fully aware of the <u>Brady</u> requirement that it disclose to the defense favorable information of such significance that it might create a reasonable doubt. The Government welcomes this constitutional responsibility and will execute it without hesitation. To the extent, however, that defendant's vague and general <u>Brady 52</u>/demand seeks more than the constitutionally mandated disclosure of favorable information which is also material, as defined in <u>Agurs</u>, the Government declines to comply with

^{50/}The Government, therefore, need not disclose as defendant's expansive interpretation of Brady suggests it must, information that might possibly "have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs, supra n. 3, 427 U. S. at 111. Nor does the "impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prpare for trial", 427 U. S. at 112 n. 20, have anything to do with a pre-trial Brady determination.

^{51/}Defendant also moves that the Government be admonished that it has, under Brady, a continuing obligation to disclose favorable, material information (Defendant's Motion, p. 108). Since we recognize here that our obligation under Brady is a continuing one, no such admonition is now, if it ever was, necessary. See e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300, 320 n. 16 (1972). Defendant also seeks disclosure of Brady information before trial. The Government will, of course, make Brady disclosures either at trial or "at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case, even if satisfaction of this criterion requires pre-trial disclosure" (citations omitted). United States v. Pollack, 175 U. S. App. D. C. 227, 236, 534 F.2d 964, 973, cert. denied 429 U. S. 924 (1976). See also United States v. Henry, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 88, 93, 528 F.2d 661, 666 (1976).

⁵²/In Agurs, the Supreme Court noted that a general request for all Brady material or for anything exculpatory, such as defendant makes here, "really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made." 427 U. S. at 106-107.

it and submits that defendant's sweeping motions for discovery, thinly disguised as a <u>Brady</u> demand, should be denied by this court.

^{53/}As the Supreme Court has noted, "there is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 559 (1977).

XIX. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WILSON'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF GRAND JURY MATERIAL IN HIS "GRAND JURY DUE PROCESS" AND RELATED MOTIONS

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The United States of America respectfully responds as follows to the defendant Wilson's Grand Jury Due Process Motion and related motions which seek discovery of matters occurring before the grand jury and attacks the grand jury procedure allegedly utilized in this case:

A. Discovery of Grand Jury Material - General Argument

Defendant seeks a wholesale disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury that investigated this case and returned the instant indictment and gives as his reasons that: "[o]ver the past ten years, counsel has made a special study of grand jury due process" (Defendant's Motion, page 73) and that in order to "fully demonstrate these [unspecified] due process failures" (Id.) he requires some discovery of matters occurring before the grand jury.

In his requests, the defendant does not even appear to acknowledge the existence of the "long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in federal

courts." United States v. Procter and Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 54/
681 (1958). See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).

When "disclosure is permitted, it is to be done 'discretely and limitedly,'" and one seeking disclosure must show a "particularlized need" for such disclosure. <u>Dennis</u> v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 868-875 (1966).

Clearly, the court is empowered under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to order disclosure of grand jury testimony "preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding" such as the trial in this case. See Dennis v. United States, supra, 384 U.S. at 870; Harris v. United States, 433 F.2d 1127, 1128, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 23 (1970). The court may also order disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) which provides for disclosure "when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury." Moreover, the Supreme Court and this Circuit have recognized "the growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of

^{54/} The most recent statement by the Supreme Court on the rationale for maintaining grand jury secrecy can be found in Douglas Oil Company v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979).

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criminal justice." <u>Dennis v. United States, supra,</u> 384 U.S. at 870; <u>Harris v. United States, supra,</u> 433 F.2d at 1128, n.6, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 22, n.6. In accordance with this thinking and with the established practice of the United States Attorney for this District, the Court of Appeals adopted the rule that:

the accused, upon seasonable request, shall be permitted, at the close of direct examination of each witness called by the Government, to inspect the grand jury testimony of the witness which is pertinent to the subjects addressed on direct examinations.

433 F.2d at 1129, 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 23.

In 1970 Congress amended the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500) to include within its scope for the first time "a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3). This action made it clear that a transcript of a witness' grand jury testimony is among those statements that are not subject to discovery "unto said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case."

Of course, we intend to follow the law by disclosing to the defense grand jury transcripts of witnesses called to testify at a trial in this case at the appropriate time. Apart from such disclosure of such testimony to the defense, we vigorously oppose any further breach of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings in this case.

First,

. . . [T]he scope of the secrecy [with respect to grand jury matters] is necessarily broad. It encompasses not only the direct revelation of grand jury transcripts but also the disclosure of information which would reveal "the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of the jurors, and the like."

Fund for Constitutional Government
v. National Archives and Records Service,
656 F.2d 856, 870, U.S.App.D.C.
(1981), quoting from SEC v. Dresser
Industries, 628 F.2d 1368, 1382-83, 202 U.S.
App.D.C. 345, 359-60 (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 993 (1980).

Second, there is a presumption of regularity that attaches to grand jury proceedings, see Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972), and to the "acts of public officials (e.g. prosecutors) in grand jury matters"; In re November 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir. 1980). The defendant, therefore, has the burden of demonstrating that any irregularity in the proceedings occurred before any disclosure of grand jury matters may be ordered. United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 250 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1976); Universal Manufacturing Company, 508 F.2d 684, 685 (8th Cir. 1975); Beverly v. United States, The defendant's claim of possible "due process" violation with respect to the grand jury proceedings in this case "amount to nothing more than unsupported speculation", United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290, 1291 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978), and are

but an expression of a generalized hope by [the defendant] that he might find some defect in the grand jury proceedings. Such 'fishing expeditions' do not provide sufficient grounds for disclosure prior to trial. 54A/

Thomas v. United States, 597 F.2d 656, 658 (8th Cir. 1979).

 $\frac{54A}{\text{See}}$ also Winchester v. United States, 407 F.Supp. 261, 277-278 (D. Del. 1975), wherein the following discussion of the presumption of regularity can be found.

Proceedings before a grand jury are generally accorded a strong presumption of regularity. 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice, \$ 6.05 at 6-53. The deductive reasoning employed by defendant in his effort to ferret out flaws in the grand jury proceedings relies upon baseless assumptions concerning the abilities of the grand jurors and the nature of the charges in the new indictment. The facile conclusions so engendered are more appropriately found in a Conan Doyle novel than a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e). That rule requires that a particularized need be demonstrated before otherwise secret grand jury matters are revealed. United States v. English, 501 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1974) (disclosure committed to discretion of trial judge; defendant must show particularized need); United States v. Perkins, 383 F.Supp. 922, 929, 930 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (superseding indictment regular on its face and particularized need not shown); United States v. Manetti, 323 F.Supp. 683, 694 (D. Del. 1971) (must show particularized need outweighing desirability of secrecy); United States v. Wolfson, 294 F.Supp. 267, 271-72 (D. Del. 1968) (must be more than "hunch"). Assertions based on vague allegations of unspecified "lawyer's charges" and conjectures concerning temporal probabilities are insufficiently particularized under the Rule to warrant a speculative inquiry into the genesis of an indictment which appears regular on its face. See United States v. Messite, 324 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). See generally, United States v. Budzanoski, 462 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 271, 34 I.Ed. 2d 220 (1972); United States v. Slawik, 408 F. Supp. 190, 201 (D. Del. 1975).

The defendant does not even present any evidence or accusation that might warrant the court, in the interest of justice, to conduct an <u>in camera</u> inspection of some or all of the materials sought as in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Hubbard</u>, 474 F.Supp. 64 (D.C.D.C. 1979). <u>See also, Dennis v. United States</u>, supra, 384 U.S. at 874-875.

Finally, before addressing the defendant's individual requests for information, we must note that "[t]he grand jury's investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged." <u>United States</u> v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974). Moreover, as the Court said in <u>Branzburg</u> v. <u>Hayes</u>, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);

"[T]he investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of citizen . . . " Id. at 700.

"The role of the grand jury as an important instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily includes an investigatory function with respect to determining whether a crime has been committed and who committed it . . . 'When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area . . society's interest is best served by a thorough and extensive investigation. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962). A grand jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.' <u>United States v. Stone</u>, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand jurors.

Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined the evidence that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an indictment can be made. Id., at 701-702.

For the above-stated reasons we submit that the defendant has not and cannot make a sufficient showing that he is entitled to most of the material he seeks. We will now respond to each of defendant's specific requests for information.

B. Discovery of Grand Jury Matters --Specific Requests

Numbers 1 and 5

- Number 1. Any and all records or logs showing the attendance of the individual grand jurors who composed the grand jury which returned the indictment against the defendant.
- Number 5. State whether any grand juror who voted to return the indictment was not continuously present when all the evidence underlying the indictment was presented to the grand jury.

For the above-stated reasons we decline to produce these records. Furthermore, we note that the defendant is presumably attempting to establish whether the grand jurors who voted to return the indictment in this case heard all of the evidence in the case. But "[n]either the Fifth Amendment nor Rule 6(f) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] expressly states whether a grand juror must hear all the evidence presented before he or she can cast a valid vote for indictment."

^{55/} Which provides in part that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . "

^{56/} Which provides that an "indictment may be found only upon the concurrance of 12 or more jurors."

United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).

"Nothing requires that every juror voting to indict attend every session." Id. at 649. Accord, United States v.

Barker, 675 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.

Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982); See also, United States v.

States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). For this reason also we decline to produce these records.

Number 2. Disclose Whether or Not These Matters Were Presented to Any Other Grand Jury, Which Either Did Not Act Upon the Evidence, or Returned a No Bill.

Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that he is entitled to this information nor does he or can he suggest that he has reason to believe that if a grand jury heard evidence in this case and did not act upon the evidence or returned a "no bill" there was something improper in that procedure.

We will state that there were a number of successor grand juries that heard evidence in the lengthy and difficult investigation that led up to the original indictment by the October 1979 grand jury and the superseding indictment returned by the August 1980 grand jury. No grand jury has ever returned a "no bill" in this investigation and case with respect to this defendant. In any event, withdrawing a case from one grand jury and re-presenting it to another or successor grand jury is an accepted and proper procedure.

- Number 3. State whether any agent of the United States Attorney's office or witnesses, or any other person summarized the testimony or events furnished to the grand jury in connection with this case.
- Number 4. State whether the grand jury was specifically advised that it was receiving summarized or hearsay testimony which may be applicable under the preceding paragraph.
- Number 8. State whether any witness before the grand jury testified with regard to circumstances or transactions about which he had no personal knowledge and, if so, whether the grand jury was clearly advised that it was receiving hearsay information.
- Number 18. State whether any hearsay testimony was submitted to the grand jury.

For the above-stated reasons concerning the importance of maintaining the integrity and secrecy of the grand jury we decline to produce this information. Moreover, through his requests the defendant appears to suggest that there would be something improper about presenting hearsay evidence or summarizing testimony given to the grand jury. The defendant cites no authority for this proposition and, indeed, the cases do not support his position. See, Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Accord, Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 173 (1965); United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980)

rational transfer continues in this work given

- Number 6. State what, if any, legal advice was given to the grand jury by the prosecution or court, including, but not limited to, the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the interpretation of the various statutes charged in this indictment, the evaluation of circumstantial evidence or hearsay proof, and any other rules with regard to the evidence presented in this case.
- Number 7. State specifically whether the entire grand jury process and proceedings, resulting in the indictment, were recorded, including the reference above to legal advice.
- Number 19. State whether the United States
 Attorney made any rulings regarding the admissibility of any
 evidence or the competence of
 witnesses before the grand jury.
- Number 20. Did the prosecutor explain to the grand jury any favorable treatment, "deals", grants of immunity or other leniency promised witnesses called before the grand jury?
- Number 21. The prosecution should disclose whether or not there were any off-the-record discussions in the presence of the grand jury which were not transcribed.
- Number 23. State specifically whether such legal advice, if any, given to the grand jury was recorded, and if a transcript thereof exists.
- Number 24. If a transcript of the legal advice given to the grand jury exists, the defendant requests a copy of it.

Any remarks made by the court to the grand jury by way of opening remarks or legal advice is a matter of public record and we, of course, do not contest defendant's right to have

access to such material. And, of course, the "Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors" is also available to the defense should they choose to inspect it. But, for the above-stated reasons concerning the importance of maintaining the integrity and the secrecy of grand jury proceedings we decline to provide any of the details of what legal advice was, in fact, given by the prosecutor to this grand jury. We will state, however, that all proceedings were recorded.

Number 9. Disclose the names and addresses of each of the grand jurors who heard evidence in connection with this case, and subsequently voted the indictment, and designate their sex.

For the above-stated reasons concerning the importance of maintaining the integrity and secrecy of the grand jury we decline to produce this information. Moreover, the defendant appears to be seeking information to challenge the composition of the grand jury through this request. The defendant does have the right to access to the master lists from which the jurors are drawn (See 28 U.S. Code § 1867(f)) to determine whether the "master lists from which [the defendant's] grand jury had been selected systematically excluded disproportionate numbers of people with Spanish surnames, students, and blacks", Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 29 (1975). See also, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (in which the court

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<u>United States</u> v. <u>Hubbard</u>, <u>supra</u>, 474 F.Supp. at 85. While we have no objection whatever to defense counsel having access to pertinent information from the master list and qualification questionnaires of the entire juror pool from which the April 1978 grand jury was selected, the authorities cited above clearly dictate that defendant's motion for access to records of only those jurors who composed the specific grand jury be denied.

Number 10. State whether the proceedings involving this case at any time were conducted before fewer than sixteen grand jurors, or whether fewer than twelve grand jurors concurred in the indictment.

In accordance with Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure there was always at least sixteen (16) grand jurors present whenever testimony was taken or the grand jury was in session in this case and in accordance with Rule 6(f)

^{57/} The juror qualification questionnaires contain, in addition to names and addresses, virtually all information pertinent to the issue of whether the juror pools were representative of a cross-section of the community, e.g., age, sex, race, marital status, occupation, citizenship, literacy, health, criminal records, education and grounds for exemption. Therefore, there can be no need for the defense to have access to the names and addresses of any grand juror, or any person named in the master lists or pools. There is, of course, a significant interest in protecting the privacy of citizens called upon to serve as jurors where there is no countervailing need to identify individual members of the master pools and since any and all information pertinent to a proposed motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) can be made available by giving access to copies of qualification questionnaires with names, addresses, and telephone numbers obliterated or concealed, we would strenuously oppose the disclosure of any information which would identify individual jurors or members of the master pools.

at least twelve jurors concurred in the indictment which was returned on August 6, 1981 before the Honorable Arthur Burnett, United States Magistrate. The transcript of the proceedings reveal that the Magistrate reviewed the poll sheet and other accompanying papers and concluded that they "show[ed] a sufficient number of votes of members of the Grand Jury for the actions involved". (Transcript of Grand Jury Indictment Return, page 4).

Number 11. Disclose the names and addresses of all those persons who were inside the grand jury room at any time when evidence relating to the defendant's case was being presented, including, but not limited to, the stenographer, court attendants, United States Attorneys, their assistants, or any persons other than the grand jurors themselves.

We will state that only authorized persons, pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, were present at any grand jury proceeding. The names of these individuals are not discoverable for the reasons stated above.

- Number 12. State whether the indictment in its final form was drafted by the United States Attorney's Office and displayed to the grand jury before they voted its return.
- Number 13. State whether the indictment in its final form was exhibited or read verbatim to each of the grand jurors who voted to return it before the vote was taken.

For the above-stated reasons concerning the importance of maintaining the integrity and secrecy of the grand jury we decline to produce this information. Suffice to say, we complied with Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and with this Circuit's opinion in <u>Gaither</u> v. <u>United States</u>, 413 F.2d 1061, 1070-1071, 134 U.S.App.D.C.154, 163-164 (1969).

- Number 14. State, as set forth with respect to each count of the indictment, the record of the grand jury's vote maintained for each count of the indictment.
- Number 22. State with respect to each count of the indictment the record for the grand jury vote maintained pursuant to Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The defendant clearly is not entitled to this information. It is enough to state that it is the practice of the United States Attorney to have grand jurors vote separately on each count as to each individual defendant in a given case.

- Number 15. State the date the grand jury's investigation of the defendant or any other persons connected with this case began and state the date it was concluded.
- Number 16. State whether there was any evidence accumulated in the investigation of this case which in any way related to these matters which was not presented to the grand jury and, if so, state the substance of that evidence.

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Number 17. State the names and addresses of the witnesses who testified before the grand jury in this case and identify any and all documentary evidence presented to the grand jury.

Number 27. State whether the same evidence was presented to the second grand jury which returned the superseding indictment as that which was presented before the grand jury that returned the first indictment on April 23, 1980.

The defendant cites no authority for the proposition that he is entitled to this information and we decline to provide it for the reasons set forth above concerning the need to maintain the integrity and secrecy of grand jury proceedings.

Number 25. State whether the proceedings before the grand jury were stenographically transcribed in toto, and, if not, state what portion or part thereof was not transcribed.

All of the proceedings before the August 1980 Grand Jury were recorded and have been or are now being transcribed.

Number 26. State whether the grand jurors that returned the superseding indictment were the same as those who returned the first indictment on April 23, 1980.

They were not the same. The grand jury that returned the original indictment had been empanelled on October 1, 1979 and served for eighteen (18) months pursuant to Rule 6(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The grand jury that returned the superseding indictment was empanelled on August 25, 1980, and likewise served for eighteen (18) months.

C. Related Grand Jury Motions

In addition to his general "Grand Jury Due Process" pleading, the defendant files eight separate and related pleadings. In our response to his Grand Jury Due Process pleading we have already addressed the issues he presents in all but one of his additional, related pleadings. That is, we have responded above to the arguments and requests for discovery of grand jury material with respect to the issues of:

- 1. Misinstructions before the Grand Jury
- 2. Grand Jury continuity
- 3. Unauthorized persons before the Grand Jury
- 4. Leaving the indictment with the Grand Jurors
- 5. Summarizing of Testimony before the Grand Jury
- 6. Inspection of the Grand Jury Minutes pursuant to Rule 6(e)
- 8. Other Grand Jury deficiencies

With respect to pleading Number 7 -- "Failure to Present Evidence to the Grand Jury" -- we respectfully refer the Court to the following discussion found in <u>United States</u> v. <u>Y. Hata and Company, Ltd.</u>, 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1976), which we think is dispositive of defendant's claim:

We reject appellants' contentions that the prosecution must present the grand jury with evidence it may have which would tend to negate guilt. Although some states have imposed a duty on the prosecution to disclose such evidence (see, e.g., Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 124 Cal.Rptr. 32, 539 P.2d 792 (1975)), the federal system continues to give wide discretion to the prosecution.

During a grand jury proceeding there is no right of cross-examination, or of introducing evidence to rebut the prosecutor's presentation. United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968). As the Court stated recently in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44, 94 S.Ct. 613, 618, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 569 (1974);

[A] grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.

This policy is based upon an abiding confidence in the jury trial system. "[T]he greatest safeguard to the liberty of the accused is the petit jury and the rules governing its determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence." Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968).

For the above-stated reasons, we respectfully submit that the defendant's motions pertaining to "grand jury due process" and related issues should be denied.

XX. THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION BECAUSE HE HAS NOT COMPLETED WITH IT

without benefit of a single citation to supporting authority or any reference to specific facts or circumstances of this case from which his claim is purported to arise, "defendant challenges the constitutionality of the Classified Information Procedures Act on its face and as applied in this case." (Defendant's Motion, p. 113). Since defendant has failed to comply with the Act, which is clearly constitutional on its face, his challenge to it is not ripe for adjudication. Defendant's motion for a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional should therefore be denied.

1. Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U. S. C. Appx. III)

On October 25, 1980, then President Carter signed into law the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. Appx. III). The Senate report states that the purpose of the bill is to provide

pretrial procedures that will permit the trial judge to rule on questions of admissibility involving classified information before introduction in open court. This procedure will permit the government to ascertain the potential damage to national security of proceeding with a given prosecution before trial.

S. Rep. No. 96-823, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in U. S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 4294. After several days of hearings in March, 1978, the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure of the Senate Intelligence Committee found that

prosecution of a defendant for disclosing national security information often requires the disclosure in the course of

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Defendant fails to specify what relief he seeks, beyond a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional, or does he explain exactly how the Act infringes on "his right to adequately defend himself" or his "right of free speech." (Defendant's Motion, p. 113-114).

trial of the very information the laws seek to protect. Id. at 4295.

The Subcommittee recommended consideration of legislation which would

minimize the problem of so-called graymail⁵⁹/ - a threat by the defendant to disclose classified information in the course of trial-by requiring a ruling on the admissibility of the classified information before trial. Id.

Subsequently, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Senate Judiciary Committee held further hearings and drafted legislation (S. 1482), which was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 20, 1980. After conference, the House of Representatives passed the Senate version of the bill, on October 2, 1980.

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^{59/}At a hearing in this case on July 21, 1982, defendant's own counsel characterized one aspect of the defense as "graymail," the very practice which the Act seeks to regulate.

[[]Mr. Fahringer] The other, of course, and the most troublesome issue in this case is, of course, the one of the graymail matter.

Obviously, for Mr. Wilson to adequately defend himself, he would have to disclose what authority he had to do what he did and the information that he was supplying to highly sensitive government agencies which I think is going to have rather severe ramifications. (Transcript of Proceedings, July 21, 1982, p. 27, lines 6-12)

^{60/}It is of interest to note, in the context of defendant's assertion that the Act infringes on his First Amendment right to free speech, that S. 1482, which was passed instead of a House version of the bill after a conference committee, had the "support of the Justice Department, all the intelligence agencies, the Association of Foreign Intelligence Officers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Bar Association. S. Rep. No. 96-283, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in U. S. Code Cong. and Ad. News, 4296 (emphasis provided).

The Act, as the Senate Report summarized its most important provisions, attempts to resolve the "disclose or $\frac{61}{}$ / dismiss" dilemma.

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by requiring a defendant who reasonably expects to disclose or to cause a disclosure of classified information in connection with any trial or pre-trial proceeding to notify the Government prior to trial, when possible. The Government can then move for a hearing to determine whether the information can indeed be disclosed by the defendant in the course of a trial. Following such a hearing, which would ordinarily be before trial, the court determines whether and the manner in which the information at issue may be used in a trial or pre-trial proceding. If the defendant's right to a fair trial will not be prejudiced, the court may allow the Government to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the specific classified information would tend to prove or to substitute a summary of the specific classified information. If the Government objects to an order requiring disclosure, the court may impose a sliding scale of sanctions against the Government, including finding against the Government on issues related to undisclosed evidence or dismissing The Government is authorized to the action. take interlocutory appeals, thus remedying the present situation in which the Government, even when faced with a district court ruling it believes to be wrong, must either compromise the national security information by permitting its disclosure at trial or with-hold the information and jeopardize the prosecution. Id. at 4297-98.

In short, the Act sets up procedures which harmonize, the defendant's right to a fair trial, where disclosure of classified informmation is necessary to his defense, with the government's right to protect classified information even within the context of a criminal prosecution.

^{61/}Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Phillip Heymann before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, February 7, 1980. S. Rep. No. 96-283, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in U. S. Code Cong. and Ad. News, 4294, 4297.

2. Since Defendant Has Not Complied With the Act His Constitutional Challenge to It Is Not Ripe for Adjudication

In his motion, defendant claims to have "complied with the Classified Information Procedures Act" (Defendant's Motion, p. 113), presumably by making this general statement:

Pursuant to §5 of the Classified Information the Procedures Act, defendant wishes to and court the United States Attorney both the that he expects to disclose classified information in the course of the conducting (sic) of pretrial hearings and, if necessary, defense of these charges at the time of in the trial. The information which it will be necessary for Mr. Wilson to disclose is highly secret material acquired while he was working with the CIA and other government intelligence This information will form an agencies. essential part of his defense and, therefore, will have to be disclosed either attrial in the course of certain pretrial hearings.

The vague statement does not constitute compliance with the notice provisions of the Act.

Section 5(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U. S. C., Appx. III, provides:

- §5. Notice of defendant's intention to disclose classified information
- (a) Notice by defendant.—If a defendant reasonably expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure of classified information in any manner in connection with any trial or pretrial proceeding involving the criminal prosecution of such defendant, the defendant shall, within the time specified by the court or, where no time is specified, within thirty days prior to trial, notify the attorney for the United States and the court in writing. Such notice shall include a brief description of the classified information. Whenever a defendant learns of additional classified information he reasonably expects to disclose at any such proceeding, he shall notify the attorney for the United States and the court in writing as soon as possible thereafter and shall include a brief description of the classified information. No defendant shall disclose any information known or believed to be classified in connection with a trial or pretrial

proceeding until notice has been given under this subsection and until the United States has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to seek a determination pursuant to the procedure set forth in section 6 of this Act, and until the time for the United States to appeal such determination under section 7 has expired or any appeal under section 7 by the United States is decided. (emphasis provided)

while defendant has advised that he will attempt to "graymail" $\frac{62}{}$ the United States, he has never provided, either formally or informally in discussions with government attorneys, any description, as required by Section 5, of the classified information which he claims he will disclose at trial or prior to it. Until defendant complies with the Act, he can have no constitutional claim that is ripe for adjudication. Insofar as defendant moves to have this Court declare the Classified Information Procedures Act unconstitutional before he complies with it, he seeks an advisory opinion of the kind which Federal courts have consistently declined to render.

Such opinions, such advance expressions of legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused because they are not pressed before the court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests, we have consistently refused to give.

^{62/}See note 59, supra.

^{63/}Defendant's statements to the media in this regard have been generally more colorful in their characterization but equally vague.

<u>United States v. Fruehauf</u>, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1962). <u>See also North Carolina v. Rice</u>, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (<u>per curiam</u>); <u>Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth</u>, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).

At an absolute minimum, defendant has a responsibility to the Court and the United States, with regard, for instance to his free speech claim: what classified information he wishes to disclose; to whom he wishes to disclose it; how the Act (as distinguished, for example, from 18 U.S.C. 798, which governs unauthorized disclosure) prohibits him from doing that; and why that particular prohibition is unconstitutional. Similarly, with regard to his claim that the Act hampers his defense, defendant should, at the very least, answer the same questions before he asks this Court to make a constitutional ruling. What classified information does the Act either compel him to disclose or prohibit him from disclosing without following its procedures? How, specifically, do the limitations of the Act on disclosing this particular information, or the procedures to be followed under the Act in connection with such disclosure, hamper his defense under the circumstances of this case? Without these specifics, defendant's motion for a ruling on the constitutionality of the Classified Information Procedures Act seeks an impermissible advisory opinion, and until he provides

a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Aetna Life Insurance v. Haworth, supra, 300 U. S. at 240-41. For his claim to be ripe, defendant must actually comply with the Act.

^{64/}Even defendant's representations would probably not be enough to create

them, this Court should not render such an opinion. See United States v. Fruehauf, supra.

3. The Classified Information Procedures Act Is Not Unconstitutional On Its Face And Defendant's Pleadings Provide Insufficient Information For The Court to Determine If the Act Is Unconstitutional as Applied

Defendant contends that the Classified Information Procedures Act is unconstitutional on its face. A statute which seeks to regulate a constitutionally protected activity is not unconstitutional on its face so long as its impact is confined to "narrowly limited classes of [that activity], "Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571 (1942) and so long as it regulates the protected activity only to the minimum extent necessary to further legitimate governmental interests. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 120 (1971). Because the Classified Information Procedures Act limits a very narrow category of free speech, the disclosure of classified information within the context of a criminal trial, and does so in the most unobtrusive way sufficient to accomplish the clearly legitimate governmental purpose of protecting such information in the interests of national security, it is not, as defendant contends, unconstitutional on its face. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971); <u>United States</u> v. <u>O'Brien</u>, 391 U. S. 367 (1967); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1930).

^{65/}The irony of the defendant, a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, now contending before this Court that legitimate prohibitions on the disclosure of classified information are unconstitutional is not lost on the Government.

Despite the absolute language of the First Amendment, the courts have consistently held that the constitutionally protected right to free speech, particularly where it may involve national security, is not without limitations. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 708 (1930). Where a compelling has conflicted with an individual's governmental interest right to free expression, the courts have determined, albeit with understandable reluctance, that limitations on individual expression are permissible. See e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (passport revocation where holder in his travels was disclosing identities of United States intelligence agents); Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 509 n. 3 (1980) (constructive trust imposed on profits from book authored by former Central Intelligence Agency employee in violation of secrecy agreement with Agency); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (Marchetti I); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975) (Marchetti II) (secrecy agreements between intelligence agency and employees not violative of First Amendment); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W. D. Wisc, 1979) (magazine enjoined from publishing classified information on hydrogen bomb despite prior restraint considerations).

Moreover, the Act limits First Amendment rights,

^{66/&}quot;It is 'obvious and inarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation." Haig v. Agee, supra, 453 U. S. at 302 (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 509 (1964). See also, Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536 (1956); Kennedy v. Mendoza- Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1962).

as its legislative history shows, only to the extent necessary to protect that interest while maintaining a balance with a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant's motion for a declaration from this Court that the Classified 67 Information Procedures Act is unconstitutional on its face should, therefore, be denied even if the issue were, and it is not, ripe for adjudication.

^{67/}We are at a loss to respond to or even understand defendant's contention that the Act is unconstitutional as applied since defendant provides no specifics whatever with regard to this claim. When defendant designates exactly which limitations of the Act on disclosure to whom of what specific classified information infringe on his constitutional rights and how he is prejudiced by those limitations, we will respond appropriately.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, the United States responds to and opposes the defendant's motions and requests appropriate relief.

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Respectfully submitted,

Stanley S. Harris and STANLEY S. HARRIS United States Attorney

E. LAWRENCE BARCELLA, JR.
Assistant United States Attorney

Assistant United States Attorney

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Assistant United States Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that copies of the foregoing motion were mailed to John A. Keats, Esquire, 1503 21st Street, NW, Washington, D. C.; and Herald Price Fahringer, Esquire, 540 Madison Avenue, New York, New York on this 8th day of September, 1982.



Address all Mail to United States attorny y Room 1106 C United States Court House Building and and Curre House Nov Nove Nov

United States Bepartment of Jugiez

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTO: NEY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

June 5, 1981

John A. Keats, Esquire
Margolius, Davis and Finkelstein
1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1105
Washington, D.C. 20036

ATTACHMENT A

Dear John:

Over the past many weeks, you have had a number of conversations with both myself and AUSA Carol Bruce regarding your client, Edwin P. Wilson. Both AUSA Bruce and I have discussed the matter at length with Charles F. C. Ruff, the Bnited States Attorney. With regard to the recent proposal that we meet with Mr. Wilson in Italy, I think it is appropriate to outline the conditions under which such a meeting could take place.

As you know, we have previously told you that the Department of Justice is not, at this time, in a position to negotiate with Mr. Wilson concerning the disposition of his pending charges and any potential charges. Since the inception of our discussions with you concerning Mr. Wilson's situation we have emphasized the need for some show of good faith on Mr. Wilson's behalf before we would be willing or able to enter into any negotiations with Mr. Wilson or make any promises to him about his criminal case(s). For teasons that we have already discussed, but need not reiterate here, we are unable to say that Mr. Wilson has, to date, made such a demonstration of good faith to us.

Your present proposal of a meeting with Mr. Wilson is greeted with some skepticism by us for without the precedent of a "good faith" showing by Mr. Wilson we cannot be assured that any meeting with him is going to be even marginally productive or worthwhile. Neverthemless, we recognize the fact that such a meeting might break the stalmate that presently exists. If the meeting can be arranged under the following conditions (and under any other mutually acceptable conditions imposed by the government of Italy) it is possible that such a meeting may set the stage for some future negotiations and settlement of the criminal matters Mr. Wilson is implicated in.

John A. Keats, Esquire Page Two

(1) the Justice Department, through the auspices of the Department of State, will make appropriate efforts to ensure that Mr. Wilson could travel into Italy for a period of 72 hours to meet with us. We would attempt to make such arrangements with the Italian Government and would obviously let you know about the results of such arrangements before any meeting would be set.

We expect that the U.S. representatives attending any meeting with Mr. Wilson in Rome will be myself, Carol Bruce, legal attache assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Rome, and possibly an F.B.I. agent from the United States.

- (2) During the period of time that Mr. Wilson is meeting with us in Italy, assuming there are no problems independent of this case, no efforts will be made to arrest, detain, deport or extradite Mr. Wilson from taly to the United States.
- (3) The flist matter of discussion at such a meeting would be Mr. Wilson providing us with all knowledge within his possession regarding the past, present and future whereabouts of Jose Dionisio Suarez and Virgilio Paz. The United States will be immediately free to act upon that information to try and apprehend those two fugitives.
- (4) If the information concerning the above fugitives is truthful and accurate, it will constitute a demonstration of good faith on Mt. Wilson's part. However, it is understood that the United States is not obligated to promise anything in return for this information.
- (5) Following the delivery of the fugitive information, Mr. Wilson will submit to a full debriefing by the representatives of the United States on topics of our choosing and additional topics of Mr. Wilson's choosing.

Of course, any statements Mr. Wilson makes to us will not be used directly against him in any criminal prosecution by the United States of him.

John A. Keats, Esquire Page Three

However, any leads that are developed as a result of anything your client says to us will be fully investigated and any evidence that is developed from your client's statements or these leads can and will be used against him in any criminal prosecution if we cannot negotiate a settlement at some later date. In essence, this is a qualified grant of informal immunity by this office. We are promising only that we will not directly use Mr. Wilson's statements to us against him at any future criminal proceeding brought in our name. You must appreciate the fact that for obvious reasons we simply cannot agree to grant your client any more protections than what we have outlined here. As I have indicated to you pre-viously, we have a number of other potential charges against Mr. Wilson and we will not decline to fully pursue them simply because of this meeting. You should also understand that the degree of Mr. Wilson's candor will most certainly be a significant factor in any future decision to negotiate with him.

(6) After we have fully debriefed Mr. Wilson, we will return to the United States and talk with officials in this office and the Department of Justice to determine what, if any, offer of disposition is appropriate in light of the information provided by Mr. Wilson.

Thus, the only obligations on the part of the United States with respect to the proposed meeting are (a) that we will make arrangements for Mr. Wilson's entry into Italy and will not seek to have him arrested during the period of time of our meetings; and (b) the statements that he makes to us at this meeting will not be directly used against him. Beyond that, no promises or obligations accrue to the United States as a result of this meeting.

On Mr. Wilson's behalf, he must (1) agree to travel to Italy on his U.S. passport, (2) agree to meet with us and with no other persons except with our explicit approval while in Rome and (3) provide us in advance with the name of the hotel where he intends to stay while in Rome with his complete travel itinerary.

this letter are acceptable to you and your client, then we can undertake the necessary arrangements for the

John A. Keats, Esquire Page Four

meeting. We anticipate that such arrangements could be worked out in less than two weeks. Please contact us upon receipt of this letter so that we can discuss the matter more fully.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES F. C. RUFF United States Attorney

By:

E. LAWRENCE BARCELLA, JR.
Assistant United States Attorney
Deputy Chief, Major Crimes Div.
Telephone: (202) 633-1708



U.S. Departme of Justice

Criminal Division

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

February 5, 1982

Mr. Edwin Wilson

ATTACHMENT B

Dear Mr. Wilson:

As you are aware, we have had communications with Mr. Ernest Kaiser as to your situation.

We are not able to pursue these matters with you while you remain in Libya. We are sure that under all the circumstances you can appreciate our position.

Sincerely,

Mark Richard Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division

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emited States Department of Justice

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATT GALL IV
WASHISTING & D.C. 20001

July 25, 1931

ATTACHMENT C

John A. Resta, the tre Marp M. M. Devis of Pathit Language Marp M. C. March Language and John March Ma

Dear doun:

Polle, income racting a long of with you and your client, we took it is a semany and against hate to call line what can understanding was poing into the meeting and what can to? I to strongs are to the both in elings have to a completely. Write we so a common to the grift clear at the communion of the meetings with Mr. Wilson a number of the policy raise fat that their capacity.

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John A. Kesta, Capite

STORT MARKET

This was not the east. Here ever, we were under the impression that he was not utilizing the case terms he had previously and to attempt to I rate the facilities. It was not until a rew lymbology we traveled to here that we impressed that will consider the facilities with his efforts to find the facilities.

In Core we told you, your client and ct why we felt Wilcon's use of was quite inapproviate and was no scepable to this government. We feel Mr. Wilson and in the past and has again in this instance used deception and ecoretar in personaling to embark upon a dangerous and potentially compromising fact finding mission. For instance, it was incredible to us that Wilcon and his representatives led to believe Wilson would receive immunity for location the Letetier Suplives and informing us of their location. We now consider the have and informing us of their location. We now consider the have and informing us of their location.

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Mr. Wiscon classification of a general to set on a control in a Cities of forther a general to gether a fine result to which we be vehicle to the finite of the following terms of the result to a finite of the fin

* For reasons of safety, the name of the individual has been deleted.

John A. Kento, Papaire Page Thrie

Or. Wilson also indicated to as there he would enswer questions put to him by as in a caudid and forthright manner. We believe that he was less than canlid and certainly incomplete in the markers that he previded to us in Rome. Since Mr. Wilson and admostingly that he fully read, understood and record I can better of the policy and the conditions had contain to our, we were in them placed, though not surprised, along him this case of contar with as.


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
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Investigation on 3/3 SA By SA	so/82 etVashington, D.G.	JOH88 File #Alexandria 1339

b6-1 b7c-1 Sis Navy.

Per Sis Navy.

Rend advered agency band advered agency band advered copies to be a serial.

That been not on serial.


b3	-1
b7E	-1


2

AX


thereafter provided the following information:	1
Full Name:	Ì
Alias: Race: Sex: Date of Birth: Place of Birth: Social Security Account Number: Residence:	b6 - b7C b7D
Telephone: Citizenship:	
Prosent Employment:	
Family Members: Father:	一
b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1	

AX	3	b3 -1 b7E -1
Education:		
Passport: b7D -1		
Vehicles:		
* ************************************		
		b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1
	pu sa &	
per Set (s ()	







FBI(21-cv-5450)-14738



AX 7	Tron	b3 -1 b7E -1
		b6 -2 b7c -2 b7b -1
Ho believes 1	Ehat	
		b7D −1
said that he had heard of from		
said that		







AX	10		b3 -1 b7E -1
	He recalled that		
	indicated that his relationship with		b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1
		t	96 -2, -4 97C -2, -4
		ŀ	77D -1
			7


AX		11	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		b3 -1 b7E -1
		The con	versation includ	ed talk	b6 -2 b7с -2 √
	He recalled that				b7D −1
					b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1

AX 12	b3 -1 b7E -1
After this discussion with	
not know who this individual was.) did not toll what they	b6 -2 b7С -2 b7D -1
talked about with	<u>L</u>
	I
;	b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1
	-
	<u> </u>

AX 13	b3 -1 b7E -1
	b6 -2 b7c -2
	b7D -1
	b6 −2 b7c −2
esid that he has not heard from	b7D −1







b3 -1 b7E -1 . 17 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1

b3 -1 AX 18 b7E -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1 b6 -2 ъ7С -2 b7D -1 per 3 (18) most recent contact with ъ6 -2 b7C −2 b7D -1 *0 TO

FBI(21-cv-5450)-14751

b3 -1 AX 19 b7E -1 b6 -2 b7C −2 b7D -1 b6 -2 b7C −2 b7D -1


b3 -1 20 b7E -1 b6 -2 b7C −2 45 b7D -1 He said that b6 -2 ъ7С -2 b7D -1 thinke he met this individual does not know this person.

21 AX b3 -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -1 b7E -1 He does not know pen 35/08 He indicated tnat b7D -1 b6 -1, -4 ъ7C -1, -4 b7D -1 (It is noted that on the evening of this date AUSA telephonically contacted SA and said that had, after the conclusion of this interview on this to be sure the record was accurate.)


AX	22	
(The interview of at approximately 10:40 a.m., and break was taken for lunch. The 2:30 p.m., and completed at 3:4 the interview, SA Federal Grand Jury	e interview was continued at	b7E -1


AX				·	b3 -1
and	Virginia. on Se	(PROTECT IDENTI	TY), Calls Cnurch	, virginia.	
• ,					
				ъ7	5 -1, -2, -3 7C -1, -2, -3 7D -2
building observat bearing		e Tnis	observation	ed in the	
run by t produced LL IMPSCHATION EREIN IS UDGLA AIE 614188	A subsequent he Alexandria F the following	computer Divisi BI Office of th information:	ion <u>of Motor</u> nis	tag number	heck b3 -1 b6 -1 b7c -1 b7E -1 21-cv-5450)-14756


AX	·	•	
<u>2</u>	<u> </u>		b3 -1
-] b6 -2
	Name:		b7C -2
	Residence:		b7D −2
			b7E -:
	Vehicle Identification		
	Number:		
	Vehicle Make:		



AX		2	NO POLICE	717	b3 -1 b6 -2, - b7C -2, b7D -2 b7E -1
of it and	d it contains the fol	Lowing i	ntormation		a copy
	na address	mation:	arvii	ng his telep	b6 -2, -3 b7c -2, -3 b7D -2
	She described	as foll	ows:		
	Race: Sex: Nationality: Age: Characteristics: Height: Weight: Build: Hair: Eyes: Dress:				
					b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, - b7D -2








		•		<u> </u>	lo gara	SECRET	4.00
AX			6			~ .	b3 -1
·							b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3
				a	re as	follows:	b7D -2 b7E -1
	She reca	lled that					ь6 -2, -3
							b7C -2, -3 b7D -2
indicated	she did	not know					
							!
							b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3 b7D -2
	1					1	

b3 -1 ₹b6 -2, -3 AXb7C -2, -3 b7D -2 b7E -1 thome The phone number at this residence is possibly b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3. b7D −2 b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3 b7D -2 .

NO POLICE TRUBERLANDICAL



AX			<u>9</u> -	270-	remain 6.5	
Special	At the concl	usion of the	<u>intervie</u> v		this date,	b3 -1, -3 b6 -1, -3 b7C -1, -3 b7D -2 b7E -1

Memorandum

(XA:00)




То	: SAC, ALEXANDRIA	(P)	Date 9/22/82	
Fi				b3 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1
Subj	ect: FRANCIS E. TERPIL Et_Al	- FUGITIVE		


PERJURY, CONSPIRACY;


SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER

Reference is made to three memos, all dated 7/30/82, concerning the establishment of sub files for captioned matter. It is noted that more than seven weeks have elapsed without these sub files having been established. case is one of extremely high visibility being coordinated by Mark Richards, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice. While no trial date presently exists in Washington, D. C., it is not known when and if subject Wilson will talk to the government. The information contained in the sub files will be needed for trial if it occurs or to adequately debrief Wilson if this occurs. Also it is anticipated that this information should be easily retrievable for the other trials involving Wilson in Alexandria, Denver and Houston. It is now expected that trial will occur in Alexandria within six to eight weeks of today.

It is understood that the support staff has extreme staffing problems, however, due to the priority of this case, it is requested the sub files be established immediately.







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	REPORTING OFFICE		OFFICE OF	NDRIA	PAT CAT	8/5/82		17/82			
	TITLE OF CASE				REP			,			
	FRANCIS EDWAMET AL	RD TERP:	IL - FU	JGITIVE;	CHA	RACTER OF RA - CONSPIR SOLICIT OOJ	ACY;	I TO C	OMMIT	MURD	ER; b3 b6 b7 b7
	Full investi	gation a	authori	Ized, 3/2	20/80.	()¤()					
	Re Miami repe	orts of	SA			dated	3/16	5/82 au	nd 1/3	28/82	•
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	APPROVED COPIES MADE: 4 - Bureau (ATTN: 2 - Alexandr - Washingt (1 - USA 3 - Miami (1 - Disseming Agency Request Recd.	ia on Fiel	Q (RM) Of Attoched Classif Reason	SPECIAL AGEN CHARGE	RECO	Notation 57 3	UIT-CA LS PE O NOT Y	SE HAS BEI NDING OVE NDING PRO OVER SIX	EN: ER ONE Y DESECUTION MONTHS SPACES I	BELOW	1-1, -4 -1, -4 -1, -8

MM CONFIDENTIAL STORET	b3 -1
Projected state court hearing mentioned in 3/17/82 contact (see FD 302 in monent details) with	b6 -1, -2 b7C -1, -2
IOF SA Mlami.	b7D -1 b7E -1
Miami has not been contacted by (see FD 302, instant report) to furnish his	
attornev an FBI. Miamil	
LEAD	

ALEXANDRIA:

Will furnish Miami results of leads set out in referenced Miami report dated 1/28/82.

CONFIDENTIAL

B.*

PEDRET

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CONFIDENTIAL ---

Copy to: 1 -		TES ATTORNEY ON: AUSA	WASHING	CON, D. C	•		
Report of: Date:	August 5, 1	982	_	Office:	MIAMI,	FLORIDA	
Field Office File	#:			Bureau File #;			b3 -1 b6 -1, -4
Title:	FRANCIS EDW	ARD TERPIL -	FUGITIVE				b7C -1, - b7E -1
Character:	REGISTRATIO COMMIT MURD	n act - er; obstruct	CONSPIR	ACY; SOL	ICITATI:	on T o	
Synopsis:	miami, Fla. state court	, could expended hearing conditions	ot to be s cerning hi	suppoenae s knowle	a ior dge of		: _1 _9
	<u> </u>	Attorney for	<u></u>			ь	S -1, -3 C -1, -3
						(\$~1)(x)	7D -1, -2
			- P -				
DETAILS:						(
Islee Classified by	Cape	ALL INFORMATIO	ነል፤ መርጭቸው ል ፒትያውሽ				
Declassify on:	unm 	HEREIN IS UNCA	SSLFIED EXCI	SPT 			
DI/PA# PPRAL# IVINA .O.# ATE UISI8 8	ELATTAME				ъ6 -1 ъ7С -		
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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

b6 -1 b7C -1



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	CONFIDENTIAL April 19, 1982	
	telephonically furnished the following:	
	and his attorney intend, therefore, to b7c -1, -2	, -3
concernin	s hearin he fore the b7D -1, -2	

pl ³	2.		
tovestigation on 4/17/82	Miami, Florida	b3 b6 b7c	-1 -1
Special Agent	Dat .	b7E	-1
	CONFIDENTIAL		

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DATE 03-28-2024

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1	CONFIDENTIAL Date of	of transcription 4/21/82
furnished the f	ollowing information:	b6 -2, - b7c -2, b7D -1
did not intend	to furnish these messages to t	he Federal Bureau
messages.	sald ne would furn	
1515.83	Special Agent (SA)	FBI, Miami b6 -1, -2, -3 b7C -1, -2, -3 b7D -1
lgation on4/19/82_	at _Miami, Florida	b3 b6 b7C
_SA	CONCIDENTIA	4/21/82

CONFIDENTIAL	b3 -1 b7E -1
the recordings to the FBI. He said that	b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3 b7D -1
He said that Assistant State Attorney and that the attorney was to bring the matter to the attention of the judg	b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3 b7D -1
<u>4</u> .	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

<u>1</u>	CONFIDENTIAL Date of transcription 4/21/82	
	, 1982, Attorney, ted Special Agent (SA)	
October by his office been made. For evaluation or an "unofficited this could not be	ation purposes. he remested a xerox al" rendering He was edone. It was suggested that he have who was in his office. listen	
was noted, could prov brief recorded message	e. then expressed (Insincere) another just-obtained tape (undoubtedly	
commented that he ass (just obtained) tape.		

<u> </u>	5.	<u></u>	
Investigation on 4/19/82	a Miami, Florida	File # Miami	b3 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1
bySA	CONFIDENTIAL	a-dictated 4/21/82	b7E −1 —

b6 -1, -2, -3 b7C -1, -2, -3

b7D -1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The same of the sa	-
CONFIDENTIAL	
1.1111224777244111.12	•

May 20, 1982

b7D -2

Lt. Homicide, Metro-Dade Police Penertment

(MDPD). Miami, was contacted in the office of Captain

Homicide, MDPD. The information furnished by Lt.

Included the following:

met

with

helieved that


b6 -2, -3, -5

b7c -2, -3, -5

6.

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telephonically fur



added that if (above Lt.

CONFIDENTIAL Date of transcription 14,	1982
Lt. Homicide, Metro-Dade Police Departmental the following information:	ent,
He received a call earlier that day from who said he was calling from the office of New York City.	î
	b6 -2, -3, -5
indicated he would be in Miami at which time he would prove his allegation to and the FBI.	b7C -2, -3, -5 b7D -2

				b3 -1
		7.		b6 -1 b7C -: b7E -:
investigation on	6/10/82	Miami, Florida	Fiie Miami Alexanoria	<u> </u>
Special A	Agent	Oate	gictated 6/11/82	<u></u>

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

		CONFIDENTIAL July 1, 1982 Date of transcription	
telephoni	Lt. cally advised a	Homicide, Metro-Dade Police Department s follows:	b6 -2, -5
from New York	York City, prev	l	b7C -2, -5 b7D -2

	8.*		b3 -1 b6 -1 b7C -
Investigation on 6/28/82 at	Miami, Florida	File #Miami Alexandria	b7E -
Special Agent	CON-PENTPL	1 ated	

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.


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	TO:	SAC, ALE	YANDRTA F						7C -1 7E -1
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	Jury,	will				ne FBI in F			· ·
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


x Airtel

		9/7/82	b3 -1
TO:	SAC, ALEXANDRIA		b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1
FROM:	SAC, CHARLOTTE (P)	chules -	
ET AT-	TERPIL - FUGITIVE; - CONSPIRACY, ION TO COMMIT MURDER UDRIA	Descrict by Posterior to the state of the st	.71
	Re Alexandria teletype to Bureau a	nd Charlotte, 8/23/82	2.
SA Fayottevi.	Enclosed for Alexandria are all the	e papers given to	
all the pa	9-2	rhe enclosed envelors	<u>l</u>
not aireac	ly provided to the U.S. Government with FBI Agents or testimony elic:	y additional informate either through lited before a Grand of FBI in Fayetteville b6 -1,	
		b7D −1	

2 - Alexandria (Enc. 1) 2 - Charlotte









FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT

of the

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

Your file no. fbi file no. latent case no.		(P)	(SQ.	14)
	B-80073	_		

September 21, 1982

b3 -1 b7E -1

TO:

SAC, Chicago

RE: FRANCIS EDWARD TERPIL - FUGITIVE;

ET AL.;

CONSPIRACY - SOLICITATION TO

COMMIT MURDER

REFERENCE: Airtel 6-22-82 EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Chicago

SPECIMENS:

Envelope, Q5
Typewritten letter, Q6

DECI-ASSIETED ON 415 885" b6 -1
b7C -1

 $\,$ The listed Q specimens, are further described in a separate Laboratory report.

Four latent fingerprints, one of which is from the side and tip area of a finger, were developed on Q5 and Q6.

Three latent fingerprints are not the fingerprints of Frank Terpil, FBI #198717E. The remaining latent fingerprint was compared with the comparable areas of the fingerprints of Terpil, but no identification was effected. Fully and clearly recorded side and tip areas are needed for a complete comparison.

The specimens are enclosed.

Enc. (2)

Classified and Extended by C3

Reason for Extended by C3

Reason for Extended by C3

Pate of Review for Declassification CADR

2)

Alexandria

-15 3.83

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ON

FBI/OQJ

	•	
SAC, ALEXANDRIA (P)	\$/22/82	b3 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1
FRANCIS E. TERPIL - FUGITIVE Et Al RA PERJURY, CONSPIRACY;; SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER (00:AX)		

Reference is made to three memos, all dated 7/30/82, concerning the establishment of sub files for captioned matter. It is noted that more than seven weeks have elapsed without these sub files having been established. case is one of extremely high visibility being coordinated by Mark Richards, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice. While no trial date presently exists in Washington, D. C., it is not known when and if subject Wilson will talk to the government. The information contained in the sub files will be needed for trial if it occurs or to adequately debrief Wilson if this occurs. Also it is anticipated that this information should be easily retrievable for the other trials involving Wilson in Alexandria, Denver and Houston. It is now expected that trial will occur in Alexandria within six to eight weeks of today.

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RR HQ AX DN NK	the state of the s
את אם את שת	
DE NY 021	
2321007 SEP 8	
FM NEW YORK	
TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE	
ALEXANDRIA ROUTINE	
DENVER ROUT INE	b3 -1.
NEWARK ROUTINE	b7E −1
BT	
UNCLA S	
FRANCIS EDWARD TERPIL - FUGITIVE; EDWIN PAU	L WILSON; ET AL;
REGISTRATION ACT; OO: ALEXANDRIA	
ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1982, NEW YORK CAUSED	AM FXHAUSTED MANUAL
SEARCH OF THE RECORDS LOCATED AT THE CLERK!	S OFFICE, BROOKLYN,
NEW YORK, WHICH WERE IN TRANSIT TO FEDERAL	RECORDS STORAGE
CENTER, HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY, FOR CIVIL SUIT	79-C-2545, ENTITLED
	DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
The same was a significant of the same of	UNITED STATES b7C -2
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK AND	
ATTORNEY GENERAL" AND WAS EVENTUALLY LOCATE	D.
IN THIS SUIT, PETITIONED UNITED	STATES DISTRICT
COURT, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, JUDGE CHARLES SI	FTON TO FILE HIS
	b3 -1
	b7C -1 b7E -1
	RIALIZE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED	SEP 20 1982
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS DINGLAST	[]
DATE TISTYS BY	5450)-14794

PAGE TWO NY	UNCLAS			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
AW SUIT IN PRO	OPER STATUS]·
THE BASIS	OF THIS SUIT IS T	HAT		
				b3 -1 b6 -2,
				b7C -2, b7E -1
			.51	
			ALLEGES	1
				<u> </u>
ALLEGES	ALL: INFORMATION IN	NOT NI MG		
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		-
	N IS MADE OF SUBJE		. · <u>L.</u>	
• • •	ELY CONNECTED FACT	,		
APTIONED INVES	STIGATION APPEARS	TO BE THAT SUBJI	ECT TERPIL W	45 _{b6 -2,} ; b7c -2,
ORN IN BROOKL	YN.			
CON1	INUES IN HIS LAW :	SUIT TO ALLEGE	IN A LONG RAI	MBLING
A NNER ,				

PAGE THREE NY	UNCLAS		
		BOTH CHARGES b3 -1	-3
APPEAR TO BE WITHOU	T. BASIS:	b7C -2 b7E -1	2, -
ON OCTOBER 25,	1979, JUDGE SIFTON R		
PETITION AND SUIT A	ND DEEMED THAT THIS L	AW SUIT WAS EXTREMELY	
FR IVOLOUS COMPLETEL	Y WITHOUT MERIT AND D	ISMISSED THE SUIT	•
AGAINST THE DEFENDA	NT S.		
BT			

SEGRET	
PAGE TWO DE HQ Ø125 CONFIDENTIAL	
UNABLE TO CONDUCT INTERVIEW OF THE WILSBN/TERPIL	
INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN REASSIGNED WIHIN THE ALEXANDRIA	b6 -2, -3
DIVISION.	b7C -2, -3 b7D -2
BASED ON INTERVIEWS OF	<u></u>
ALEXANDRIA HAS INITIATED INVESTIGATION CAPTIONED	
OO: ALEXANDRIA."	_
ADVISED THAT	
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY (AUSA)	
(WILSON/TERPIL P _R	
OSECUTOR), DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND	b3 -2
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) ATTORNEYS AND	b6 -2, -4 b7C -2, -4
(PROSECUTORS IN CASE CAPTIONED	b7D -2
OO: DENVER") WILL	
	1



PAGE THREE DE HQ Ø125 CONFINENTIAL

DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY AND SENSITIVITY OF THE WILSON/TERPIL	
CASE AND THE NUMEROUS SPINOFF INVESTIGATIONS IT IS NOT	
FEASIBLE FOR ALEXANDRIA TO PROVIDE NEW YORK WITH ALL	
BACKGROUND INFORMATION NECESSARY TO CONDUCT EXTENSIVE	
INTER VIEW OF	
	6 -1, -2 7C -1, -2
	57D -2
AUTHORIZED TRAVEL TO NEW YORK CITY TO INTERVIEW	
DUE TO	
ALEXANDRIA IS TO INSURE THAT INTERVIEWING AGENTS	
HAVE FULLY REVIEWED PREVIOUS STATEMENTS GIVEN BY	
SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY INTERVIEWED	
CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF	
	ь6 -2
	b7C -2 b7D -2
<u> </u>	WID -2
SHOULD ALSO BE	
INTERVIEWED CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF AND ALL	

PAGE FOUR DE HQ Ø125 C O N F I DX N I I A L


ALLEGATIONS, INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS ENUMERATED IN WILSON/TERPIL SPINOFF INVESTIGATIONS.

NEW YORK IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE FBIHQ AND ALEXANDRIA OF	
AND TO IDENTIFY AN AGENT TO ASSIST	
ALEXANDRIA.	b3 -1 b6 -2
ALEXANDRIA IS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY SECOND AGENT TO ASSIST	b7С −2 b7D −2
IN INTERVIEW OF	b7E -1
BI	
#Ø 125	


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



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is to 1 d to 2 det and it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.










PG		<u>5</u>	b3 -1 b7E -1	SECRET
	was questioned conce	rning He advised	that	<u></u>
		advised that		b6 -2, -3 b7c -2, -3
	advised that	He advised	that	b7D −2
he noted	again reiterated that ive with the Federal Bureau of that he feels that a <u>federal</u> ame Unknown) last name	of Investigation	. However	n.c.
	furnished no further	pertinent infor	mation.	b6 -3, -4 b7c -3, -4 b7D -2

· FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-78)	(🌦 FBI		
TRANSMIT VIA		ICATION:	
☐ Teletype		SECRET	
Facsimile	Priority SEC		
M Airtel		FIDENTIAL	
<u> </u>		LAS E F T O	
	: UNCI	<u> </u>	•
		<u>•</u>	
r	Date	9/20/82	
TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI	. 1,	
FROM:	SAC, PITTSBURGH		3 -1
SUBJECT:	FRANK TERPIL, aka		57E −1
	FUGITIVE;		
	EDWIN WILSON;	_	
	CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER	•	•
	(OO: ALEXANDRIA)		
		· <u>-</u>	
"Seoret"	All information contained herein unless otherwise noted.	is classified as	
	Re Pittsburgh airtel to Director	dated 6/17/82;	
Buairtel	dated 6/24/82.		
	Enclosed for the Bureau are three	copies of an	b6 -3
	oncerning interview of		b7C -3 b7D -2
On 8	/20/82.		B1D -2
two copi	Enclosed for Alexandria as OO ar es of the above mentioned FD-302, ar	e the original and agent's interview notes.	
_	•	•	
within to	Inasmuch as there are no further he Pittsburgh Division at this time ed RUC.	outstanding leads this matter is	
		1-	
	STO STORY	RAT.	→ b3 -1
2 - Bure		tended by: G-3.	1
2 - Alex	andria (Encs. 4 (2, 3 & 4)		b7C −1
 1 - Di+		or Declassification:	b7E −1
[L ₃ ,]	Originating agen requested.	c determination	
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	requested.		
	hard-mark-mark-mark-mark-mark-mark-mark-mark		/4
1515	DECLASSIFIED ON 4/1/88	A Children and A Chil	
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3.0			
		. Crn	
Approved:	Transmitted	· 359	27 1982
	(Number) (7	(ime)	,
		.	
	•	· L	
	FI	BI(21-cv-5450)-14823	







AX 2	SECRET	b3 -1 b7E -1
stated that where	n asked to	
did not know very muc	h about	b6 -3 b7C -3 b7D -2
not further described.		
stated that from his knowledge	e e	
specific situation in which has received	ot no such information	b6 -3 b7C -3
	tated that it	b7D −2
was his belief that		



AX 3	5ECX b3 -1 b7E -1
provided the following informa	tion concerning
turther inquiry, would only state	b6 -2, -3 b7c -2, -3 b7D -2
stated that he would be willing any other information he may obtain concerning	o to report


PAGE TWO DE HQ 00	23 SECRET		
WILSON'S ATTORNÉY	S AND ASSISTANT UNITI	D STATES ATTORNE	
. ú	ISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	HAVE BEEN UNPRODU	. 66 -4 JCTIVE. (U) b7c -
WHEN WILSON	WAS ARRESTED IN NEW	YORK CITY ON JUNE	15, 1982,
HE DID NOT HAVE A	NY SIGNIFICANT PERSON	VAL DOCUMENTS ON	HIS
PER SON OTHER THAN	A TYPEWRITTEN PAGE V	WHICH LISTED HIS	PROPERTY
HOLD INGS WORLD WID	E. UNDOUBTEDLY THERE	ARE"NUMEROUS DOC	UMENTS
OF EVIDENTIARY VA	LUE STILL LOCATED AT	WILSON'S DUPLEX	TOWNHOUSE
(VILLA NUMBER 361) IN TRIPOLI, LIBYA,	<u> </u>	
I.	F DEEMED APPROPRIATE,	IS REQUESTED TO	b3 -1, -2
RECONTACT	TO DETERMINE IF	HE COULD ASSIST	THE
DOJ AND THE FBI			
BU			
###O Z			

NNNN

SECRET

Best Copy Available

300 North Lee Stre Room 500 Alexendria, Virginia - October 4, 1982



b6 -1, -4 b7C -1,

داساوه Classified by Declassify or

Criminal Division U. S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20001

Dear.


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

In secondance with procedures established. It is requested that the fallowing information edukagarah artukang artemilisabit tulagritunionak

b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -6

2-Addressee 1-USA, WDC 1-USA, AX


b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1



FBI(21-cv-5450)-14855

SEGRET b3 -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -6 b3 -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -6

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Should you have request, please contact effice at 683-2680.	ve any questions or avoblems re Special Agent	erarding this of this
	Very truly yours,	
	Lawrence Karl York Special Agent in Charge	b6 -1 b7C -1
. •	The r	
1-United States Attorney District of Columbia U. S. Courthouse Third and Constitution	•	
Second Floor Vashington, D. C. 200 (Attention: Assista	001 ant United States Attorney	-
1-United States Attorney Eastern District of Vi 701 Prince Street Alexandria, Virginia (Attention: Assists	rginia	b6 − 4 b7С − 4

Date of transcription 10/4/82

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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SACKGROUND INFO		•	_		
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iorthwest, Wash					
	id he was raise				
	C., and attende U. S. Air Force				
Jeorgetown Univ	ersity for a ti	me but did	net ob	tain a deg	ree.
ie revired from (CIA) in Septem	employment with ber, 1971, and	n the Cent while empl	ral Into	elligence th CTA be	Agency
ttended Cornel	l University fo	r a time,	not obt	aining a d	egree.
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LENN ROBINETTE	ASSOCIATES:				b6 -1
	·	<i>A Sun- 6</i> 71	4- 307	t Babén at	ъ7С -
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He wentioned that

Intertel. He said intertel is owned by Resorts international.

b3 -1 b6 -2

When gambling at Atlantic City, New Jersey, became both 2 to 2 to 2 both 2 both

He mentioned that Intertel conducted background and clearance-type inquiries for Resorts International personnel but indicated that his work was oriented more toward the physical security aspects of the casino.

He said Intertel has its office at 1707 H Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., Pourth Floor.

TOM CLINES:

Robinette said he first met Clines many years ago when they both were employed with CIA. He said he and Clines were assigned together in certain CIA components and also saw each other in connection with joint ventures they worked on while with the agency.

Since Robinette's retirement, he said his relationship with Clines was strictly a social relationship. He also indicated that as they both were raised in the Washington, D. C., area, they have mutual friends going back to the time when they were growing up in Washington.

EGYPTIAN AMERICAN TRANSPORT AND SERVICES CORPORATION (EATSCO):

Robinette said he started working with EATSCO in about September, 1981, based on a request of Tom Clines that he begin

3

work there. In this employment, he was involved in supervision of Seico to see if he could improve its business prospects. Robinette said he had been anxious to leave Intertel as he wanted to do

something on his own for one or two years.

| Description of the said of t

When he began working with Seico, was still working with that entity. He said there was a firm called Intertech which was there also, and Seico and Intertech were both small companies, both dealing in the sales and installation of physical security equipment. He said business regarding both of these companies was very poor at that time.

Robinette said he received a salary of \$48,000 per year in connection with his work with Seico and Intertech and was paid by EATSCO in this regard. In this regard, Robinette said he had an office at 7777 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, Virginia.

Based apparently on the poor sales record of Seico, terminated his association with this company after having a meeting with Their parting was "friendly."

After this occurred. Robinette said he took over responsibilities, noting that

Robinette said he left this employment himself in around February, 1982, which was around the time that Tom Clines also left EATSCO. Robinette said that he and had a discussion bfc -2 prior to his departure, and it was a "friendly" parting.

GLOBAL AMERICAN RESOURCES (GAH):

After leaving employment with EATSCO, Robinette said he set up Global American Resources in approximately February, 1982, but the company was not incorporated in Delaware until the summer, possibly June, 1982. He indicated that this company is still in the early stages of development and is concentrating on international business activity including procurement or export/import activities. He said it has not freight forwarding activity. The only office of GAR is at 8373B Greensboro Drive, McLean, Virginia.

b7E -1

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Robinett	se said that he is Presiden Eo and	nt of GAR and
dvisor to GAR, an pinion in busines He has i	Tom Clines is employed as ad Robinette said he highly as matters.	y regards Clines'
s follows:		
		b6
		ъ7С
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ational alarm sep	NVICE COMPANY (NA SCO):	b6 -2 b7C -2
ike, Falls Church	a small firm which was als , Virginia. Robinette sai to supervise NA SCO in addi	id and Ton

AX AX AX AX

8

b3 -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -1

marketing as inernancius household intrusion alarm that Robinette

Robinette said he had no financial interest in Seico or MA SCO or EATSCO. He said he was given 1,000 shares and ownership of Intertech in around February, 1982, when he left EATSCO. This was given as part of the settlement with EATSCO, and indicated he did not want anything further to do with Intertech. He said Intertech primarily exists in name only at present but it had had some contracts in Abu Dhabi in the Middle East regarding physical security equipment such as TV cameras, etc. In this regard, Robinette said he has been back and forth to Abu Dhabi about four times since around September to October, 1981, in connection with seeking contracts for Intertech there.

He indicated he has been unsuccessful recently in obtaining any such contracts in Abu Dhabi.

b6 -2 b7C -2

in connection with Robinette beginning to work at EATSCO. He said he believes it was in about August, 1981, that he began his work at EATSCO.

ED WILSON:

Robinette said he initially met Wilson years ago when they both were employed with the CIA. He recalled seeing Wilson in Libya in about 1979 to 1980 when Robinette was there. Robinette said he (Robinette) was employed with Intertel at that time and was involved in designing and furnishing police headquarters in Tripoli, Libya. At that time, he said he was going back and forth to Tripoli about once a month in that regard. During one such occasion, he was at the airport at Tripoli when he saw Ed Wilson. He indicated that he knew Wilson was having some legal problems at that time and did not want to meet him, so he stepped behind a pillar to avoid contact with Wilson on that occasion. He said he knew that Wilson was doing business in Libya then. Robinette said he has never been to Wilson's farm in Northern Virginia.

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AX	6	
	obinette said that Intertel was associated with Libya at around the time period mentioned above. as associated with oil activities there at that time	b3 -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -1
FRANK TERPI	<u></u>	
Re	obinette does not know this person.	
is a have hear in that occasion and last saw	obinette said he has met through Tom Clines friend of Clines. He said his meetings with a connection with a social environment, and he ment had been to Clobal American Resources on at least he believes he has met him elsewhere. He said he about six weeks ago at a social occasion. e does not know this person.	loned one
2.5		-2
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He does not know this person.

NUGAN HAND BANK:

Robinette is not familiar with this entity.

TED SHACKLEY:

He said he knows Shackley from when Robinette was employed with CIA. He said their relationship at present is a social relationship and he has had no business dealings with Shackley except that he will call Shackley occasionally or Shackley will call him occasionally to get a "reading" on someone they may be considering having a business dealing or contact with.

AX AX AX AX AX
ь6 - ь7с
He does not know this individual except from reading $$^{\rm b7E}$$ about him in news articles.
Robinette said this individual is approximately years of age and is a friend of Tom Clines. Robinette said he knew
C AND G ASSOCIATES:
Robinette said he is not familiar with this company or its principals.
Robinette indicated that he initially met when
she was with Tom Clines probably in a bar about two to three years ago.
CLINES' ROTUNDA CONDOMINIUM: b7c
by Clines at the Rotunda at McLean, Virginia.
Robinette said he knows having met him through Tom Clines.
He does not know this person.

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TOH CLINES' EMPLOYMENT:

In connection with Clines being employed with Global American Resources, he comes to the GAR office several times a week. Robinette said that Clines has not traveled out of the United States or outside of the Washington, D. C., area specifically for him in connection with Global American Resources business. He said that Clines is in town at present.

He said that Clines is in town at present.	1	b6 -2
He said he talked to	}	b7C -2

(This interview commenced at approximately 1:00 p.m. on this date and was completed at approximately 1:51 p.m.)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Date of transcription 10/5/82

Text is unclassified except for any portion specifically indicated to be classified.

Brigadier General Joseph J. Cappucci, United States Air Force - Retired, was contacted at his office at Belcap International, Suite 701, 1000-16th Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., telephone number 775-9024, on the afternoon of this date. After being advised of the official identities of the contacting Special Agents, and of the nature of the contact, he provided the following information:

He was born on January 1, 1913, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, and received his early education in the Bridgeport, Connecticut, vicinity. He attended the University of Wyoming, obtaining a commission through the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), but did not graduate. From 1940 until 1974, he had continuous military service, totalling 34 years, and his service assignments were oriented towards intelligence and counterintelligence matters.

During World War II, he was assigned to British Intelligence in London, England and in 1946, he helped to establish the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) During the period of 1965 to 1972, he was Director of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). Thereafter, he was asked to set up the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and he set this up in April, 1972. He was Director of DIS from that time until his retirement on September 1, 1974.

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is lossed to your agency.

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He said his present business. Belcan International.	b3 -1 b6 -2
is a partnership between himself and	ъ6 -2 ъ7С -2
He said the page "Releap" is drawn from the name which	b7E −1
He said this business does security-	
type work on a connercial basis.	

Tracor Corporation:

AΧ

General Cappucci said that while on active duty with the United States Air Force (USAF) OSI, he was involved in training Presidential or executive protective details for various countries, including the Philippines, Thailand, Bolivia, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Korea, and one other country, name unrecalled, but not a Middle East country.

learned of Cappucci's background through White House contacts, and asked Cappucci to set up a security division at Tracor, which had its headquarters in Austin, Texas. Cappucci began working with Tracor's security division in 1975, in the Resslyn, Arlington, Virginia, office.

General Cappucci said in the Fall of 1975, he was in London, England, on a business trip for Tracor. While in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in London, a bomb exploded approximately ten feet away from where Cappucci was, which killed four persons and seriously wounded 28 others. He indicated that British police attributed this bombing to Irish Republican Army (IRA) related terrorists. He feels that it was just a coincidence that he was at the location where the bomb exploded when it did. As a result of injuries suffered during this incident, General Cappucci said he lost hearing in his left car and has a permanent numbness in his neck.

While still employed with the Tracor Corporation, in May, 1977, General Cappucci said he had a serious heart attack while at his Northern Virginia residence. This resulted in his hospitalization for a couple of weeks and a period of convalescing at home. In about September to October, 1977, he returned to work at the Tracor Corporation, but only worked about two to three hours a day.

At around this time, told him about a contact named Ed Wilson, who he said was a former government worker and an important businessman internationally. He

b6 -2 b7С -2

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AX 3	
indicated that Wilson was going to buy the security division of the Tracor Corporation. Two to three days after this, Cappucci said he ran into who he knew, and Ed Wilson was with this Korean at the time. This was his first meeting of Ed Wilson.	b3 -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -1
Subsequently. Who Cannucci said he believes was told Cappucci that Ed Wilson had been impressed with Cappucci's contacts and wanted to finance Cappucci in a business that Cappucci could operate out of a townhouse that Wilson had obtained.	
Cappucci and Associates:	
Subsequently, in about October to November, 1977, Wilson invested approximately \$30,000 in a new company which was called Joseph Cappucci and Associates. As part of the investment, Wilson took stock options in the new company, which amounted to about twenty percent ownership. Wilson had obtained a townhouse at 1016-22nd Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., near Washington Circle, and Cappucci leased space in the townhouse from Wilson in connection with this business.	<u>.</u>
Cappucci said that	
Cappucci said his position with the company was as Chairman. He said presently resides in the Crystal City area of Northern virginia. Cappucci recalled that bad said that Ed Wilson	
Canpucci	b6 -2
approved this when learning of it and mentioned that he had known	b7C −2
General Cannucci said he subsequently net	
named a woman and he recalled that nad connections with	
U.S. Congressmen. Cannucci said that as far as he could see.	



NO PORDICK DISCOMMENTION

AX 4	b3 -1 b7E -1
General Cappucci said he had fifteen to twenty contacts with Wilson about seven months. He never had a socihim and was never invited to Wilson's fi	over a period of ial relationship with
Egyptian Security Contract:	
As background, General Cappuc while he was still on active duty with OSI command at Wheelus Air Force Base, In connection with this, Cappucci met a of who had a close relation elements in Libya at that time. When C over Libya in 1969, General Cappucci sa in secreting various individuals out of been executed had they remained under t One of the Libyans he got out in this result of this contact we contacts in Egypt. General Cappucci was the secreting was the secretion of the contact who at that time we	the USAF, he had an Tripolia, Libya. Libyan by the name ship with United States clonel Qadhafi took id he was instrumental Libya who would have hat new government. egard was b6 -2 b7C -2
who at that time we arry 1978. As a result of this contact through Joseph Cappucci and Associates, train 25 to 30 Egyptian military people measures. Cappucci went over to Cairo, connection with setting this up and he to nine Americans, retired OSI employee The training was conducted at a militar Cappucci returned to Egypt for the grad six to seven-week course that was conducted the training, the training team was trainees in the order of their standing Cappucci said he does not know how thes in security protection were subsequent! Egyptian government, as pertains to whi have been detailed to protect.	as about fare 1977 or t with Cappucci, got a contract to in security protection Egypt, initially in said a team of eight s, comprised the team. y base in Cairo and uation, following the cted. At the conclusion required to list the in the class. General e Egyptians trained y utilized by the ch officials they would
Cappucci said this training p government approximately \$100,000 to \$2 was made, Wilson took out his investmen ensued. He said would have	00,000, and when payment

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He said that Ed Wilson actually had nothing to do with Cappucci and Associates obtaining this contract or in the operation of the contract and his only involvement in the matter consisted of his obtaining his investment back from the profits that resulted.

Cappucci said this was his only involvement with Egypt and he had no business with Libya. He said other business of Joseph Cappucci and Associates pertained to local security work in the United States. He said his staff during the period he was with Joseph Cappucci and Company, was a small one.

lle said it was in about early 1978, when Wilson took his investment back from the proceeds of the Egyptian security training venture. About two to three months later, Cappucci got a notice, in the form of a letter from Wilson, directing him to get out of the townhouse within ten days, as Wilson said he was going to sell the townhouse. Cappucci said he was surprised at this sudden action and when he inquired about it, someone, name unrecalled, told Cappucci that Wilson thought that Cappucci was spying on him and this was the reason for his being asked to leave the townhouse.

General Cappucci reiterated that his relationship with Wilson totalled about a seven to eight month period and he had no other business interests with Wilson. He said he has had no contact with Wilson since early 1978, and he received no indication that Wilson was involved in any criminal activities during the time he had association with him.

Sale of Cappucci and Associates:

He said about eighteen nonths ago, he and sold out their interests in Joseph Cappucci and Associates to a group of buyers, one of whom was Tom Clines. He said would know who the other members of the group were but cappucti does not know who the others were. He said one of the provisions of the sale was that the purchasers could no longer use the name Cappucci in connection with the company. As a result, the name of the company was changed and he is not certain what the new name was, but it was possibly Intertech or possibly American Security, but he is uncertain. NO PORTION DISSEMINATION



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General Cappu CIA employee who Cappud between the CIA and the employed with CIA. He social relationship with	e Department of Defen knew Clines only cas	sensitive natters ase while still	
Ted Shackley: He knew Shackwas an official with Clarkley or Clines Cappucci and Company by	s, other than the sal	le of the Joseph	
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He does not know and has never net him.	b3 -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -1
He has had no association with hut mentioned that	
Operational Systems Incorporated (OSI):	b6 -2 b7C -2
He said sometime in 1977, the Tracer Corneration sold its security division to Ed Wilson. when wilson purchased it am it was renamed ost. This occurred when Cappucci was still	ia i
employed with Tracor, but Cappucci never had anything to do	would
Frank Terpil: Cappucci does not know Terpil.	
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Egyptian American Transport and Services Corporation (EATSCO):

Cappucci said he has no financial interest in this company and is not familiar with its personnel. He said since he retired from the Air Force, he has only been associated with the Tracor Security Division, with Joseph Cappucci and Associates, and with Belcap International. He said the Belcap office is in the process of being moved to another location in the downtown Washington, D.C., area.

Nugan Hand Bank:

AX

Outside of newspaper articles, he is not familiar with this bank.

J. Edgar Hoover:

General Cappucci volunteered that he knew former Director J. Edgar Hoover well and had an approximately two hour meeting with Hoover a month before Hoover died, at Hoover's request. He said he was photographed with Director Hoover on that occasion.

Cappucci and Associates:

General Cappucci said Cappucci and Associates no longer exists as a company and after being put out of the 22nd Street townhouse, a subsequent office, after temporary quarters in a nearby hotel, was at 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, Northwest, Suite 910, Washington, D.C.

(It is noted that the interview of General Cappucci on this date commenced at about 2:00 p.m., and was completed at about 3:00 p.m.)





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	described Terpil as a colorful, likeable person but it was hard to tell when he was telling the truth or not. Terpil's manner is such that one cannot tell when he is talking business and when he is merely socializing	b7C -2, -3 b7D -1
	Terpil and Wilson several times. These were always social occasions and conducted no further business with either of them.	
Γ	stated the following concerning the	
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Ternil had nothing	As far a	s	knows. Wilson	
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ROUTING SLIP

TO: SA

DATE: 10-14-82

FROM:

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RE:

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
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
This routing slip is being furnished to you for validation purposes.

Where the NCIC record is missing pertinent searchable information, this should be included by a "modify" message. You should review the file listed above for empty fields on the NCIC entry to insure immediate modifications of data which were not available at time of entry. Be alert for recovered guns and vehicles and wanted persons to be cleared from NCIC.

Your attention is called to the fact that this routing slip has been serialized into your case file and charged to you. If changed are to be made, appropriate notations for desired actions should be listed on the routing slip and returned NCIC Operator. If no changes are to be made in word, you must return this routing slip to the rotor for filing as it is an integral part of the file. Rules governing charged serials apply.

This communication is to be returned by





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
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
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
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



OPTIONAL FORM NO. 18 (REV. 7-76) GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.5 5010-112

Memorandum









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
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
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		Washington, D.C. 20535	
		October 22, 1982	
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	10.	Assistant United States Attorney WHERESHOWN OTHER	67C -1, -3, -4 67D -2
		District of Columbia	
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		International Terrorism Unit	
		FBIRQ Declassify or	
	Subject:		
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
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
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
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


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
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	S DATE.	
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
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THIS WHEN INTERVIEWING	b7D -2
AS HEAD QUARTERS IS AWARE, SA	
OBTAINING SIGNED STATEMENTS F	ROM
ALEXANDRIA WILL REINTERVIEW ON THE IT	EMS SET OUT IN BUREAU
TELET YPE DATED APRIL 14, 1983, HOWEVER, BE CA	USE OF THE
A FOREMENT 10 NED ITEMS, NO FURTHER CONTACT IS	DEEMED USEFUL OR
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AT THIS POINT, THE DISCUSSION CENTERED AROUND	



In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. 35

Alexandria, Virginia
April 26, 1983

and his activities came to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through interviews of close business and personal associates of Edwin P. Wilson. Various attempts were made to attempt an FBI interview of when it was learned	
Attorney (AUSA) attorney. Washington, D. C., contacted AUSA Prior to submitting to interview by the FBT.	
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
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Subsequently, submitted to	
interviews by the FRI The quality of the information furnished	7 <i>/</i>
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On April 21, 1983 the Alexandri	 _a
Field Office of the FBI	b7c -3
	b7D -2
On April 22, 1983, the Alexandria Field Office	<u></u>
of the FBT was advised by the New York Office that	
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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· .

TRANSMIT VIA: Teletype	Ft-St*(Rev. 8-26-82)	FBI		- ,
DIRECTOR, ERT (ATTN: SSA M: SAC, ALEXANDRIA M: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (P) NCIS_E_TERPIL = FUGITIVE; AR - CONSPIRACY; SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER (OO: AX) Re Alexandria teletype to Bureau and New York, -1, -3, -4 Enclosed for the Bureau are five, and New York, two copies each of an LHM suitable for dissemination as deemed appropriate. This LHM contains information from FBI files and recent contacts with the involved narties. This LHM has been disseminated to AUSA The Bureau, in a teletype dated 4/21/83, and the guality of the information he has furnished, management in the Alexandria teletype dated 4/21/83, and the guality of the information he has furnished, management in the Alexandria field office believe it would serve no useful purpose to conduct further interviews of 2-Bureau (Epc. 502) 2-New York 2-Alexandria Transmitted ☐ Teletype ☐ Facsimile	☐ Immediate ☐ Priority	☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLAS E F T O ☐ UNCLAS	3 b6 -1	
Re Alexandria teletype to Bureau and New York, 4/21/83; and New York teletype, 4/22/83. Enclosed for the Bureau are five, and New York, two copies each of an LHM suitable for dissemination as deemed appropriate. This LHM contains information from FBI files and recent contacts with the involved parties. This LHM has been disseminated to AUSA The Bureau, in a teletype advised that should be reinterviewed concerning a number of items not previously covered. In light of the recent events involving Alexandria teletype dated 4/21/83, and the quality of the information he has furnished, management in the Alexandria Field Office believe it would serve no useful purpose to conduct further interviews of Coviminal District of Transmitted Approved: Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted	M: SAC NCIS E TE AI RA - CO SOLICITATION	TTN: SSA C, ALEXANDRIA RPIL - FUGITIVE; ONSPIRACY;		b7E -1
Approved: Alexandria teletype dated 4/21/83, and the quality of the information he has furnished, management in the Alexandria Field Office believe it would serve no useful purpose to conduct further interviews of 2-Bureau (Enc. 518 2-New York 2-Alexandria Approved: Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted Transmitted	1, -3, -4 4/21/83; and 1 -1, -3, -4 -2 -1 copies each or appropriate. and recent cor has been dissorted. AUSA The that state of the s	New York teletype, 4/2 closed for the Bureau f an LHM suitable for This LHM contains inf ntacts with the involve eminated to Easte Easte bureau, in a telet hould be reinterviewed	are five, and New Yor dissemination as deer formation from FBI filled parties. This LHM AUSA ginia adv.	rk, two med les M
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OACB, Alexandria Will not attempt further interview of	
Alexandria, in reviewing the file, has determined only two short FD-302's (one 1-page, dated 7/20/82; and one 2-page, dated 4/21/82) of interviewsof in the Alexandria file. Also, Alexandria and AUSA are	i
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TO DIRECTOR FBI ROUTINE 325-26	
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FRANCIS E. TERPIL-FUGITIVE, ET AL; RA CONSPIRACY; SOLICITAT	Talephoxe Rm
TO COMMIT MURDER (\$); 00:AX.	
RE ALEXANDRIA AIRTELS DECEMBER 17. 1982. AND MARCH 23. 1983	
INTERVIEWED AT HIS RESIDENCE APRIL 21, 1983. DETAILS TO FOLLOW IN	
AIRTEL AND FD-302.	
HOWEVER, FOR INFORMATION AND LEAD PURPOSES REGARDING FRANCIS	1
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HIM SINCE HE HAS A "GUT" FEELING THAT TERRIL IS STILL	A 17
ALIVE.	1330
ACCORDING TO	o3 -1 o6 -1, -2, -3
MAY HAVE INFORMATION REGARDING TERPIL * !	57C -1, -2, -3 57D -2
WHEREABOUTS. ADVISED THAT ALTHOUGH DENIED KNOWING	57E -152 ;
TERPIL'S LOCATION, HE WAS SKEPTICAL OF THIS DENIAL AND IN FACT	1983
1-ee in 4239, 073 to Alexand	The
IN 4 626 83	b6 -1 b7c -1
Xotered	
5 4-JUN 2-1985	**************************************
FBI(Z	T-cv-5450)-14961

·	ı
PAGE TWO DE 0271 SERET	
RECEIVED A CALL FROM DURIN	G -
WHICH STATED TO	
	b3 -2 b6 -2, -3
BELIEVED WAS REFERRING TO TERPIL. HE WAS	b7C -2, -3 b7D -2
RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE NAME AND IT IS REQUESTED THAT ANY	
INTERVIEW OF HIM WHICH ALEXANDRIA MIGHT REQUEST THAT	
BE DONE IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PROTECT	
DURING THE COURSE OF THE INTERVIEW, WAS ASKED IF HE	\neg
EVER WAS AWARE THAT	
	b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3
	b7D -2



PAGE FOUR DE Ø271	
COULD NOT RECALL DOES RECALL READING	b3 -2 b6 -2, -3
NEWS ACCOUNTS	b7C -2, -3 b7D -2
]
	b3 -2 b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3 b7D -2

THE ABOVE WILL BE DETAILED IN FOLLOW-UP AIRTEL AND FD-302.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

FBIHQ RETRANSMIT TO ALEXANDRIA.

G-BY 2675; DECL ON GADR.


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MAY 2, 1983	UNCLAS	PRIORITY	
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FM DIRECTOR'FBI			
TO FBI ALEXANDRIA RO	UTINE		
FBI NEW YORK PRIC	RITY		
ВТ			
UNCLAS.			
FRANCIS E. TERPIL - FUGITIV	/E; EDWIN PAUL WILSO	Na ET ALa RA-	
CONSPIRACY. SOLICITA	ATION TO COMMIT MURD	ER. 00:	
ALEXANDRIA		,	
RE ALEXANDRIA AIRTEL A	AND LHM DATED, APRIL	26. 1983; NEW	b3 -1 b6 -1
YORK TELETYPE TO BUREAU. DA	ATED APRIL 22. 1983;	BURETPE	b7C -1 b7E -1
TO ALEXANDRIA DATED APRIL	11. 1983.		
NEW YORK IZ REQUESTED	TO EXPEDITIOUSLY SU	BMITFNG	
FORTH DETAILS CONCERNING			
			→ b6 -3 b7C -3
BASED ON RECENT DEVELO	PMENTS		b7D -2
			(_ #·
			3/
	[5}		- ₍ r
I - MR. KLEIN			b3 -1
1	erri erri erri erri erri erri erri erri		b6 -1 b7C -1
1 -	12	MAY 4 1983	b7E -1
1 -	MICTINGET OFFICE		
	3 2 2	ALL INFORMATION C	
MAY MAY	203	HEREIN IS UNCLASS DATE STATES BY	
OBMAY 25 1202 MAI		FBI(21-cv	-5450)-14965
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PAGE TWO DE HQ DDS1: UNCLAS	
IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WILSON SPIN-OFF CASES	AND
THE INDEPENDENT WILSON INQUIRIES	b6 -3 b7C -3
FBIHQ CONCLUDES THAT THE CONTINUED	b7D −2, −5
DEBRIEFING OF IS DESIRABLE.	
ALEXANDRIA IS REQUESTED TO PROCEED WITH INTERVIEWS AND	TO
ADVISE IF	
ВТ	
•	

NOTE: REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE REQUESTED EXANDRIA	
REINTERVIEW CONCERNING TOPICS	
PERTINENT TO THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN WILSON AND	
ASSOCIATES. THESE TOPICS WERE NOT ADDRESSED DURING PREVIOUS b6 -3	
INTERVIEWS: b7D -	
REFERENCED NEW YORK TELETYPE ADVISED	
REFERENCED ALEXANDRIA AIRTEL AND LHM	
b6 -3, -4 b7C -3, -4	
MARK b7D -2	•
RICHARD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL {DAAG}, CRIMINAL	
LLOG . NOIZIVIG	
THIS COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTS NEW YORK TO SUBMIT LHM	
SETTING FORTH DETAILS CONCERNING	
IN SPITE OF THESE RECENT b6 -3 b7C -3	
DEVELOPMENTS ALEXANDRIA IS BEING REQUESTED TO CONTINUE 67D -2,	-5
INTERVIEWS OF DUE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WILSON SPIN-	
OFF CASES AND THE INDEPENDENT WILSON INQUIRIES	



PAGE TWO UNC	. MEN YORK		
THAT AUSA	OF THE WASHINGTON, D	.C. OFFICE OF THE	•
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFI	CE		
	•		b3 -1 b6 -3, -4 b7C -3, -4 b7D -2 b7E -1
	·		
* .	EXANDRIA WILL RECALL	OYM EHT TAHT	
EXTENSIVELY INTERVIE	MED AFTER :	SHE CONTACTED	
	TO ADVI	SE OF HER KNOWLEDG	SE
	A	ND HER BELIEF THAT	· •
HE WAS CONNECTED WIT	H EDWIN PAUL WILSON AM	D PEPHAPS WITH	
		w a warrakest so that the	
			b6 -2, -3. b7C -2, -3
			b7D −2
	·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	<u> </u>		

HAS CONTACTED THE NYO ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS SINCE CONTACT WITH HAS INDICATED THAT b6 -2, -3	PAG E	THREE	UNC	L	NEW YORK			<u>) · </u>		
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INDICATED THAT b6 -2, -3 b7c -2, -3				HAS CON	TACTED THE	NYO ON	NUMEROUS	OCCASIONS	5.0	
b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3	SINC	E CONTACT V	PITH					BAŞ		
ъ7С −2, −3	INDI	CATED THAT								
ъ7С −2, −3								•		h6 -2 -3
Ъ7D −2										b7C -2, -3
										b7D −2
										-

PAGE, FIVE UNCLAS MEW YORK	
	¬
	b3 -1 b6 -2, -
	ь7с -2, ь7р -2
	b7E -1
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]
NEW MODEL WAS INCOMMETAND TWO TAND	b6 -3, -4
NEW YORK HAS NO INFORMATION INDICATING	Ь7С −3, Ь7D −2
THAT HAS EVER PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION WHICH	
LED DIRECTLY TO THE CONVICTION OF EDWIN PAUL WILSON OR	
ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CASE. ALEXAN	DRIA
PLEASE DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH AUSA AND SUTEL	
RESULTS. FBIHQ COMMENTS ARE SOLICITED.	
BT	

BI AUTOMA	TIC DECLASS:	ORITY DERIVED FROM	% 1∶		b6 -1 b7с -1	_		
NTE 04-04		randum			B/C -1		(iii)	Exec AD Adm Exec AD Inv Exec AD LES
			,	SECRET				Asst. Olr.: Adm. Servs Crim. Inv
								Insp
	То :	Mr. O. B. R	evell			Date	3/28/83	Lob Legal Coun Off. Cong. & Public Affs
	From :	S. Klein			_ ^			Rec. Mgnt Tech. Serve Training Telephone Rm
	Subject :) (x/			Director's Sec'y
	PURPOSE						t the Depar	rtment b6 -2
		ice (DOJ) co L. Criminal D						b7C -2
	was to	advise the p	articipa	nts that	the FBI	Willi	oe attempti	ing to b7D -2
	eriect	contact with		s contac	t 18/bel	na puri	sued as a i	sespit
	OI			V		Wilas	/Mormil ny	
	with other h	Bl investiga	tions.				n/Terpil ar le within t	
,	framewo	ork of law en	forcemen	t matte	s and wi	thin t	ne paramete	
	matters	of investig	ative in	terest	:o the FB	I. (X		
	SYNOPSI	S: On 2/25/8	13.		(protect	ident	itv):	<u>lan</u> guadan kapu
								b6 −2
								b7C −2 b7D −2
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	Mr.						si ules Classified b	, <u></u>
	1 - Mr. 1 - Mr.	Revell Gilbert					Declassify o	1
ا المشارية	1 -	Girbert						
	1 - Mr.	Klein						b3 -1
	1 -			—			1/	34 b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1
					MATERIAL		1A	34 b7E -1
		(9)	Modern	and mad	2 from		~ '	•
Bo	chigiann	Enrateless.	4/08/83		- 0	appression	7 . 730-5 46 FBI	I(21-cv-5450)-1497
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	Drism	Consterial:	ی کارسات	2055022	~~*y^ <u>l</u> _			request by Mr.

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
	b6 -1, -2 b7C -1, -2 b7D -2
RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) That contact with be continued in order to effect contact between at the earliest date possible. (x)	đ
2) That this contact be arranged which is mutually acceptable to and FBI representatives. (See details) (\$)	b3 -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -2
3) Due to the extreme sensitivity of the contact the details or which should be on a need-to-know basis. (See details)	
4) That the initial contact be effected within the context of establishing a long-term relationship with	b3 -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -2,

Memorandum to Mr. O. B. Revell from S. Klein Re:	Ä
DETAILS: S. Klein to O. B. Revell memorandum, dated 2/1/83 contained two recommendations concerning contact with that FBIHO not pursue any rurrner action at this time to contact contact be maintained with	b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -2
(who has requested that his identity be protected) (a) a large number	
of documents concerning the ongoing Wilson/Terbil investigation and related spinoff cases	
has expressed an interest in speaking with FBI representatives indicated that he would be willing to discuss matters concerning Wilson.	
FBI Supervisor	b3 -2
Copies of the documents were furnished to Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) Mark M. Richard. Criminal Division. DOJ. on March 22. 1983.	b6 -1, -2 b7c -1, -3 b7D -2
	」 -
Richard was advised that these documents After reviewing these documents with key DOJ personnel assigned	
to the Wilson/Terpil Task Force he convened a meeting on March 23, 1983, the purpose of which was to advise the participants that the FBI will be attempting to effect contact with	


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Memorandum to Mr. O. B. Revell from S. Klein	Y
Re:	b6 −2 b7c −2
	b7D −2
]	
CONTACT 15 being pursued at the express request of DOI as a	
result of	
with concerning the Wilson/Terpil and	
other FBI investigations, and will be made within the framework	
of law enforcement matters and within the parameters of matters of investigative interest to the FBI. (x)	
The following individuals attended the meeting: ()	
1) DAAG Mark M. Richard (X) 2) AUSA, District of	
Columbia (A)	
3) Section Chief Stan Klein. FBI	,
4) Supervisor FBI (X) 5) Hnit Chief FBI	
6)	S -1, -4 7C -1, -4
U. S. Department of State (USDS) (X)	, , , , , ,
7) Attorney-Adviser (USDS) (X) 8) Director, Office of Egyptian	
Affairs. USDS (X)	\mathcal{J}
9) Bureau of Intelligence and Research,	
10)	
11)	
Topics discussed at this meeting included the	
following: (X)	
·*	
a) Value and significance of documents related to the	
Wilson/Terpil Investigation (*)	
b) Wilson's relationship to those individuals who	_
	ъ7D -3
	€ .

Memorandum to Mr. O. B. Revell from S. Klein Re:	
b3 -2 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -2	_
	•
Richard advised all present that the FRI should	
expeditiously attempt to effect a contact with in an effort to pursue all matters previously mentioned which impact on the Bureau's jurisdictional responsibilities. (%)	
It is noted that at the meeting stated that the FBI has "done an outstanding job in obtaining this information", and continued his laudatory comments b7C -2, concerning the FBI's work throughout the meeting. concerning the FBI's work throughout the meeting. concerning the FBI's work throughout the meeting. b7D -2, concerned with Richard that the FBI should pursue this opportunity to contact at any location deemed appropriate.	-4 -3
Tepresentatives articulated no objections to the above proposal. Concerning the proposed meeting with a suitable location will be selected with the assistance of which will be mutually acceptable to all representatives.	
snowld be observed on a strict need-to-	



AX SECRET	
nformation about aka	b3 -1 b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, - b7D -2 b7E -1
It is requested that one copy of this airtel and LH be provided to Office of Professional Responsibility, Inspect Division, FBIHQ, for review. One conv of LHM being provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney U. S. Attorney Washington, D. C., who have prosecutive interests in captioned matters. REQUEST OF THE BUREAU: Requested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Washington, D. C., who have prosecutive interests in captioned matters. Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Washington, D. C., who have prosecutive interests in captioned matters. Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Washington, D. C., who have prosecutive interests in captioned matters. Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alexandria Division's contaction of the provided to Assistant U. S. Attorney Beauested to approve Alex	ion tant : 2, -3, -4 -2, -3,- 4



UNDED STATES DEPARTMEN'T OF LITTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Alexandria, Virginia April 25, 1983

·	FRANCIS E. TERPIL - FUGITIVE; EDWIN PAUL WILSON; AND OTHERS;	
b3 -1 b6 -2 b7C -2 b7D -2	CONSPIRACY; SOLICITATION TO COMMIT MURDER	
b7E -1	n Paul Wilson is a white male, born May 3, 1	028 24
harges at Ale respectively, and illegally to Libya. He lew York City, afforts to have	who since late 1982 has been convicted on fe xandria, Virginia, and Houston, Texas, relat to illegally exporting firearms to Europe an exporting over 40,000 pounds of C-4 plastic is awaiting trial in U. S. District Court in New York, on Federal charges relating to him actions initiated to kill two Pederal areas.	lony ing, d Libya, explosives
nd several por n Federal cust	central wither	3

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ALL INFORMATION C	
HEREIN IS UNCLAS	
DATE 573189 B	

b6 -2 b7C -2

ಬಾ	-т
b 6	-1
b7C	-:
b7E	-:

RE:	FRANCIS E. TERPIL - FUGITIVE; ET AL .	; /
		b6 -2, -3 b7c -2, - b7D -2
	is a white male horn	7
were	The following interviews of conducted on March 15, 1983, and March 24, 1983:	<u> </u>

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

3/17/83 Date of transcription. (Protect Identity) was contacted on this date at the office of Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) b5 -1 the United States Attorney's Grace, 3rd and Constitution b6 -1, -3, -4 Avenues, Northwest, Washington, D.C., where he was advised b7C -1, -3, -4 at the outset of the official identity of the contacting b7D -2 Special Agent. AUSA was present at the beginning of the interview and was "in and out" during the course of the interview. Just prior to the contact with on this date. AUSA Special Thereafter, CONFIDENTIALLY provided the following information. b5 -1 b6 - 3b7C -3 b7D -2 Background Information: provided the following information about his background: b3 -1 Alexandri b6 -1, -2 nvestigation on_ at Washington, D.C. b7c -1, -2 b7E -1 Date dictated 3/15/03

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302	RÉV.	3-8-77
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b7C -1, -2

b7E -1


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
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


		b6 -
•	(PROTECT IDENTITY) was interviewed at the Alexandria Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, fifth floor conference room, on the afternoom this date. He is aware of the official identity of the interviewing Special Agents from prior contact with each. On this occasion, he CONFIDENTIALLY provided the following information:	ь7с ь7D n of
-2, -3 C -2, -3 D -2		
		\downarrow


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
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













RE:	FRANCIS ET AL	E.	TERPIL	 FUGITIVE;	b6 -	-2
					ь7c	-2
					ь7р	-2
						


Investigation is continuing in captioned matters.

April 18, 1983



memorandum from Assistant Director Revell to DAAG	5 -3 6 -2 7C -2
memorandum from Assistant Director Revell to DAAG	6 -2
memorandum from Assistant Director Revell to DAAG	6 -2
Pichard dated 2/20/02\ \\	
Dr.	
In light of the shove LCD	
Title 28, United	
that: (S)	
The Attorney General may appoint officials -	
(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States;	
* * *	
(3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General. (3)	
T.CD	
	5 -3 6 -2
b ⁻	7C -2
SDCDOT	

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ZIESTS. RECEIVED APR 20 11 30 AM '83 EXEC. A. D. FBI EB. HY EH 11 22 HAY

US. Santa no JUSTICE

b6 -1 ъ7с -1 AIRTEL

SECRET

May 31, 1983

b3 -1 b6 -1, -2

b7E -1

b7C -1, -2

Director, FBI

SACs, Albuquerque Alexandria

Denver

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNEXACSIFIED EXCEPT WHELE SHOWN

WHITE COLLAR CRIME ASPECTS OTHERWISE OF WILSON/TERPIL INVESTIGATIONS;

aka:

BRIBERY-COI, FCPA

ALEXANDRIA 00:

FRANCIS EDWARD TERPIL - FUGITIVE;

EDWIN PAUL WILSON; ET AL;

TTAR-EXTORTION, CONSPIRACY

CONSPIRACY, SOLICITATION

TO COMMIT MURDER; ALEXANDRIA

OO: DENVER


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Declassify o

Re Bureau airtel with enclosures captioned as above, dated March 25, 1983.

Referenced airtel along with all enclosures should be classified "SECRET" in their entirety in order to protect foreign sources and methods.


Recipient offices are requested to properly classify the above referenced documents.



NOTE: This airtel instructs recipient offices to properly classify

b7D −2

Classification required in order to protect foreign sources and methods. (8)




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b AX	UNCLAS	SECRE	Ţ		
]	DOES NOT KNOW		7	b3 -1 b6 -1,
HAD BEEN IN	CONTACT WITH			SINCE HE FIRST	b7C -1 b7E -1
ET HIM. T	HE LAST TIME H	E SAW			
ADV	ISED THAT MOST	OF HIS CONTACT	s with w	ERE USUALLY	•
SOCIAL,			HE CANNOT	RECALL	
	STATED HIS CO	ONTACTS WITH TH	IE PROPERTY D	ISPOSAL OFFICE	
PDO) AT FT	. BELVOIR WERE	MAINLY TO GET	EQUIPMENT FR	OM THEM.	_
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Çuşi ^r	WAS AWARE THA	,	APANCER STR	T BATE NAT WHAD	
	一种种种,这种种种类。在种种		rnew Bu	T DOES NOT KNOW	b6 -1, b7C -1,
v ² • v z		医多数形位于	一般的使用的现在分词 不足		and the state of the second
		Q Saure C		1077 227 1047 2314	


b6 -1 b7С -1

FBI(21-cv-5450)-15015

PAGE THREE AX UNCLAS	SECRET	; •
AT HIS OFFICE OR IF HE EVER SAW	HIM AT THE PDO.	
ADVISED HE HAS NEV	VER MET EDWIN PAUL WILSON; HOWEVER,	\neg
	, ,	ᄀ
WAS TOLD EITHER	BY OR THAT THEY KNEW	_
SOMEONE IN AND	THAT THIS PERSON AND	
THIS PERSON HAD		b3 -1 b6 -1, -2
		b7C -1, -2 b7E -1
	WAS TOLD THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS	
HE	LATER LEARNED THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL	•
WAS WILSON.	AND	-
THOUGHT NOTHING ABOUT		
E IT HER OR	ASKED IF HE COULD DELIVER	
SOME FURNITURE		
_	THE DELIVERY WAS	b6 -1, -2
MADE DURING THE WEEK ON A NORMA	L WORK DAY. RECALLS HE WENT	b7C −1, −2
TO THE PDO AND THAT	LOADED THE TRUCK WITH A COUPLE OF	
DRESSERS AND A CHEST OF DRAVERS		
	HAT WAS TAKEN; HOWEVER, THE FLOOR	
SPACE OF THE TRUCK WAS COVERED.	BUT THE FURNITURE WAS NOT STACKED.	




PAGE FOUR AX UNCLAS
EITHER OR GAVE HIM DIRECTIONS ON HOW TO FIND THE
AND TOLD HIM JUST TO TELL WHOEVER WAS THERE WHO HE WAS AND THAT HE
WAS EXPECTED. STATED WHEN HE ARRIVED AT THE HE MET AN
INDIVIDUAL NAMED AND THAT LAST NAME WAS POSSIBLY b3 -1 b6 -1, -2
WAS THE ONLY PERSON HAD CONTACT WITH AND b7c -1, -2
ASSISTED HIM IN UNLOADING THE FURNITURE
DOES NOT RECALL IF THERE WAS OTHER FURNITURE IN THE
STATED THAT THE FURNITURE HE DELIVERED WAS USABLE, BUT WAS
CONSIDERABLY BANGED UP. TOLD THE FURNITURE WAS GOING
TO BE USED SIGNED NO RECEIPT FOR
THE FURNITURE AND WAS NOT PAID BY ANYONE FOR DELIVERING IT.
BELIEVED THIS WAS IN FURTHERANCE OF
STATED THE TRIP TO THE WAS
NOT A SECRET AND MOST EMPLOYEES KNEW WHERE HE WAS GOING.
HE DID NOT THINK IT OUT OF THE ORDINARY TO GET b6 -1, -2 b7c -1, -2
FURNITURE AT THE SAME TIME, HE DID NOT THINK IT
WRONG AT THE TIME FOR HIM TO BE ASKED TO DELIVER THE FURNITURE.
KNEW THAT THE PDO DID NOT HAVE TRUCKS NOR DID THE AMC.
HE THOUGHT IT NOT



SECRET
PAGE FIVE AX
UNUSUAL TO BE REQUESTED TO MAKE THE DELIVERY IN THAT HAD A
LARGE TRUCK. AT NO TIME DID SEE ANY PAPERWORK OR
REQUISITIONS FOR THE FURNITURE AND SIGNED NO FORMS WHEN PICKING UP
THE FURNITURE. b6 -1, -2
UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, EITHER A FEW WEEKS OR MONTHS b7C -1, -2 b7E -1
BEFORE HIS TRIP TO EITHER OR WANTED
SOME BUNK BED FRAMES TAKEN TO A HOUSE IN HE WAS TOLD THIS
FURNITURE WAS FOR
NAME .
UNRECALLED, AND WENT TO THE PDO TO PICK UP THE BUNK BED FRAMES.
LOADED THE TRUCK AND THERE WAS NO PAPERWORK SIGNED OR
OBSERVED BY DOES NOT RECALL THE NAME OF THE
INDIVIDUAL TO WHOM HE DELIVERED THE FURNITURE, BUT BELIEVES THIS
PERSON HAD WORKED WITH BEFORE. DOES NOT THINK WILSON'S
NAME HAD COME UP AT THIS POINT. AFTER DELIVERING THE FURNITURE, THE
PERSON WANTED TO REIMBURSE FOR HIS EXPENSES, BUT 66 -1, -2
DECL_INED.
STATED THAT THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO TIMES THAT HE TOOK
ANY EQUIPMENT FROM THE POO EXCEPT FOR THE EQUIPMENT HE TOOK TO USE
HE STATED HE NEVER TOOK ANYTHING FOR ANYONE

<u> </u>
PAGE SIX AX HNCLAS SECRE
ELSE AND DOES NOT KNOW IF EVER DID. STATED HE NEVER b3 -1
RECEIVED ANY FUNDS FROM NEVER ASKED TO DO ANY- 67C -1, -2
THING THAT THOUGHT TO BE ILLEGAL OR IRREGULAR.
STATED HE HAS NOT HAD ANY CONTACT WITH OR SINCE
JOING THE FBI. STATED HE REQUESTED TO HELP HIM GET INTO THE FBI, b6 -1, -2 BUT WITHIN A DAY CHANGED HIS MIND AND TOLD TO FORGET IT AS HE b7c -1, -2
WANTED TO GET THE JOB ON HIS OWN.
LHM WILL FOLLOW.
BI

SECRET -6.



USE AND PREPARATION OF FORM 0-73

Restrictions on Use

- Only incoming teletype messages within the categories listed in MiOG Section 16-1.7 pages 1251 & 1252 may be prepared using form 0-73.
- 2. Use of Form 0-73 is restricted to incoming teletype messages received at FBIHQ Communications Center within the last 72 hours.
- 3. Addressees must be Bureau Offices (LEGAT/Field) or other Government Agencies. Geographical location must be indicated if other Government Agency is located outside the Washington, D.C. area.
- 4. Editing of message text is restricted to typed or printed changes of a word or two. Changes to the existing text involving more than a word or two will require the originator to initiate a new message using Form 0-93. Administrative data may be added immediately following the text and must be identical for all addressees.
- 5. Teletype meesages received by the Communications Center that do not meet the above criteria shall be returned to the originator for preparation using Form 0-93.


Preparation of 0-73 Form (Yellow)


- 1. Date & Precedence Type or print date and indicate precedence by checking the appropriate box.
- 2. Addressee(s) Type or print addressee(s) immediately following the "TO:" or place a check mark in the appropriate box. Note: When using block "Other," indicate geographical location if addressee(s) is located outside Washington, D.C. If addressee(s) is a military installation, the name of the base, fort, or station must be listed to ensure delivery.
- 3. Classification Type or print the classification and if appropriate the caveat and warning notices.
- 4. Addressee Internal Distribution Complete when the originator wishes the message to be distributed to a known entity within a Headquarters Agency (i.e. Division, Section, Unit, etc.). List the addressee(s) abbreviation and the internal distribution, i.e. a message to Dept. of State, Dept. of Justice, and Defense Intelligence Agency; list on the "For" line(s) as follows: Example: For: DOS For SY/TAG; DOJ for Asst. AG Criminal Div.; DIA For DSOP. Messages which do not list internal distribution shall be delivered to the agency headquarters where their analyst will effect in-house distribution.
- 5. Subject Type or print the subject in the space provided or check "see attached" if subject is identical to attached message.
- 6. Originator's Boxes Type or print the originator's name, telephone extension, room number, and division.
- 7. Approved By Box Indicate approval for transmission by initialing the approved by box. Note: The person approving the message is solely responsible for assuring all necessary editing changes are accurate and are legible.

Preparation of Message To Be Transmitted

- 1. Duplicate Copy & Notations Xerox 1 copy of the incoming teletype message. A notation shall be made on the original incoming teletype indicating one copy made for relay to SACS ______, (or LEGATS) ______, (or Government Agencies) _____.
- Editing of Duplicate Copy (Heading) Using a lead pencil ONLY draw single lines through the first and last lines of the message heading; connect these lines from top right to bottom left forming a "Z" figure. (Do Not Obliterate the Heading)
- 3. Editing Changes to the Text (See Restrictions on Use, item 4)
- 4. Administrative Data Type or print administrative data immediately following the text.










 \Box

7)





U.S. Departmen Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation New York, New York

In Reply,	Please	Refer to	
File No.			

May 10, 1983

Francis E. Terpil - Fugitive Et Al Registration Act -	ьз - ь6 - ь7с ь7р ь7е	-2, -2, -2
For information, on May 2, 1983 and advised New York (NY) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FB) that	was contacted	

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be disseminated outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION C HEREIN IS UNGLAS

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b7E -1

FBI(21-cv-5450)-15030 FBI/DOJ


ENCLOSURE

0-93 (Rev. 4-13-7)	Ž Ž	COMMUNICATION MESSAGE PORM			
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10	5/1,2/	B3.		b7C -1, -2 b7E -1	
<u> </u>	Iz	REQUESTED TO ARRANGE	FOR INTERVI	EW OF	
8	FOR ANY IN	FORMATION HE MAY HAVE	REGARDING T	ERPIL'	
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FBI(21-cv-5450)-15031

Memorandum





D-36 (hev :5-22-64)			
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	FBI		
	Date: 4/27/8	3	
Transmit the following in	Type in plaintext or code)		
ATRTEL	Type in plantest of tower		
Via	(Priority)		
To: Director, FBI			
Attention: SSA		Section	b3 -1, -2 b6 -1
Crit	ninal Investigat	ive Division	ь7c -1
FROM:	(P)		67E −1
SUBJECT: FRANCIS E TERPIL -			
RA CONSPIRACY			∏ Ь3 −2
	FUGITIVE	INDEX	b6 -1, -3 =b7C -1, -3
			ъ7С -1, -3 ъ7D -2
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tached for both FB	IHQ and Alexandr	ia are fi <u>ve con</u>	
Part D. rwo separate FD-302s W	high reflect int	erview at	
B			
Also attached is the designated for Alexandria.	Grand Jury Suno	oena which is	
similarly only designated for submitted to both Alexandria as			
Attached for FBIHQ a		e photocopies o	f the
page of publication "Facts on	File, 197 <u>8" whic</u>	h reflects the	death
	PE-6	12	12
Interview log original envelope in which	nal wokes, roven	orant of FD=30	2s and
being maintained in appropriat	e la encompes l	n	
5 Bureau (Enclosures - 7)	────────────────────────────────────	74(HD) -2	
[2 - SAC, Alexandria	Enclosur _{b6 -1} ,		3 1983
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	sified v: 30/5		
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Special Agent in Charge	and the second of the second o	Sovernment Printing Office: 19	72 455-574 -0v-5450)-15034

Airtel to Director, FBI b3 -1 FRANCIS E. TERPIL - FUGITIVE, et al b7E -1 CONSPIRACY 00:AX

For information of FBIHQ and Alexandria, review of available research materials at U. S. Embassy, Paris, failed to reflect any additional documentation of the death of Bruce Roy McKenzie.

was cooperative during the intervience did not display any evasiveness and, aside from occasional difficulty in remembering certain items due to the lapse of time, there did not appear to be any effort to conceal any of the facts as he knew them.	W. b6 -3 b7C - b7D -

Finally, advised he would be willing to be reinterviewed should additional areas need exploring subsequent to 00 and/or AUSA review of the interview and the

according to him

documents provided.

It is suggested that FBIHQ, through liaison with U. S. Department of State, endeavor to obtain through the U. S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, documentation regarding the death of Bruce Roy McKenzie.

-3

ALL INFORMATION
HEREIN IS UNCEAS
DATE STYLES

b3 -1 b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -1

1242

FBI(21-cv-5450)-15036

1242

. b7E -1

Haiti. The country's economic growth rate fell to just over 1% in the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1977, compared with an average of almost 4% from 1972 to 1976, according to the Latin America Economic Report June 9. The drop was blamed largely on the widespread drought in the first half of 1977.

Kenya. Bruce Roy McKenzie, former Kenyan agriculture minister, was killed May 24 in a plane crash during a flight from Kampala, Uganda to Nairobi, Kenya. The two other passengers on the flight and the pilot also were killed.

The Kenyan government sent a telegram to Uganda May 26 charging that the crash had been caused by a bomb placed on the plane at Entebbe airport in Kampala. The Ugandan government denied the charge the next day. McKenzie and the two other men had been in Uganda to discuss arms deals, and it was suspected that opponents of the Ugandan government might have placed the bomb.

(McKenzie, 59, born in South Africa, was the only white to have served in the independent Kenyan Cabinet. He had moved to Kenya in 1946 and had been appointed to his first post in 1959.)

—It was reported April 9 that contracts totaling \$95 million had been awarded to two West German companies and one French firm for the construction of a dam and reservoir on the Tana River.

Malagasy Rapublic. Troops moved into the capital city of Antananarivo May 30 to curb two days of violence that had left three persons dead. Students had begun demonstrating May 29 against what they called a lowering of educational standards. However, the disturbances had been aggravated by gangs of unemployed city youths who looted shops and set fire to buildings. The government had imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew and by May 30 reported that the city was calm.

Nigeria. More than a week of student riots in Nigeria had left at least nine impersons dead and resulted in the arrests of hundreds by April 28, according to reports. University students began demonstrating April 20-over governmentmandated increases in tuition and lodging fees. Police and army troops occupied several universities, killing a number of students and closing three institutions indefinitely. Secondary school students took to the streets of Lagos, the capital, April 28 and wrecked school buses and other government vehicles in protest against increased costs at their schools. The increases had been announced as part of the government's austerity program to cut public spending and curb inflation. [See p. 249 A 1]

Sudan. Sudan officially devalued its pound June 8 by 13%. The value of the currency was lowered officially to \$2.50 from \$2.89, but government subsidies to foreign purchasers of the pound and government taxes on buyers of foreign currency made the effective exchange rate \$2.00 to the pound. The devaluation was an effort to aid the country's foreign debt

However, the country's ambitious development programs, which required most of the foreign loans, would not be curtailed, according to President Gaafar el-Nimeiry May 24. He promised to improve financial controls and cautioned against exaggerating the importance of recent oil discoveries in the southwestern-area of the country.

—In February elections for the National Assembly (parliament), an estimated one-half of the seats were won by opposition candidates, according to the Financial Times (London) March 21. It was the first contested election since Nimeiry had come to power in 1969.

Tanzania. The government June 2 ordered the expulsion of Lonrho Ltd., a British-based firm, from Tanzania and the liquidation of all its assets within three months. A statement by the Tanzanian High Commission, the country's representative in Britain, said Lonrho known to have undermined the freedom struggle in southern Africa," a reference to charges that Lonrho had violated United Nations sanctions against trade with Rhodesia. Lonrho that day replied that Tanzania had presented a "totally false picture regarding its activities in Africa. . ." Lonrho had extensive holdings in eastern Africa, and Roland Rowland, its president, was an active sup-porter of Rhodesian majority rule. The value of the Tanzanian holdings was not reported, but it was estimated to be a small proportion of Lonrho's African dealings. [See 1977, p. 810D2]
—President Nyerere April 26 freed 13

—President Nyerere April 26 freed 13 prisoners, among them former Economic Affairs Minister Adbulrahman Babu, who had been sentenced to death for the assassination of Zanzibar leader Sheik Abeid Amani Karume. [See 1976, p. 1013C3]

Upper Volta. Gen. Sangoule Lamizana, leader of Upper Volta since 1966, was elected president of the country's first civilian government in 12 years after a runoff vote May 28. Lamizana won 56% of the vote, while his opponent, Macaire Ouedraogo, won 43%. (The rest of the votes were disqualified.) The runoff had been called after presidential elections May 14 in which none of the four candidates received a plurality. Voter turnout was low in both races; 35% of the electorate voted May 14, and 44% voted May 28. Under the Constitution, Lamizana would serve a five-year term and could be reelected president only once.

—Gerard Kango Ouedraogo was elected president of the National Assembly June 9 by 29 of the 57 members of the newly elected parliament. [See p. 345D3]

MISCELLANEOUS

Disasters

Tornadoes Strike Southeast. Numerous communities were damaged April 17-18 when a string of tornadoes battered Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana, leaving four dead and 57 in-

property damage as a resurt.

A general storm system, with a violent front that swept across the country, spawned additional twisters in the South.

On May 4 a tornudo dropped down from the sky and demolished an elementary school in Clearwater, Fla. Two children were killed and 96 injured. Earlier the same day, another twister had jumped across Gainesville, Fla. No injuries were reported but power outages forced closure of the University of Florida.

In Jackson County, Kans. May 31, a tornado left a path of damage 20 miles long and a half-mile wide. Three persons were killed and one seriously injured when their mobile home was struck. In Marshall County, 16 cars of a freight train were derailed.

On June 17 in Ottawa, Kans., a showboat was capsized by a tornado about 100 yards from shore on Lake Pomona. It had embarked with 59 passengers and crew. Fiften persons were killed.

Tornadoes, Heat Wave in India. Six villages in India's eastern state of Orissa were devastated April 16 by a 10-minute tornado which flattened all the dwellings in the area. All-India Radio reported a death toll of between 400 and 500 persons. Another tornado struck a village in West Bengal state, killing about 100.

In a June 7 report from Delhi, over 200 persons were said to have died from sunstroke or dehydration during a monthlong heat wave. The temperatures had ranged between 105° and 110° F (between 41° and 43° C), remaining in the high nineties at night. It was reckoned to be the worst hot spell in 11 years.

The Delhi municipal electricians went on strike June 6 leaving the city without power for refrigeration, fans or air conditioners.

(The current of extremely hot air extended across to southwest Iran where it was reported June 12 that at least 10 persons had died in temperatures that had reached 124° F (51° C), the highest in 27 years.)

Japan Hit by Earthquakes. Twenty-seven persons were killed and nearly 1,100 were injured June 12 when Japan's main island of Honshu was rocked by an earthquake that measured 7.5 on the Richter scale. The epicenter of the earthquake, which lasted only several seconds, was in the Pacific Ocean 12 miles (19 kilometers) east of the city of Sendai, 180 miles (288 kilometers) northeast of Tokyo.

It was the most powerful quake recorded anywhere during 1978 and the strongest tremor in Japan since 1964. A lesser quake shook the same area two days later and again June 21 without causing injuries.

Another earthquake had occurred Jan. 13 on the Izu peninsula, 80 miles (128 kilometers) southwest of Tokyo. It registered 7 on the Richter scale and was followed by a series of minor tremors. The death toll was 23 and property damage was put at \$76 million.

Additional quakes struck other areas of Japan on Feb. 20 and May 23, Both

June 23, 1978

b6 -1 b7C -1 ALL DATOR MATION
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CASE SHIPS
FBI(21-cv-5450)-15039

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1242

b3 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription April 26, 1983


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		Edwin Paul Wilson		ъ7с -
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of Terpil's where in approximately the could be local to indicated he had beard from a funich, Germany,	cabouts. He advised and he ted. This last me had a "gut feeling n unrecalled indivited weeks after he advised moreover to know or respirating his location.	as asked if he had lested that he had lested no current knowlesting occurred at lesting occurred at lesting occurred at lesting alloged assassing alloged assassing he was accuainted recounted	t seen Terpil edge as to when and stated no had been seen in sation. 66 with one whom have some	
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
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	Shout that time, he received a call from	b6 -2, -3
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		b7D −2
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	AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER	, .
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		b7C −3 b7D −2
	Shortly thereafter	B/D -2
marka Baa	Terpil contacted and introduction. Both men stated	luced
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and Miles	As it was explained to by TQT	211
200 Page 10 Pa	-	

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ndividu	He has	not see	en Torp	il since	that day	• , ,	b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3


	that in one of Wilson advised him
<u>+5=+</u>	
and never knew who he was.	gdaraed us usasz
Wilson associate, advised no never knew him by reputation.	as being a bfc -2, -3 br net him and only bfc -2, -3
concluded by stating the his knowledge he had never done anything dealings with Wilson/Terpil, et al but questions he began to ask himself	: illegal in his
	ELIONE IN DIS OWN


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription April 25, 1983

contacted from	advi	sed he had g	one through	his files for	b6 -3 b7C -3 b7D -2
Wilson/To	Thick might roil, et al, to the above of	and had fou	t to his as: nd several v	sociation with which he was wil	Lling
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2, -3					
-2, -3 -2					
vestigation on APP	il 25, 1983	at		File *Alexano	iria
_SA			b3 -1 -b6 -1, -3_Date b7C -1, -3	dictated April 26,	
nis document contai	ns neither recommendation	ons nor conclusions of ti	b7D -2; the propert	FBI(2 y of the FBI and is loaned to y ALL INFORMATION	21-cv-5450)-1

FBI(21-cv-5450)-15068





PAGE TWO SECRET NEW YORK STATED THAT HE HAS ALREADY CONTACTED THE PRINCIPLE LEGAL AGENT STATED THAT HE HAS ALREADY CONTACTED THE PRINCIPLE LEGAL AGENT B3 -1 B6 -2 B7C -2 B7C -2 B7C -2 B7C -2 B7E -1 APPARENTLY PROVIDED A WASHINGTON FIELD BUREAU AGENT IN ORDER TO
IN CONNECTION WITH NUMEROUS INVESTIGATIONS
WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED IN.
IS ALSO AWARE THAT THE NEWARK OFFICE OF THE FBI
MAY HAVE
HE DESIRES TO REVIEW ANY [INFORMANT FILE] FROM NEWARK AND/OK
HEADQUARTERS AND AS HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT
DEFENSE MAY BE THAT HE ACTED AT THE DIRECTION AND
CONTROL OF THE FBI IN COMMITTING b3 -1 b6 -2, -4
WHICH HE STANDS CHARGED. b7c -2, -4
WEW HILL TO TO LEE TOUR MILE TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O
OTHER REFERENCES AVAILABLE AT NEWARK REGARDING CAPTIONED
SUBJECT AND PROVIDE A SUSCINCT YET DETAILED SUMMARY TO FBIHQ.
THE NEWARK PRINCIPLE LEGAL AGENT SHOULD CONTACT
AFTER APPROPRIATE CONSULATATION WITH FBIHQ
SUPV. REGARDING THE ABOVE.
FBIHQ IS REQUESTED TO HANDLE REQUEST IN

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PAGE THREE	SECRET	
ACCORDANCE WIT	TH EXISTING PROCEDURES. FOR INFORMATION, I	NEW .
YORK INDICES F	REGARDING SUBJECT REFLECT REFERENCES TO SUB	
IN NYFILE	WHICH IS THE WILSON/TERPIL FOREIGN AGE	
REGISTRATION A	ACT WATTER, 88-19278 WHICH IS THE MAIN UNLA	WFUL 67D -2 b7E -1
FLIGHT INVESTI	IGATION CONDUCTED AT NEW YORK WHEN	FLED
THE NEW YORK A	AREA TO AVOID PROSECUTION AND CONFINEMENT C) N
CHARGES BROUGH	HT BY THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFF	ICE
AND IN NYFILE	AND IN	
WHICH IS A	OFFERED	TO
PROVIDE CERTAI	IN INFORMATION. HIS OFFER WAS REJECTED BEC	CAUSE
OF THE CIRCUMS	STANCES THESE FILE	S WILL b6 -3
BE REVIEWED I	N DETAIL AND A SUSCINCT SUMMARY PROVIDED.	ъ7с -3 ъ7р -2
	IS ALSO KNOWN TO BE MAKING CONTACTS WITH	b7E −1
THIS	S CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE	AND
THIS WILL BE R	REPORTED SEPERATELY. 💢	
0-BY G-3,	DECL: OADR.	
BT		

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION IDENTIFICATION DIVISION


Date_5/2/83

(To be used in lieu of correspondence covering eviden Submitting Agency	The state of the s
- Samuellis rigottoy	LOCAL & STATE
by	
g Agency MR. OB PFVF14 ASS	Time 3:00 PM b3 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1
Requested by	Accepted By
ictim	FBI FILE NO.
Offense	LATENT CASE NO. <u>B- 80073</u>
Suspects	b3 -1 b6 -1, -2 b7c -1, -2 b7E -1
EVIDENCE / BRIEF FACTS COMPARE FORTS OF BROWER WITH DEVELOPED ON TEM #7 & #10. #7 & #10 SUBMITTED BY SSA	(THIS SPACE FOR BLOCKING)
ON MARCH TO 183	Dy JUL S 1983 b3 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -1 ANSO 33
ALL INFORMATION CON HEREIN IS UNGLASOR DATE SHIRE	(over) FBI(21-cv-5450)-1507

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUID	* h6 -1	
DATE 04-08-2024 BY:	• 67c -1	Exec AD Adin Exac AD Inv. Exe: AD LES Ass. Dif. Adm. Serva Crim. lev.
F∘ Mr. O. B	. Revell SECRET	Date 3/29/83 Legal Carriage Signal State S
From S. Klein		Rec Maris Tech Serve Training Training Templane Rec Director's See 7
Subject: FRANCIS EDWARD P RA- COMMINIS	EDWARD TERPIL - FUGITIVE; AUL WILSON; ET AL; CONSPIRACY, SOLICITATION ' URDER;	b3 -1 b6 -1 b7c -1
	XANDRIA mit Wilson's business docume	ents to the Laboratory
and Identification of the fingerprint exam	on Divisions for handwriting	g and latent
one documents be	sent to the Laboratory Divi ons Unit 2 for handwriting a	ision, Documents
cuments be proceed of the company of	2) It is also recommended cessed for latent fingerprin ivision, Latent Fingerprint	its by the
		ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
regarding Wilson CID, Terror	lowing twenty-one documents s business activities were ism Section on March 11, 19 urnished reliable informatio	furnished to SSA b7C -1
Enclosures	lMr. Klein	5 4 89 Classified b Declassify o
1 - 1 - 1 -	Div. 1)	
(10)		
	SECHEL	FBI(21-cv-5450)-15080


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Memorandum to Mr. O. B. Revell from S. Klein RE: FRANCIS EDWARD TERPIL - FUGITIVE; EDWARD PAUL WILSON; ET AL;



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Memorandum to Mr. O. B. Revell from S. Klein RE: FRANCIS EDWARD TERPIL - FUGITIVE; EDWARD PAUL WILSON; ET AL;





Memorandum to Mr. O. B. Revell from S. Klein RE: FRANCIS EDWARD TERPIL - FUGITIVE; EDWARD PAUL WILSON; ET AL;

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 ŽX I	_
	b7D −2

To authenticate these documents as belonging to Edwin Paul Wilson, handwriting and latent fingerprint examinations are essential.


The Laboratory Division, Documents Section, Operations Unit 2 is requested to compare the known signatures of Wilson previously submitted by the Alexandria Division under case entitled "Edwin Paul Wilson, OOJ, OO: New York" to the Wilson signatures on documents numbered 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Report of findings should be furnished to the Alexandria Division and to SSA CID, Terrorism Section, Room 4239.

The Documents Section is requested to forward the twentyone documents to the Identification Division. Latent Fingerprint Section when handwriting examinations are completed.

b6 -1 b7C -1

The Latent Fingerprint Section is requested to process the twenty-one documents for latent fingerprints and to compare results with the known fingerprints of Edwin Paul Wilson, FBI number 945-252-V10.

Report of findings should be furnished to the Alexandria Division and to SSA CID, Terrorism Section, Room 4239. The twenty-one documents should be sent to the Alexandria Division.



INCONS BIN 20 1983

FELETY DE MARRY

17 MAY 83 20 492

OF INVESTIGATION

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PAGE TWO DE HQ OLSA S	ECRET		
FOR INFORMATION	OF NK AND NY REFE	RENCED WFO AIRTEL	
REPORTED RECEIPT OF			
			b6 -1, -3, -4 b7C -1, -3, -4 b7D -2
ON MAY 12. 1983	- PLA	NK DIVISION CONTAC	CTED
AZUA	SDNY TO DETERMINE	SPECIFIC FBI ASSI	STANCE
REQUESTED FOR			
AUSA RE	QUESTED INFORMATION	N ON ALL FBI CONTAC	272
WITH TO INCL	UDE PURPOSE DATES	AND IDENTITIES OF	
CONTACTING AGENTS SI	NCE MATERIAL COULD	BE ZUBJECT TO DIZ	CLOSURE
UNDER BRADY OR SECTION	on 3500.	% 1	
REVIEW OF THE F	BIHQ [ASSET FILE	PERTAIN	ING TO b3 -1 b7E -1
SUBJECT BY SUPERVISOR	RY SPECIAL AGENTS	ASSIGNED TO THE IN	TD AT
FBIH@ HAS FAILED TO	REVEAL THE EXISTEN	CE OF ANY DOCUMENT	2
QUALIFYING AS BRADY	MATERIAL OR SECTIO	N 3500 MATERIAL. N	OR HAS
THE REVIEW REVEALED	ANY INFORMATION PE	RTINENT TO THE CRI	MINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH	SUBJECT IS CURREN	TLY INVOLVED. THIS	2

PAGE THREE DE HQ DL38 S E CRE T

REVIEW ALSO FAILED TO REVEAL ANY MATERIAL IN THE SUBJECT'S

[ASSET FILE COMING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

SURVEILLANCE ACT {FISA} OF 1978.]

THE NK SA WHO WAS THE CASE HANDLER FOR SUBJECT DURING THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD SHOULD. FOLLOWING REVIEW OF ALL NK MATERIALS PERTAINING TO SUBJECT AND AFTER CONSULTATION WITH PLA. NK. PREPARE AND EXECUTE AN AFFIDAVIT ATTESTING TO THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO BRADY OR SECTION 3500 MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE FBI ASSET FILES CONCERNING SUBJECT AND THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING ANY ALLEGATION BY SUBJECT THAT AT THE TIME HE PERFORMED THE ACTS FOR WHICH INDICTED HE WAS ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE FBI.

	ZNCH	AFF	FIDA	VIT	SHOUL	D BE	SUFF	ICIEN	T FOR	UTI	LIZAT	TION I	BY	
AZZA			IN	CONN	ECTI	N MI	TH T H	E CRI	MINAL	PRO	CEEDI	ENGS		
INVOL	VING	ZÜE	BJEC	T IN	THE	UNIT	ED ST	ZBTA	DISTR	ICT	COURT	IdZ .7	NY -	b6 -4
	RECEI	/IV	1G 0	FFIC	ES AF	RE AD	AIZED	THAT	a ALT	ноцс	H IN1	ZA Œ	A	ъ6 -4 ъ7С -4
GENER	RAL PO	LIC	Y M	ATTE	R NO	RMALL	Y INT	ERPOS	ES AN	0BJ	ECTI	N TO		
REVIE	W OF	CL.A	IZZ	FIED	FBI	FILE	Z BY	PERS0	NNEL	ZTUQ	IDE C	F THE	E FBI,	I
FBIH6	INTE	RPO	ZES	NO	OBJE	TION	TO R	EVIEW	of [s	пвје	Z'TS	ASSET	T FILE](x(
BY AL	AZI			TH	IS DE	CISI	ZI NO	BASE	D ON	A DE	TERMI	NATIO	0 N ¬	

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PAGE FOUR DE HQ 0138 S E CRET
AFTER CONTACT BETWEEN PLA AND AUSA. THAT IN THIS
PARTICULAR CASE PERSONAL REVIEW OF THE FILE BY THE AUSA WOULD
ENHANCE HIS UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJECT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
FBI. THUS STRENGTHENING HIS ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY AND
CONFIDENTLY RESPOND TO ANY ALLEGATIONS MADE BY SUBJECT'S
ATTORNEY DURING THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. THE OFFICE OF b6 -1, -4
SECURITY: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: HAS ADVISED
FBIHQ THAT AUSA POSSESSES ALL SECURITY CLEARANCES
NECESSARY TO REVIEW ANY OF THE MATERIALS IN QUESTION IN THIS
MATTER. PLA. NK. IS REQUESTED TO COORDINATE ALL EFFORTS IN
CONNECTION WITH PREPARATION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED AFFIDAVIT AND
TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES ARE FOLLOWED IN
THE DELIVERY OF SUBJECT'S ASSET FILE TO AUSA FOR HIS
PERSONAL REVIEW.
AZUA - EBPL - LL YAM NO
TAHT DEZIVOA

b6 -1, -2, -4 b7c -1, -2, -4 b7D -2



	PAGE FIVE DE HQ 0138 S E R E T		
		FBI	
	TEZZA	_	
	INVOLVEMENT OF A	N SA 66 -1, 67C -1	
	NAMED IN THIS CASE IS UNKNOWN TO NK OR FBIHQ.	b7D −2	
	ON MAY 16, 1983, A REVIEW OF THE ELSUR INDEX REGAR	EDING .	,
	REVEALED THREE REFERENCES UNDER		
b3 -1 b6 -1, -2, -	1		
	-4 PLA NK IS ALSO REQUESTED TO SERVE AS THE COORDINAT	OR OF	
b7E -1	COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN INSTANT MATTER INVOLVING AUSA		
	SDNY AND APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL IN THE RECIPIENT OFFICES) = 	
•	CONTACT POINTS AT FBIHQ ARE SSA SPECIAL STAF	F. INTD	
	EXT. 46773 AND SSA TERRORIST SECTION. CI	D EXT.	
	4575}.		
	NK. NY AND WFO ARE REQUESTED TO REVIEW APPROPRIATE	-	
	FOR CONTACTS WITH SUBJECT AND REFERENCES TO SA	I VIUTEI	5 -1 C -1
	RESULTS TO FBIHQ AND RECIPIENT OFFICES.		

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C-BY-G-3; D-ON: -OADR

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NOTE: BY TELETYPE, DATED MAY 10, 1983, NEW YORK	REQUESTED
GUIDANCE IN HANDLING REQUEST OF AUSA SI	NY TO REVIEW
FBI DOCUMENTS REGARDING FOR	POTENTIAL BRADY
AND SECTION 3500 MATERIAL. (X)	
	ľ
	b6 -3, -4
	57C -3, -4 57D -2
	b7E -14
	•
-£U.}-	
	b6 -3 b7C -3
	b7D -2

. SECRET	* *
	b3 -1
AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION IN	b6 -2, -3 _ b7c -2, -3
CONNECTION WITH INVESTIGATION ENTITLED	b7D −2 b7E −1
} \$\$\frac{1}{2}\$.
THIS TELETYPE REQUESTS THAT PLA. NEWARK ACT AS OVERALL	
COORDINATOR SINCE FORMER CASE AGENT WILL BE REQUIRED	> т◊
PREPARE AN AFFIDAVIT ATTESTING TO THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO	
BRADY OR SECTION 3500 MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE ASSET FILE M	IOR
IS THERE ANY DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING ANTICIPATED ALLEGATION	
ZNBAECT THAT	b6 -1, -3 HE b7C -1, -3 b7D -2
WAS ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE FBI	


THIS RESPONSE HAS BEEN COORDINATED BETWEEN SSA

TERRORISM SECTION: CID AND SSA

INTD. (X)

APPROVED:	Ādn	oratory	
Director Exec. AD-Adm. Excc. AD-Inv. Exec. AD-LES	Crin Iden Insp Intel	at Coun. of Cong. Public Adda o. Mgnt on Server.	ь6 -1 ь7с -1

SPECIAL STAFF.



PAGE TWO. NK SEPRET	T
	b3 -1
	b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3
PROVIDED USE FUL	b7D -2 b7E -1
BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING	
TIT WAS ASCERTAINED THAT	
INFORMATION HAD COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE NEW YORK OFFICE	
T HAT	
	b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3
[BASED ON THIS INFORMATION	b7D −2
NEW AR K	
REVIEW OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN THE INFORMANT FILE	



	THE ABOVE REFERENCED NEW ARK
ELET YPE TO THE BUREAU	∞ NTAINS DETAILS OF
MEETING BETWEEN	HIS ATTORNEY, NEWARK SPECIAL AGENTS
NO REPRESENTATIVES OF	THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.
HROUGH THE COURSE OF TH	HIS MEETING,

COMPLETE DETAILS OF THIS MEETING ARE CONTAINED WITHIN


RE FERENCED NEWARK TELETYPE.

C. BY 4549; DEC : OADR

BT

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-1



SECRET
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PAGE TWO UNCLAS THEW YORK	
	<u> </u>
AGAIN ADVISED	b3 -1
	b6 -2, -3 b7c -2, -3
	b7D -2 b7E -1
ADVISED THAT	
TADVISED IRAI	
	'
NYTEL TO HEADQUARTERS AND ALEXANDRIA DATED JANUARY 8, 1	952,
SET FORTH DETAILS REGARDING INTERVIEW OF BY NEW YOR	% b6 -2, -3 b7C -2, -3
FBI.	b7D −2
FUTURE CONTACTS WITH	
WILL BE SET FORTH IN A LATER COMMUNICATION.	

SEGRET